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Abstract 
 
 
In Tacitus’ treatment of the various military conflicts of 69-70 CE, the military oath of allegiance 
(sacramentum) assumes tremendous significance throughout. The historian pointedly begins his 
narrative with Galba’s failure to properly compensate his soldiers for their loyalty. This 
expectation of financial reward for swearing allegiance, a phenomenon which I call the 
“sacramentum-donativum contract”, arose earlier in the Julio-Claudian period and is still, in 
Tacitus’ view, the bedrock of the soldier-emperor relationship in 69. Vespasian and his close 
supporter Mucianus appreciate this contract and understand the vital role the sacramentum ought 
to play, as the rise of the Flavian challenge in the east demonstrates. Yet, notably, it is instead the 
brutal and greedy campaign of Antonius Primus that allows for Flavian rule. In Histories 4, after 
the civil wars have officially ended, Julius Civilis and his fellow rebel Batavians prove adept at 
administering oaths in order to garner support and subvert loyalties, thereby forcing Roman (and 
reader) to reckon with the source of Flavian power. The extant text ends with no guarantees that 
the new regime will ever strike the correct balance between a soldier’s greed and an emperor’s 
demand for loyalty. In fact, there is every indication that no full reconciliation is on the horizon. 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
 
Usually in Latin literature, the fact that fealty is or has been pledged lurks somewhere in the 
assumed cultural context. If an oath is mentioned, its inclusion is usually incidental, part of the 
textual scenery. This makes perfect sense: oaths were a fact of life in the Roman world. So there 
is really no particular reason to dwell on them.1 Tacitus chooses to dwell. By doing so, he 
transforms an element of interpersonal interaction, usually relegated to the background of 
historiographical narratives, into a prominent motif, imbued with meaning beyond the merely 
documentary.2 Those who have discussed the oaths in Tacitus’ works in past scholarship have 
been almost exclusively concerned with their evidentiary value in the reconstruction of Roman 
institutional history.3 While not without merit, this approach does not do justice to Tacitus’ 
literary craft. As we shall see, the diverse and subtle ways in which the various strata of military 
society in the Histories employ, respond to, embrace, and resist oaths all shed much-needed light 
on the civil war landscape of 69-70 CE.4  
                                                      
1 You might say that to do so would, in some instances, be like sports broadcasters offering commentary during the 
singing of the national anthem.  
2 I do not mean to suggest that Tacitus alone is capable of treating oaths in this way. Studies on other historians’ uses 
of oaths are without doubt also needed. 
3 Scholarly interest in parsing and codifying the precise functions of oaths, their administrators, their recipients, and 
how all three changed over time, dates back at least as far as Mommsen (1871) 792-93. The following is a (certainly 
incomplete) list of attempts to elucidate several aspects of the historical oath, some of which have proved more 
influential than others in the present study, including a brief description of their argument or contribution: 
Premerstein (1914) 36-74 saw a relationship between oaths and imperial clientela. Brunt (1962) 77 emphasizes the 
apparent weakness of oaths to ensure loyalty in the late Republic. Millar (1963), esp. 238, questions the continuity in 
form between the Tiberian accession oaths and what preceded them. Beare (1979) address whether pre-Christian 
emperors received imperial oaths to their Genius. Herrmann (1968) has authored the most recent monograph on the 
subject of imperial oaths, in which he argues, contra Premerstein, that the loyalty oaths of the principate are an 
outgrowth of the conflicts of the late Republic. Though he is too trusting of the objective truth of our evidence, his 
reconstruction of the loyalty oath’s diachronic development is convincing in broad strokes. Watson (1969), esp. 44-
49, argues that the “marked conservatism of Roman religious ritual” (49) explains an alleged continuity of 
sacramentum ritual from the Republic through the late Empire. Lendon (1997) 253 views the sacramentum as a 
transaction of real social utility in the “highly sacralized community” that was the Roman army. Chrissanthos (1999) 
1-12 points out the connection between sacramenta and seditiones in the Republic. Stäcker (2003) 294-306 focuses 
on the oath’s personal and religious dimensions in the bond between miles and princeps. 
4 My attention to Tacitus’ inordinate aversion to treating armies and soldiers as a monolith is owed to Ash (1999), 
one of the first monographs to focus specifically on the Histories, and still one of the most useful.  
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Tacitean oaths do not exist in a vacuum. Rather, they recur repeatedly within a network 
of other components of soldier-elite interactions—genuinely felt loyalty, mutiny, silence, 
ignorance, perception, among others—the sum of which constitutes a large range of the 
historian’s expression. This study proposes to focus in particular on one less-obvious and 
hitherto-unrecognized connection within this interactive network, namely the connection 
between oaths of loyalty and the remuneration of rank-and-file soldiers. Specifically, I argue that 
the Roman soldiers of the Histories pledge their loyalties with the expectation of receiving a 
range of special monetary rewards in exchange. This expectation was born out of the Julio-
Claudian years, and was one of the dominant forces in the post-Neronian fallout (i.e., Histories 
1-4). For Tacitus, Vespasian’s successes and ultimate victory (and the delays thereof) depend 
upon how Galbans, Othonians, Vitellians, and Flavians all handle both the oath itself and the 
rewards expected for it. The nature of these monetary rewards becomes increasingly violent and 
intense as the narrative progresses; what starts as a desire to be justly compensated, as the 
soldiers saw it, turns into flat-out greed. Yet at the most fundamental level, the simple fact that 
the act of swearing loyalty has been so thoroughly “commoditized” is a powerful symbol for the 
potential transience of military loyalty and the social instability of Tacitus’ civil war landscape. 
 
The present study, like so many others of the past generation, stands on the shoulders of 
classicists who, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, began elucidating the ways in which Roman 
historiography participated in the larger project of Roman literary culture.5 Nearly forty years 
ago, T. P. Wiseman showed how the historians employed many of the same techniques of 
persuasion the orators did: rhetorical colorings (colores) allowed the historian not only to make 
                                                      
5 Wiseman (1979) distinguishes between the rhetor’s need to be persuasive and convincing, and the historian’s need 
only to be convincing.  
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the narrative more entertaining, but also more didactic as he saw fit. Using the rhetorical 
technique of inventio, historians were expected to fill in the gaps of what was “known” with 
what was likely, and thus convincing, to their intended audience. A few years later, A. J. 
Woodman applied Wiseman’s and similar observations to Tacitus in particular, demonstrating 
that several elements of the preface of the Histories bear remarkable similarity to Cicero’s recipe 
for “pleasurable history.”6 The implications here are wide ranging: Rome’s writers of history 
might draw from anywhere—not only from what “really happened,” or even only from (flawed) 
unliterary annals and (flawed) previous histories, but also from speeches, poems, cultural 
currents, and their own imaginations—in order to fashion historical meaning and narrative.7 This 
discovery, unsurprisingly, threw the interpretive doors wide open. Tacitean scholars now 
regularly elucidate the historian’s employment of, and debt to his prosaic (primarily 
historiographical) and poetic (primarily epic) predecessors.8 Such intertextual approaches 
expose, guide, and solve points of interpretation on a micro- and macro-level. Indeed, my 
interpretations of the words, phrases, and motifs of the Histories will often be informed by 
contributions made in this arena. 
Yet the present study (with the notable exception of one section in the third chapter)9 is 
not primarily intertextual in orientation. Rather, I seek to discover how Tacitus constructs 
meaning via lexical and thematic relationship within the Histories and (sometimes) within his 
                                                      
6 Woodman (1988), esp. 79-80, 165-66. Cf. Woodman (1979) 154: “It think the reasons for Tacitus’ ‘substantive 
self-imitation’ in Annals 1.61-2 and 64-5 lie…in entertainment. However foreign it may be to us today, historians in 
the ancient world were expected to provide their readers with entertainment, delectatio lectoris, a responsibility of 
which Tacitus expresses himself only too well aware (cf. Annals 4.32.1, 33.2-3).” 
7 Cf. the influential framework proposed by White (1973/2014) 5: “the historical work represents an attempt to 
mediate among what I will can the historical field, the unprocessed historical record, other historical accounts, and 
an audience” (emphasis in original). 
8 For historiographical predecessors, Sallust and Livy in particular, see esp. Woodman (1998) and Ash (1999). For 
epic predecessors, see most recently Joseph (2012) and the many essays collected at Woodman (2012).   
9 See Ch. 3, pp. 112-20. 
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corpus more broadly. One might—and I occasionally will—refer to such relationships between 
scenes by employing the convenient term intratextual. By this I do not mean anything 
particularly technical.10 Repetitions and internal allusions have long been recognized as an 
essential component of Tacitus’ technique.11 One recent study in particular will help frame my 
approach: Cynthia Damon, in an essay on Tacitus’ sustained interest in various themes and 
scene-types (including fides)12 throughout the Histories, concludes that the passages in question 
“are not must-have incidents in the narrative of 69.”13 Rather, Tacitus included them because he 
“wanted the reader to see the parallels and contrasts, not because these events demanded 
inclusion.”14 This is an important point—and one which owes its existence to the discoveries of 
Wiseman and Woodman. Much the same can be said for (failed) oaths and their attending 
complications: they are interesting because they did not need to be included; Tacitus wanted 
them to be. It is up to us to understand why. 
 
It should be stated from the outset that I am not seeking a unifying picture of oaths in the 
Histories, if for no other reason than the fact that we only possess approximately one-third of the 
                                                      
10 Nevertheless, for a good introduction and survey of the topic, see Sharrock (2000), whose 
“unashamedly…theoretical” essay contains the following useful definition: “It is the hypothesis of intratextuality 
that a text’s meaning grows not only out of the readings of its parts and its whole, but also out of readings of the 
relationships between the parts, and the reading of those parts as parts, and parts as relationship (interactive or 
rebarbative): all this both formally (e.g. episodes, digressions, frame, narrative line, etc.) and substantively (e.g. in 
voice, theme, allusion, topos, etc.)—and teleologically” (6-7). 
11 The compellingly clear relationship between the beginnings of Tiberius’ (primum facinus novi principatus fuit 
Postumi Agrippae caedes, “the first crime of the new principate was the slaughter of Postumus Agrippa,” A. 1.6.1) 
and Nero’s (prima novo principatu mors Iunii Silani proconsulis Asiae, “the first death in the new principate 
belonged to Junius Silanus, proconsul of Asia,” A. 13.1.1) principates has been an area of particularly sustained 
interest; see Martin (1955), who cites an even older bibliography, Woodman (1997) 92, and especially Woodman 
(1998) 23-69. O’Gorman (2000) 144-75, esp. 145-46, has analyzed Tacitus’ professed “monotony of destruction” at 
A. 4.33.3 and 16.16.1-2 as a self-conscious magnification of a theme: “Tacitus’ narrative, therefore, expands the 
monotonous repetition, asserting the individuality of the principate’s victims but also highlighting the destructive 
nature of the regime as a repetitive one” (146). 
12 See Ch. 2, pp. 60-61. 
13 Damon (2006) 275. 
14 Damon (2006) 276. 
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full work. Still, the extant text reveals a historian deeply concerned not only with the oath as an 
institution, but with how that institution evolves throughout the Long Year. For that reason, I will 
often seek to make connections between books, arguing for resonances that span long stretches 
of narrative. In order to convey better the diachronic development of oaths, I will adhere to a 
largely chronological structure. Each of my four chapters corresponds roughly to the four fully 
extant books of the Histories. Within each chapter, my tendency is to track the relevant themes 
as they unfold in each acclamation scene, mutiny, campaign, or the like.  
In Chapter 1, the terms of this discussion are more precisely defined. The sacramentum, 
the proper word for the “oath of allegiance” and a favorite word of Tacitus’, is placed within its 
historical context. From the start, the ritual had strong connotations of Republican ideals: loyalty 
to the state and fear of the gods. But by the middle of the Julio-Claudian period, the practice had 
come to embody a different reality: emperors ruled with the consent of the military. Offering 
“gifts” (donativa) in exchange for oaths of allegiance appears to have become commonplace. 
Galba, by refusing to perpetuate this recent yet entrenched tradition (which I refer to as the 
“sacramentum—donativum contract”) in the early days of January 69, drove Rome to civil war 
soon after his principate began. It is no accident, then, that the Histories begins with the breaking 
of oaths and grumbling over missing donatives: the work is about institutional disruption every 
bit as much as military and political conflict. 
Chapter 2 analyzes Vespasian’s acclamation and the inauguration of the Flavian 
challenge in the East. Alone among our sources for these events, Tacitus’ narrative is interested 
in the vital role oaths play in legitimizing the new faction. The Flavians, more than any other 
group in 69, understand that the sacramentum is a tool that, used properly, can transform feelings 
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of genuine loyalty into lasting allegiance and a stable society. Moreover, Vespasian and 
Mucianus realize that donatives are a fact of life, but that excessive generosity corrupts.  
Chapter 3 explores a different side of Flavian success. Antonius Primus, in order to 
preserve the loyalty of his legions, enacts a calculation far more brutal than the contract between 
oaths and gifts of the Julio-Claudians. Merely in exchange for a modicum of control over the 
chaos (oaths, the more formal side of loyalty, have no place in the march toward Rome), Primus 
encourages a different form of “remuneration”: the permission to act upon urges to plunder and 
murder innocents and combatants alike.  
In Chapter 4, the chaos escalates, as Tacitus holds up a mirror to the Flavian faction in 
the form of the Batavian Revolt. Its instigator and leader Julius Civilis, with one foot in the 
barbarian world and one in the Roman, turns the Flavian tactics discussed in the previous 
chapters against his former patron, thereby sparking a crisis of identity worse, ironically, than 
any during the civil war proper. Germans swear sacramenta to Vespasian, while the now-dead 
Vitellius’ legions swear sacramenta to Civilis. Flavian attempts to restore normalcy are undercut 
by their own failure to recognize the importance of the sacramentum-donativum contract. When 
book 4 ends, we have reason to believe that dysfunctional oaths may have persisted into 
Vespasian’s “peace-time” emperorship. 
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Chapter 1 
 
sacramentum: Definition, Evolution, and Rupture 
 
 
When Tacitus employs the word sacramentum, he means one thing: the military oath of 
allegiance sworn by soldiers to emperors, imperial aspirants, and their proxies (OLD s.v. 2a). 
Although sacramentum was the proper term for this type of imperial-era oath, ancient authors—
Tacitus included—often opted for phrases such as in verba adigere or more generic oath terms 
such as iusiurandum (iurare).15 Yet the phenomenon of loyalty oaths merits study in Tacitean 
scholarship for the sheer frequency of the word sacramentum. The historian uses this relatively 
rare term a total of thirty-four times, more than any other classical author; twenty-seven times in 
Histories 1-4. To put that kind of devotion to one word into perspective, the thirty-five extant 
books of Livy’s Ab Urbe Condita contain a mere thirty occurrences. Tacitus, perhaps more than 
any other Roman author, was prone to varying his expressions, even to the point of strained 
periphrasis.16 Thus it is all the more striking how repetitively this same technical term is 
employed. Add then the many times Tacitus uses another word or phrase for the sacramentum, 
and we have in the Histories the most loyalty-oath-obsessed text in Latin literature by far. 
                                                      
15 For the use of iusiurandum to denote a sacramentum, cf., e.g., Liv. 3.20.3-5. Every sacramentum (OLD s.v. 2a) 
was a iusiurandum (OLD s.v. iuro 5), but not every iusiurandum was a sacramentum. Scholars (see, e.g., Herrmann 
(1968) passim, Campbell (1984) 25-26, Rüpke (1990) 76-91, Chrissanthos (2003) 10n36, Pagán (2004) 10-14) have 
argued that “sacramentum” and “iusiurandum” in origin referred to different types of oaths, sometimes couching the 
distinction as one between an older “oath of office/enlistment” (“Diensteid”) and a later-developing “oath of 
loyalty” (“Loyalitätseid”). This line or argument relies heavily on Liv. 22.38.5, who says that, prior to the battle of 
Cannae, there was no other oath than the sacramentum, which hitherto had been voluntary. But then, for the first 
time, another “compulsory oath” (iuris iurandi adactionem) was taken at the behest of the tribunes. It is unclear, 
however, whether or not Livy intends for iuris iurandi adactionem to denote replacement of, or addition to, the 
sacramentum. In any case, Tacitus’ many usages in the Histories demonstrate clearly that the two related ideas of 
“oath of office” and “oath of loyalty” had by his day been fully assimilated. Cf. the conclusion to the discussion at 
Campbell (1984) 26: “It may be concluded, therefore, that when Tacitus employed the term sacramentum, he had in 
mind primarily the traditional military oath [of enlistment], and the oath of allegiance as it applied to soldiers was 
assumed to be part of this.” 
16 Cf. A. 1.65.7, where Tacitus literally refuses to call a spade a spade. 
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The present chapter explores the implications of the word sacramentum and, more 
significantly, the Roman custom it denotes in three ways. In PART 1, I present a brief summary 
of what we think we know about the historical sacramentum. Against that backdrop, I begin to 
define how Tacitus conceives of and uses loyalty oaths in the Histories. Then, in PART 2, I 
argue that, throughout the late Republic and Julio-Claudian periods, the sacramentum developed 
increasingly intimate connections with the custom of giving cash bonuses (donativa, 
“donatives”) to soldiers. Within a relatively short time, paying for oaths appears to have been 
normalized. In PART 3, I approach Galba’s well-known refusal to pay any donatives from the 
perspective of this Julio-Claudian phenomenon. In particular, I argue that Tacitus organizes his 
narrative of the early, messy weeks of the Galba-Otho-Vitellius conflict around failures of 
disembodied institutions that transcend immediate political and military allegiances.  
 
 
Part 1: The sacramentum and Tacitus 
 
 
WHAT IS THE SACRAMENTUM? 
 
 
Although I am interested primarily in the literary functions of oaths in the Histories, it will be 
necessary first to sketch out, to the best of our knowledge, (a) what the sacramentum was, (b) 
how it functioned, and (c) how it changed over time. 
Like any Roman oath, the sacramentum had strong religious connotations.17 Its severity 
was imbedded in the word itself (SACRŌ + -MENTUM): he who swore the oath faced being 
                                                      
17 For a clear statement on the religious nature of Roman oaths (iusiuranda) generally, cf. esp. Cic. Off. 3.104: non 
fuit Iuppiter metuendus ne iratus noceret, qui neque irasci solet nec nocere. haec quidem ratio non magis contra 
Reguli quam contra omne ius iurandum valet. sed in iure iurando non qui metus, sed quae vis sit, debet intellegi; est 
enim ius iurandum affirmatio religiosa; quod autem affirmate quasi deo teste promiseris, id tenendum est. iam enim 
non ad iram deorum, quae nulla est, sed ad iustitiam et ad fidem pertinet. nam praeclare Ennius: ‘O Fides alma 
apta pinnis et ius iurandum Iovis! qui ius igitur iurandum violat, is Fidem violat, quam in Capitolio vicinam Iovis 
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“cursed” (sacer) by the gods called upon to witness it: should the oath ever be broken, the 
transgressor could (theoretically) be killed with impunity.18 None of this is particularly 
surprising, for as Helgeland puts it, “the entirety of Roman military life was imbued with what 
we would call ‘religion.’”19 For the Romans, a military oath was a religious and ritual act, 
performed publicly and according to formulaic elements of language. Once the words were 
spoken, the citizen (civis) was sanctioned, under the law, to participate in military ventures. Such 
sanctioning was of the utmost importance. In the De Officiis, Cicero discusses a letter Cato the 
Elder wrote to his son, warning him not to enter into battle now that he has been discharged from 
his legion and is no longer a miles, “for [Cato the Elder] says that the man who is not legally a 
                                                      
optimi maximi, ut in Catonis oratione est, maiores nostri esse voluerunt (“So far as oaths are concerned, what we 
must grasp is not the fear they induce, but their impact, for swearing an oath is a scrupulous affirmation; you must 
keep the pledge which you made solemnly as though God were witnessing it. What is at issue here is not the anger 
of the gods, which is non-existent, but justice and good faith. As Ennius so splendidly says, ‘O winged Faith with 
kindly eye and oath witnessed by Jupiter!’ So the man who renounces his sworn oath renounces the goddess Faith, 
whom our ancestors decided to set next to Jupiter Best and Greatest on the Capitol, as a speech of Cato attests,” 
trans. Walsh (2000)). The diversity of gods who may be called upon to witness an oath are numerous, especially in 
epic. In the Aeneid, for instance, in what happens to be a poetic version of a sacramentum (cf. Serv. A. 2.157), Sinon 
blusters: vos aeterni ignes, et non violabile vestrum / testor numen, ait, vos arae ensesque nefandi, / quos fugi, 
vittaeque deum, quas hostia gessi: /  fas mihi Graiorum sacrata resolvere iura (“‘I invoke you, eternal flames and 
inviolable divine will,’ he says, ‘and you altars and wicked swords, which I fled, and garlands of the gods, which I 
wore in my role as sacrificial victim: it is divinely right that I break my sacred oaths to the Greeks…’” Verg. A. 
2.154-57). Cf. Austin (1964) 81-82: “Fas est implies not what is compulsory but what is allowable without 
transgressing the law of heaven.” For other Vergilian oaths with various divine invocations, cf. A. 2.27 (Pudor); 
12.195-215 (several different gods), 808-28 (Jupiter).  
18 In our best preserved extant inscription of a Latin loyalty oath (CIL II 172 (=Smallwood (1967) 32; Herrmann 
(1968) 122)), quoted in full below, the people of Aritium in Lusitania call upon Jupiter the Best and Greatest to 
destroy them and their family if they swear falsely. Cf. D.H. 11.43.2: ὅ τε γὰρ ὅρκος ὁ στρατιωτικός, ὃν ἁπάντων 
μάλιστα ἐμπεδοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι, τοῖς στρατηγοῖς ἀκολουθεῖν κελεύει τοὺς στρατευομένους, ὅποι ποτ᾽ ἂν ἄγωσιν, ὅ τε 
νόμος ἀποκτείνειν ἔδωκε τοῖς ἡγεμόσιν ἐξουσίαν τοὺς ἀπειθοῦντας (“Not only does the military oath, which the 
Romans observe most strictly of all oaths, bid the soldiers follow their generals wherever they may lead, but also the 
law has given the commanders authority to put to death without a trial all who are disobedient or desert their 
standards”). French scholars have long noted the meaning inherent in the etymology of sacramentum. Long ago, 
Meillet (1919) 126-27 suggested that sacer, sacramentum, and sancio approximate hagios, hagnos and hazomai, 
defining sancio as, “je donne la garantie religieuse à quelque chose.” He continues: “les sens de tous les mots 
italiques de ce groupe, qui son nombreux, se rattachent à ce sens fundamental.”18 Mohrmann (1958) 236-39 later 
posited that “[d]ans les mots de ce groupe prédomine tantot l’élément religieux (sacer), tantot l’élément juridique 
(sancio).” For a summation of similar language-based perspectives in older German scholarship, see Klingmüller 
(1920) RE 1A2 1669.37-1670.44 (s.v. sacramentum). More recently, Freyburger (1986) 202: “Nous savons en effet 
que les Romains avaient dans le sacramentum un moyen particulièrement contraignant de lier leurs soldats. Le 
terme, plus fort que coniuratio, marque la consequence du serment, qui est de render sacer, ‘maudit,’ celui qui le 
violera.” See also Nicolet (1980) 102-3. On sacer as “accursed” more generally, see, e.g., Beard et al. (1998) 59.   
19 Helgeland (1978) 1501. 
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soldier has no right to be fighting the foe” (negat enim ius esse, qui miles non sit cum hoste 
pugnare, Cic. Off. 1.37). An apparent interpolator elaborates:20 
Popilius imperator tenebat provinciam in cuius exercitu Catonis filius tiro 
militabat. cum autem Popilio videretur unam dimittere legionem, Catonis quoque 
filium, qui in eadem legione militabat, dimisit. Sed cum amore pugnandi in exercitu 
remansisset, Cato ad Popilium scripsit, ut, si eum patitur in exercitu remanere, 
secundo eum obliget militiae sacramento, quia priore amisso iure cum hostibus 
pugnare non poterat. adeo summa erat observatio in bello movendo. (Cic. Off. 
1.36)  
 
The commander Popilius was a provincial governor, and Cato’s son was serving as 
a raw recruit in his army. Popilius decided to discharge one legion, and as Cato’s 
son was serving in it, he was demobilized as well. But the boy was keen on fighting, 
and he remained with the army. So Cato wrote to Popilius stating that if he 
permitted his son to stay in the army, he should bind him to the military by means 
of a second oath of allegiance, for he had forfeited his earlier rights, and could not 
join battle with the enemy. Such was the degree of punctiliousness observed in 
initiating warfare. (trans. Walsh (2000), adapted) 
 
The sacramentum was, in its more idealized and abstract sense, an act of initiation—a rite of 
passage21—possessing the power to transform an ordinary Roman man into a miles and to “bind” 
(obligere) him to that status. As we shall see throughout the present study, Tacitus occasionally 
draws upon and alludes to such “religious” ideas as he constructs his sacramentum narrative. 
More often than not, these ideas are left implied.  
 As our passages from the De Officiis suggest, the sacramentum was trotted out routinely 
in Republican Rome whenever new recruits were levied for campaigning season. The milites 
were “administered an oath of allegiance” (sacramento rogati, Serv. A. 2.157), wherein they 
swore, simply, to obey their commanders, fight “for the state” (pro re publica, Serv. A. 8.1) and 
                                                      
20 See the thorough discussion at Dyck (1996) 143-44, who concludes: “The accumulated linguistic problems make 
it very doubtful that this text can stand” (144). 
21 Cf. Gordon (1972) 94: “The swearing of the oath upon enlistment had the effect of dividing the soldier’s life into 
two periods: his former civilian existence and his present career. As such, the oath became a rite of passage.” For the 
belief that the element of initiation was primary, and the oath itself secondary, see Dölger (1930) 268 and 
Mohrmann (1958) 238-39, who cites as evidence Liv. 39.15.3, 10.38.2; Apul. Met. 11.15. 
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“not to desert their unit, except by order of the consul upon completion of their term of service” 
(non recedere, nisi praecepto consulis post completa stipendia, Serv. ad A. 7.614).22 In this 
period, the mere fact of saying the words seems to have mattered more than who the oath’s 
administrator was, since the polity at large, in whose service the levy was enacted, was the oath’s 
ultimate recipient.23 It should be noted that our evidence for the specific nature of Republican-era 
sacramenta derives almost exclusively from authors of the Augustan era or later. Thus, a 
factually reliable picture cannot be assumed. For instance, Servius’ insistence that the sworn-in 
soldiers “are held for twenty-five years” (viginti et quinque annis tenentur, Serv. ad A. 2.157) is 
certainly an anachronism creeping in from the professional armies of the Imperial period.24 
 As the era of the strongman dawned at the end of the Republic, oaths of allegiance seem 
to have adapted to meet the needs of generals jockeying with one another for power. Looking 
back on the conflict between Sulla and Cinna, imperial authors such as Plutarch and Appian 
represent the oaths sworn to those men as expressions of individual devotion above all else.25 In 
Caesar’s account of his generation’s civil war, Caesarian partisan Curio speaks to recent arrivals 
                                                      
22 For similar prohibitions against desertion, cf. Liv. 22.38.4; D.H. 10.18.2, 11.43.2; Front. Str. 4.1.4; Isid. Etym. 
9.3.53-55. According to the antiquarian Servius (ad A. 2.157), there were tria genera militiae (“three types of 
military campaign”): militia legitima (“standard campaign”), coniuratio (“emergency levy”), and evocatio (“call to 
arms”). The sacramentum seems primarily, perhaps exclusively, to have applied to the militia legitima. The latter 
two types may, in origin, have contained oaths, but were differentiated by their more ad hoc nature. Servius (ad A. 
8.1) alone confirms the formula pro re publica for the sacramentum, but cf. Donatus’ comment (Don. Ter. Eu. 772) 
on Terrence’s apparently colorless line, Simalio, Donax, Syrisce, sequamini (“Simalio, Donax, Syrisce, follow”): 
huiusmodi militia per tumultum repente suscipitur et dicitur evocatio, ubi dux alloquitur cives ‘qui rem pu. salvam 
vultis esse, sequamini!’ (“there is a campaign of this sort, taken up suddenly and tumultuously, called a “calling 
forth,” where the general says to the citizens, ‘those of you who want the state to be safe, follow me!’”). Linderski 
(1984) argues that coniuratio and evocatio referred to different aspects of the same concept, but that the militia 
legitima, the only one of the three certain to have contained a sacramentum, was distinct. Cf. Nicolet (1980) 141-42, 
who considers the coniuratio to be the ancient predecessor of the sacramentum.  
23 Cf. Plb. 6.21.1-3. Brunt (1974) 162-64, contra Mommsen I (1971) 115-19, argues (rightly) that the holder of 
imperium who enacted the levy required permission from the senate to do so. For the power of the principes to hold 
levies, cf. Cass. Dio 53.17.6. 
24 See, e.g., Smith (1958) 29-33 and Linderski (1984). 
25 For Sulla, cf. Plut. Sull. 27.4. For Cinna, cf. App. BC 1.66 and Suet. Caes. 23.2, with Herrmann (1968) 56. See 
also Brice (2003) 54n165 and 56. 
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from the Pompeian faction about the need to take a new oath now that they are with Caesar.26 In 
short, loyalty to person came to supersede loyalty to office. Unsurprisingly, during the 
Principate, the “personalization” of the oath only intensified, as Octavian Augustus and his 
successors continued to stockpile the powers and prerogatives of military rule.27 The oath, in 
fact, became synonymous in this period with expressing undying loyalty to the imperial person.28 
When we arrive at the Galba of the Histories, Tacitus writes that the mutinous legions of 
Germany, lacking an obvious human recipient for their new oath, address it to the senatus 
populique Romani—“a formulation already having fallen into disuse” (obliterata iam nomina, 
1.55.4).  
We know from an accession oath inscription preserved from Caligula’s reign—the only 
loyalty oath in Latin preserved more or less in tact—that the swearers of these personalized oaths 
pledged an intense level of personal devotion: 
           C. Ummidio Durmio Quadratio 
 leg(ato) C. Caesaris Germanici imp(eratoris) 
                         pro praet(ore). 
Iusiurandum Aritiensium 
Ex mei animi sententia, ut ego iis inimicus 
ero, quos C. Caesari Germanico inimicos esse 
cognovero, et si quis periculum ei salutiq(ue) eius 
in[f]ert in[f]er[e]tque, armis bello internecivo 
terra mariq(ue) persequi non desinam, quoad 
poenas ei persolverit, neq(ue) me <neque> liberos meos 
eius salute cariores habebo, eosq(ue) qui in 
                                                      
26 Caes. BC 2.32.8-10. Cf. also 1.23 and 76 with Campbell (1984) 20-21. 
27 On the personal orientation of the sacramentum in the Imperial era as an outgrowth of the Late Republic, see esp. 
Herrmann (1968) 55-89 and Stäcker (2003) 293-94. Watson (1969) 44-50 emphasizes the continuity in our sources 
from the Republic through the late Empire, which in his view is not surprising given the “marked conservatism of 
Roman religious ritual (49).” Before the discovery of an inscription of a loyalty oath in Greek from Tiberius’ 
emperorship in (IGR III 137=Herrmann (1968) 123), all three of our surviving inscriptions (CIL II 172, CIL XI 
6998a, and IGR IV 251) were all from the time of Caligula, which emphasis to be placed on the oath as a Caligulan 
phenomenon; see Briscoe (1971) 260. 
28 For the best example of a personal oath under Augustus, cf. Aug. Anc. 25 (discussed below) and Cass. Dio 50.6.5, 
57.3.2. According to Suetonius (Cal. 15.3), Caligula dared to expand the oath to include his sisters as well. For a 
general statement on the personalized nature of the military oath in the early empire, cf. Epict. 1.14.15, with 
Campbell (1984) 24.  
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eum hostili animo fuerint, mihi hostes esse 
ducam; si s[cie]ns fa[ll]o fefellerove, tum me 
liberosq(ue) meos Iuppiter Optimus Maximus ac 
Divus Augustus ceteriq(ue) omnes di immortales 
expertem patria incolumitate fortunisque 
omnibus faxint.        [a. d.] V Idus Mai(as) in 
Aritiense oppido veteri Cn. Acerronio 
 Proculo C. Petronio Pontio Nigrino cos. 
 […]    (CIL II 172=Smallwood (1967) 32=Herrmann (1968) 122)29 
 
To Gaius Ummidius Durmius Quadratus,  legate of Gaius Caesar Germanicus 
Imperator  with pro praetorian power.  Oath of the Aritiensians:  It is in 
accordance with my inner convictions that I will be an enemy to those  who I come 
to learn are enemies to Gaius Caesar Germanicus,  and if danger to him or to his 
welfare  is brought or will be brought by anyone, with armed might and war of 
extermination  on land and sea I will never cease to pursue him until  he pays the 
penalty to [Caesar]. Neither myself nor my children  will I consider dearer than 
his welfare, and those who  will have hostile intentions toward him, I will consider 
my enemies;  if knowingly I swear or will swear falsely, then  may Jupiter the 
Best and the Greatest and  the deified Augustus and all the other immortal  gods 
deprive me and my children of our motherland, our safety, and all our fortunes.  
On the fifth [day before] the Ides of May in the  old town of Aritium when Gnaeus 
Acerronius  Proculus and Gaius Petronius Pontius Nigrinus were consuls (37 CE). 
[…] (trans. Sherk (1988), adapted)30 
 
We may note the prominence of the imperial namesake (C. Caesari Germanico), the professed 
subordination of one’s self and offspring to that one individual (neq(ue) me <neque> liberos 
meos eius salute cariores habebo), the overwhelmingly strong concern for the emperor’s 
personal safety (inimicos; periculum; salutiq(ue) eius; eius salute), and the acceptance of a bitter 
fate upon the event of the oath’s violation (si s[cie]ns fa[ll]o fefellerove, tum me liberosq(ue) 
meos Iuppiter Optimus Maximus ac Divus Augustus ceteriq(ue) omnes di immortales 
                                                      
29 Roller (2001) 59-60 notes that this oath’s identification of the emperor’s enemies (inimicus…inimicos…hostes) as 
the swearer’s enemies is echoed at Luc. 1.373-86, when Laelius uses “alienating rhetoric” in his fervent oath of 
loyalty to Caesar; cf. Luc. 7.318-22. 
30 Cf. Suet. Cal. 15.3: de sororibus auctor fuit, ut omnibus sacramentis adiceretur: ‘neque me liberosque meos 
cariores habebo quam Gaium habeo et sorores eius’ (“As for his sisters, Caligula ordered that the following words 
be added to all loyalty oaths: ‘neither myself nor my children will I consider dearer than Gaius and his sisters’”).  
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expertem patria incolumitate fortunisque omnibus faxint). It is no wonder, then, that every new 
princeps wanted a new oath of his own upon his accession (see PART II).  
 
SACRAMENTUM, SEDITIO, AND FIDES: A TACITEAN NEXUS 
 
 
When he composed the Histories, Tacitus inherited the historical and cultural baggage sketched 
above. A historian prone to taking the long view, he was certainly not unaware of, or 
uninterested in, a custom that persisted into his own era, and that continued to be vested with real 
significance.31 Yet Tacitus adapts what he inherits in the service of crafting his own literary 
environment. In PART 3 of this chapter, we shall explore in depth how Tacitus marshals the plot 
of Histories 1 around the sacramentum (not) sworn upon Galba’s accession. But first, let us 
briefly establish a blueprint for how our historian situates the sacramentum in relation to other 
themes and motifs central to his narrative of civil war. To that end, three interconnected passages 
in Histories 1 will serve us well: 
(1) paucis post kalendas Ianuarias diebus Pompei Propinqui procuratoris e 
Belgica litterae adferuntur, superioris Germaniae legiones rupta sacramenti 
reverentia imperatorem alium flagitare et senatui ac populo Romano arbitrium 
eligendi permittere, quo seditio mollius acciperetur. (1.12.1) 
 
A few days after the kalends of January, word was sent from Belgium by the 
procurator Pompeius Propinquus that the legions of Upper Germany had broken 
their respect for the oath of allegiance in demanding a new emperor, and that, 
in order that their mutiny be treated more leniently, they were entrusting the 
authority of choosing [a replacement] to the senate and people of Rome. 
 
(2) infecit ea tabes legionum quoque et auxiliorum motas iam mentes, postquam 
volgatum erat labare Germanici exercitus fidem. (1.26.1) 
 
                                                      
31 Our best evidence for the persisting relevance of the sacramentum in Tacitus’ time his comes from contemporary 
and friend Pliny the Younger, whose Panegyricus, in honor of Trajan upon his imperial accession (Pan. 64-65, 70) 
records a civilian oath ceremony, and whose letter to the emperor in 110/111, note provincial soldiers’ enthusiasm 
upon the military oath’s renewal (Ep. 10.52, 53). On Tacitus’ relationship with Pliny, see esp. Whitton (2012). On 
Tacitus’ engagement with Republican civil wars in the Histories, see the recent discussions by Ash (2010b) and 
Joseph (2012).  
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The rot [i.e., mutinous sentiment] infected the already disturbed minds of both 
the legions and the auxiliaries, after the news broke that the loyalty of the 
German army was faltering. 
 
(3) nec cuiquam ultra fides aut memoria prioris sacramenti, sed quod in 
seditionibus accidit, unde plures erant, omnes fuere. (1.56.1) 
 
No one had loyalty or memory of their earlier oath of allegiance, but, as happens 
in mutinies, everyone stood with the majority. 
 
All three of these passages refer to the same event—German legionaries refusing to 
renew their oath of allegiance to the new emperor Galba in the first few days of January 69. In 
passage (1), Tacitus links two concepts together: (a) the military, insurrectionary separation 
(seditio) of the German legions from their patron, the emperor Vitellius; and (b) the violation of 
the oath (rupta sacramenti reverentia).32 For Tacitus, the constant, multi-faceted discord between 
different strata of military society operates on an abstract and concrete level—or, perhaps more 
accurately, on a religious and political level—simultaneously.  
By pitting seditio against sacramentum, Tacitus operates on well-trodden Roman ground. 
Stefan Chrissanthos, in his study of mutinies in the Republic, asserts that to break the 
sacramentum was to commit seditio—and vice-versa.33 Indeed, inasmuch as a seditio was, at 
root, an act of removal or desertion (SĒ(D), “apart” + EŌ, “to go”),34 there is considerable 
evidence, preserved in literary allusions to the oath’s actual content, that substantiates Tacitus’ 
formulation at 1.12.1. In one representative passage, Livy explains that the Roman infantry and 
cavalry, drawn up in ranks, “swore that they would not quit their ranks in flight or out of fear, but 
only in order to retrieve or find a weapon and either strike an enemy or save a citizen with it” 
                                                      
32 My recognition of the importance of seditio in the Histories is owed to Manolaraki (2003). 
33 Chrissanthos (1999) 1 and 12, who engages with Brunt’s (1962) discussion of the many motivating factors in 
Republican soldiers’ loyalty (e.g., religious piety, the desire for land upon discharge, etc.). For a skeptical view, see 
Brice (2003) 55n169. 
34 Cf. OLD s.v. seditio. 
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(coniurabant sese fugae atque formidinis ergo non abituros neque ex ordine recessuros nisi teli 
sumendi aut petendi et aut hostis feriendi aut civis servandi causa, Liv. 22.38.4). The historical 
authenticity of Livy’s formulation seems assured by the frequency with which the same phrases 
and sentiments crop up in a diverse array of texts.35  
It has become increasingly evident in recent decades just how deeply ingrained and 
complex were the concepts of civil war, internecine strife, and mutiny in the intellectual and 
literary climate of the Principate generally, and in Tacitus in particular.36 In the present study, by 
highlighting a further manifestation of these Tacitean themes—namely, the breakage of the 
sacramentum—I hope to contribute to our understanding of this area of Tacitean historiography.   
In passages (2) and (3) quoted above, Tacitus expands the semantic and conceptual scope 
of the sacramentum even further to include fides (OLD s.v. 8 “loyalty, allegiance”). In passage 
(2), labare…fidem is a reference to, and periphrastic variation on, seditio (1).37 The juxtaposition 
in passage (3) between the state of fides and the memory of an earlier sacramentum crystalizes 
and legitimizes an important assumption of this study: when Tacitus uses the word sacramentum, 
                                                      
35 Front. Str. 4.1.4: ceterum ipse inter se coniurabant se fugae atque formidinis causa non abituros neque ex ordine 
recessuros nisi teli petendi feriendive hostis aut civis servandi causa (“But they swore an oath among themselves 
that they would not depart out of flight or fear, and that they would not desert their post except to fetch a weapon or 
strike an enemy, or save a fellow citizen”). D.H. 10.18.2: ἐπεὶ δὲ κωλύσειν αὐτὸν ἔλεγον οἱ δήμαρχοι στρατοῦ 
ποιεῖσθαι καταγραφήν, συναγαγὼν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἐκκλησίαν εἶπεν, ὅτι πάντες ὀμωμόκασι τὸν στρατιωτικὸν ὅρκον, 
ἀκολουθήσειν τοῖς ὑπάτοις ἐφ᾽ οὓς ἂν καλῶνται πολέμους, καὶ μήτε ἀπολείψειν τὰ σημεῖα μήτε ἄλλο πράξειν μηθὲν 
ἐναντίον τῷ νόμῳ: παραλαβὼν δὲ τὴν ὑπατικὴν ἐξουσίαν αὐτὸς ἔχειν ἔφη κρατουμένους ἅπαντας τοῖς ὅρκοις 
(“When the tribunes said they would not permit him to enroll an army, he called an assembly of the populace and 
declared that since they had all taken the military oath, swearing that they would follow the consuls in any wars to 
which they should be called and would neither desert the standards nor do anything else contrary to law, and since 
he had assumed the consular power, he held them all bound to him by their oaths”). Cf. D.H. 11.43.2; Serv. ad A. 
7.614; Isid., Etym. 9.3.53-55, with Linderski (1984) 76.  
36 On the phenomenon of seditio in Tacitus, see esp. Keitel (1984), Ash (1999), O’Gorman (2000) 24-39, 
Manolaraki (2003), Woodman (2006), Joseph (2012).  
37 Livy is especially fond of this labare metaphor: cf. 22.61.10 (the wavering of Roman loyalty at Cannae), 27.1.5 
(the alleged wavering of Herdonia’s loyalty to Hannibal), and 32.30.9 (the weakening of the loyalty of the Insubres), 
all cited at Damon (2003) 155. 
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he is not simply referring in some artistic or metaphorical sense to loyalty itself; he means rather 
the act of swearing, past or present, or the absence thereof.  
As we round out our lexical and conceptual nexus, one further passage in Histories 1 
ought to be considered. Otho, hoping to consolidate his position around the empire at the 
beginning of his reign, encounters obstacles: 
primus Othoni fiduciam addidit ex Illyrico nuntius, iurasse in eum Dalmatiae ac 
Pannoniae et Moesiae legiones. idem ex Hispania adlatum laudatusque per 
edictum Cluvius Rufus; et statim cognitum est conversam ad Vitellium Hispaniam. 
ne Aquitania quidem quamquam ab Iulio Cordo in verba Othonis obstricta, diu 
mansit. nusquam fides aut amor: metu ac necessitate huc illuc mutabantur. (1.76.1) 
 
The first thing that boosted Otho’s confidence was a messenger from Illyricum who 
reported that the Dalmatian, Pannonian and Moesian legions had sworn allegiance 
to him. The same news arrived from Spain, and Cluvius Rufus was praised in an 
edict. But it was soon learned that Spain had been converted over to Vitellius. Not 
even Aquitania, though it had been bound to Otho by oath by Iulius Cordus, stayed 
around long. Nowhere was there loyalty or affection: out of fear and necessity, the 
provinces were shifting this way and that. 
 
Once again, Tacitus couples another concept adjacent to fides, namely amor, thereby implicitly 
honing his definitions. Loyalty, implies Tacitus, is not the same thing as affection, but the two 
are certainly connected. The fides (or lack thereof) in this passage is part of the internal, 
emotional life of the soldier. The sacramentum, on the other hand, is something that has been 
forced upon (obstricta) the Aquitanian legions—an external fact of a soldier’s experience which 
may or may not reflect his true feelings.38 Here, in the absence of fides, the imposed 
sacramentum could not last long (ne…quidem…diu mansit).  
As we shall see throughout this study, Tacitus is fond of producing conflict and 
heightening dramatic tension by juxtaposed the absence or superficiality of one concept with the 
presence or substantiality of the other. In other words, a change of oath may not always reflect a 
                                                      
38 For this sense of obstringere (OLD s.v. 4 “to bind”), cf. 1.54.3; A. 1.14. The issue of coerced oaths will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 2. 
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genuine change in loyalty; nor, by the same token, does a new oath always appear the moment a 
new loyalty forms. Oaths can outpace loyalty, just as loyalty can outpace oaths. In the Tacitean 
environment, the sacramentum is a tool by whose means fides—and therefore political and 
military power—is variously acknowledged, manufactured, and coerced. 
 
Even if we were to confine our discussion to Tacitus alone, the myriad roles and manifestation of 
fides/Fides in imperial society and culture is far too vast and open-ended a subject to do justice 
here.39 Thus, in the present study we will confine our attention to Tacitus’ tendency to identify 
mutinies and broken oaths with the absence and/or disintegration of this cardinal virtue. 
   
PART 2: The sacramentum-donativum Contract  
 
 
Oaths of allegiance are not the only oaths which the term sacramentum denotes in Classical 
Latin. In a legal context, it may refer either to an oath in a lawsuit where money is staked by both 
parties; or to the money itself in such a lawsuit (OLD s.v. 1).40 The jurist Gaius explains that the 
sacramentum was a civil suit in which an amount of money was put up as collateral by both 
parties. The loser of the suit lost his money, which went to the public treasury (Gai. Inst. 4.12-
14).41 If we are to understand how the same term could have applied, on the one hand, to a ritual 
with overtones of the divine, and, on the other hand, to a mechanism of civil law by which 
                                                      
39 For a good formal discussion of the sacramentum as an aspect of fides (in the Republic), see Freyburger (1986) 
200-6. On fides in the Histories, see Shotter (1991) 3324, and more recently Damon (2006), and Keitel (2006) 262-
66. 
40 Cf. Var. L. 5.180. 
41 Cf. Paul. Fest. p.344M; Cic. Rep. 2.60, Fam. 7.32.2. Hickson (1993) 112 summarizes the theory: “[O]aths also 
played a part in the judicial system of Rome. The most common form of early legal action (legis actio) required the 
deposit of a sum of money by both parties to a suit; the loser’s money was forfeited to the state. The term for this 
deposit, sacramentum, has led many scholars to suggest that it was derived from an earlier proceeding in which the 
sacramentum, as its name implies, was actually an oath. In that situation the party whose oath was proven false was 
obligated to make an expiatory offering to the gods.” For this type of sacramentum, see also Kaser (1971). 
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monies regularly passed from private hands to public coffers, we must first realize that the 
military oath of allegiance also in effect had a monetary component.  
Already by the final gasps of the Republic, the loyalties of armies at times appear like 
little more than purchasable commodities. Yet, as we shall see, it took several decades of 
imperial rule for emperors to resort to outright bribery. According to our extant sources, both 
Claudius and his emulator Nero gave “donatives” (donativa)—i.e., lump-sum cash bonuses— 
to soldiers in exchange for their initial oaths of fealty.42 Such formal transfer of wealth from 
imperial coffers to private hands reverses Gaius’ legal definition of sacramentum. Henceforth, 
for the sake of convenience, I will occasionally refer to this cash-for-loyalty phenomenon as the 
“sacramentum-donativum contract.” When the crisis of 69 CE erupted, this contract was the 
operating model Galba and other power-players of that year were forced to reckon with.  
My overall argument in PART 2 is not primarily historical in orientation; I make little 
attempt to deduce how emperors and soldiers actually behaved. Rather, my intention is to 
elucidate how Roman (and Greek) authors used oaths to express the evolving relationship 
between Julio-Claudian ruler and subject. The sacramentum, in other words, is a mechanism to 
explore the shifts in the style and substance of imperial rule.  
 
THE EARLY EVIDENCE 
 
 
Before turning to the Julio-Claudians, let us consider the possible Republican roots of the 
“monetized” sacramentum (OLD s.v. 2). Though the primary aims of PART 2 are literary in 
orientation, in this first section a historical survey of the evidence is attempted. 
                                                      
42 On the role of donatives amid the reciprocal relationships between the Julian-Claudians and their subjects 
generally, see the brief discussions at Millar (1977) 195-96, Veyne (1990) 334-43, Roller (2001) 174, and Stäcker 
(2001) 389-97.   
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We will recall that, for Tacitus, a mutiny (seditio) is roughly synonymous with the 
breaking of a sacramentum. Thus, Stefan Chrissanthos’ thorough study of the causes and 
resolutions of the mutinies of the Republic (ca. 590-40 BCE) furnishes us with an excellent 
starting point for exploring the relationship between money and oaths in the Histories.43 Out of 
forty-six mutinies he studied, eighteen (39%) were motivated by the soldiers’ concern for 
personal wealth in the form of land grants, tax relief, salary hikes, or the distribution of 
plundered wealth.44 In the early (590-280 BCE) and middle (280-90 BCE) Republican periods, 
when the monetary causes of mutiny were primarily in the less cash-oriented realm of land 
grants, debt relief, and tax relief, most such mutinies ended in failure.45 The collective power of 
the common soldier had not yet risen sufficiently to leverage their loyalty into material gain. In 
the Late Republic (90-40 BCE), however, more than half46 of the “monetary” mutinies were 
motivated by a desire for back pay (stipendium), plunder (praeda), and bonuses (donativum). 
Notably, during the 50s and 40s, most such mutinies were successful.47 Furthermore, all the 
successful mutinies occur from 55-44 BCE, the very end of the period studied. 
This statistical breakdown is not surprising. It was no doubt true that the Struggle of the 
Orders contained several moments when the military tribunes, working on behalf of the 
commons, stifled the administration of oaths, blocked the levying of troops, and led secessions 
from the polity in order to leverage the lower rungs of society into a better position. Even the 
                                                      
43 Much of the content and structure of this section derives from Chrissanthos (1999) passim. 
44 See Chrissanthos (1999) 166-69 for a discussion of the many possible “underlying causes” of mutinies, as well as 
a breakdown of money as a cause into separate categories. He divides the causation of the 90-40 BCE mutinies into 
three “stages”: (1) underlying, preexisting causes; (2) “the conditions that provided the circumstances necessary for 
these causes to come to the surface”; (3) “the spark that ignited the mutiny.” On this topic, see also Brunt (1962). 
45 The only unmitigated successes are in 494 BCE when the First Secession results in the creation of the tribunate 
(Liv. 2.24-34; D.H. 6.23-28) and at Sucro in 206 BCE when P. Cornelius Scipio grants the soldiers back-pay.  
46 Six of ten, to be exact. 
47 Chrissanthos (1999) 158: The success rate for all mutinies between 90 and 40 BCE was quite high at twenty-two 
out of thirty. 
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mutiny resulting in the creation of the tribunate itself was sparked by unrest over unfair financial 
policies.48 But it was in the late Republic—as soldiers’ loyalties increasing lay with individuals 
rather than the offices they held, and as the competition for those loyalties became a fact of life 
under near-constant civil war—that a soldier’s pledge of fealty began to be treated as a 
commodity.  
During most of the Republic, donatives were reserved for rewarding soldiers upon 
military victories.49 When armies mutinied for money, they were primarily simply seeking 
payments—in the form of either salaries or spoils of war—that had been unfairly withheld.50 
However, when civil war is again taken up in the 40s, and as the frequency and severity of 
mutinies increases considerably, the generosity of the generals and the boldness of the soldiers 
likewise increases. Caesar, ever the careful cultivator of his own image, declined to discuss two 
mutinies that his civil war campaign suffered in 49 BCE at Placentia and again in 47 BCE in 
Italy. However, several later sources discuss them at length. Whereas Scipio’s men at Sucro 
wanted a share of the wealth obtained from plundering a foreign enemy,51 the civil war soldiers 
at Placentia (49 BCE) wanted to plunder friendly soil.52 According to Appius, the soldiers were 
also angry because Caesar had not paid the small donative (δωρεάν, App. BC 2.191) of five 
minae which the general had promised them. Cassius Dio describes the soldiers’ greed thus: 
“their hope was to obtain from him anything and everything, inasmuch as he stood in so great 
need of them” (Cass. Dio 41.26).  
                                                      
48 Cf. Liv. 2.24-34; D.H. 4.49-55, 6.23-28, 31-32, with Chrissanthos (1999) 14-15. 
49 See Brunt (1962) 77. 
50 For examples numerous, see Chrissanthos (1999) 68-88. According to Plut. Sull. 27.3, when his soldiers made a 
voluntary oath of loyalty to him upon landing in Tarentum, they also offered to give their money to him!   
51 As Chrissanthos (1999) 127 shows, although our sources of this mutiny use the episode as a demonstration of 
Caesar’s skilled control of his troops, in actual fact “Caesar did not quell the mutiny at all but was forced to give in 
to all of the soldiers’ demands.” 
52 Cf. Luc. 5.244-48. 
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Though Caesar was able to quell the mutiny at Placenta by executing the ringleaders, two 
years later another legion mutinied at Rome. According to Appius (App. BC 2.92), past promises 
of “vague” (ἀόριστα) rewards after the Pharsalus and Africa campaigns were never fulfilled. So, 
when Caesar tried to end the sedition by promising a donative of another 1000 drachmas to every 
man, the mutineers declared that they were only in interested in cold hard cash, not promises 
thereof (App. BC 2.92). Caesar himself confirms that the allegedly unfulfilled promises made in 
the Africa campaign were in the form of donatives (largitionis, Caes. BC 2.28). He even relates 
that these promises were intended to reinforce the soldiers’ memory of the oath (sacramenti) 
they had sworn (Caes. BC 2.28).53 Similarly, Suetonius’ description of the rewards Caesar 
promised to his legions after crossing the Rubicon suggests the context of an already sworn oath, 
now appealed to: pro contione fidem militum flens ac ueste a pectore discissa inuocauit (“at an 
assembly, while crying and rending his clothes, he invoked the troops’ loyalty,” Suet. Caes. 33). 
Ancient authors agree that these mutineers got paid what they were owed in the end.54 Thus, 
even at this early date, there is evidence that the symbolic binding power of the sacramentum 
was giving way to matters of money. 
 
THE EVOLUTION FROM TIBERIUS TO NERO 
 
Overview 
Close analysis of Tacitus’ Annals and other sources, especially Suetonius, reveals an ancient 
perspective on the Julio-Claudians not hitherto recognized—namely, that that era saw a gradual 
                                                      
53 For other, less explicit passages in Caesar which merely hint at a connection between money and oaths, see BC. 
1.23 and 85-86. 
54 Chrissanthos (1999) 135n515 provides a list of the relevant passages; cf. Plut. Caes. 51, Cass. Dio 42.54, App. BC 
2.94, Suet. Caes. 70. 
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debasement of the intrinsic value of the sacramentum over time.55 Following Tacitus’ lead, we 
begin our discussion with Tiberius’ accession. In the second princeps, Tacitus portrays a cautious 
man reluctant to deviate from the unpurchased oaths of Augustan propaganda. Tiberius’ primary 
concern is appearing to be honoring the legacy of his predecessor. After Tiberius, the power of 
the Augustan attitudes toward oaths appear to dissipate. Though the loss of Annals 6-10 deprives 
us of Tacitus’ accounts of the inauguration of Caligula’s and Claudius’ reign, according to 
Suetonius, Claudius “was the first of the Caesars who resorted to bribery to secure the fidelity of 
the troops” (primus Caesarum fidem militis etiam praemio pigneratus, Suet. Cl. 10). Suetonius’ 
assessment certainly conforms with Tacitus’ Tiberian narrative. Furthermore, Annals 12-16 
contain indications that, by the age of Nero, loyalty through bribery had become the custom in 
the land.  
 
Tiberius  
 
Tacitus’ inaugural account of Agrippa Postumus’ murder—“the first crime of the new 
principate” (primum facinus novi principatus, A. 1.6.1)—introduces two notions that will recur 
throughout the Tiberian hexad: (1) Tiberius wants to give his actions the appearance of following 
Augustus’ wishes (“he was pretending there were orders from his father,” patris iussa simulabat, 
A. 1.6.1);56 (2) the crimes of Tiberius’ reign will not be punished, since Rome’s political class 
has been cowed into submission (“At Rome the consuls, senators, and knights rushed into 
servility,” at Romae ruere in servitium consules patres eques, A. 1.7.1).  
                                                      
55 Veyne (1990) 334-43, who provides the first study of the function of donativa, comes closest to seeing the 
particular connection between oaths and gifts, but stops short of the sort of explicit oath-gift reciprocity argued for in 
this study. Furthermore, he mistakenly downplays the personal relationship between soldiers and emperors: “Apart 
from military ceremonial and inspections, the Emperor’s relationship with his soldiers was as impersonal as with the 
mass of his officials. … The fact remains that, although not a citizen army, neither was the Imperial army a band of 
liegemen devoted to their leader, the sovereign” (335). 
56 According to Tacitus’ assessment, it is more credible (propius) that Tiberius and Livia were responsible for the 
murder (1.6.2).  
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With the tone of the first days of Tiberius’ emperorship thus set, Tacitus describes a 
different, more official sort of inaugural moment: 
Sex. Pompeius et Sex. Appuleius consules primi in verba Tiberii Caesaris iuravere, 
apudque eos Seius Strabo et C. Turrianus, ille praetoriarum cohortium praefectus, 
hic annonae; mox senatus milesque et populus. [3] nam Tiberius cuncta per 
consules incipiebat, tamquam vetere re publica; et, ambiguus imperandi, ne 
edictum quidem quo patres in curiam vocabat nisi tribuniciae potestatis 
praescriptione posuit sub Augusto acceptae.57 (A. 1.7.2-3) 
 
Sextus Pompeius and Sextus Appuleius as consuls were the first to swear allegiance 
to Tiberius Caesar, and in their presence Seius Strabo and C. Turranius, the former 
being prefect of the praetorian cohorts, the latter of the food supply; next came the 
senate, soldiery and the people. [3] For, in fact, Tiberius initiated everything 
through the consuls, as though it were the old republic; and, being ambivalent about 
commanding, even when he posted the edict by which he summoned the fathers to 
the curia, he headed it only with the tribunician power received under Augustus.58 
   
This scene, though perhaps not obviously compelling, is in fact infused with the quiet drama of 
the first imperial succession.59 A detailed re-examining of its precise language will lead to a 
deeper understand of the development of the Tacitean sacramentum. The semi-colon in the 
above translation after tamquam vetere re publica follows A. J. Woodman, who recognizes that 
et ambiguus imperandi begins a new thought.60 In some other respects, however, our 
interpretations of the passage part ways. Woodman translates the phrase Tiberius cuncta per 
consules incipiebat as “Tiberius’ entire start was through the consuls,” explaining it as “a 
forward reference to the formal motion which the consuls placed before the senate at its second 
meeting [at] 1.13.4.”61 I, on the other hand, suggest that nam, which Woodman translates “and in 
                                                      
57 Punctuation follows Woodman (1998) 67. 
58 Translation adapted from Woodman (2004) 5, with some key alterations (See below). 
59 Commentators have tended to focus on categorizing and defining the historical parameters of oath, rather than 
determine its role in the narrative; see Mommsen III (1887) 792-93, von Premerstein (1937) 73-74, Millar (1963) 
328. For a useful summary of their positions, see Goodyear (1972) 138-39. 
60 Woodman (2004) 5n18. I have also changed the Latin punctuation in Heubner’s text to reflect this. 
61 Woodman (2004) 5n18 (emphasis in the original); for the full argument of the passage’s structure, see Woodman 
(1998) 66-69. Though I disagree with Woodman’s article on this one point, his ability to see beyond inherited 
communis opinio about Tiberius is impressive. 
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fact,” be taken to introduce a common explanatory clause (OLD s.v. 2 “for”), and that Tiberius 
cuncta per consules incipiebat thus be read closely with the description of the sacramentum 
immediately preceding it.62 In that case, incipiebat, a transitive verb with Tiberius as subject, 
would neatly pick up on the idea of the primacy (primi) of the consular oaths in the previous 
sentence. With cuncta, Tacitus gathers “all” the various sacramenta of the previous sentence—
consular, praetorian, senatorial, and military, in that order—and subordinates them to Tiberius’ 
designs. I therefore propose the following expansive paraphrase of A. 17.2-3: various individuals 
and groups, beginning with the consuls, swore an oath of allegiance to Tiberius. They swore their 
oaths in this manner—i.e., with the consuls swearing first—because Tiberius had arranged it that 
way (incipiebat). That way, the whole affair would have the veneer of an old-fashioned oath 
from a time before the principate.  
If this interpretation of A. 1.7.2-3 is correct, the full implications are profound. Tiberius, 
not the consuls, had ultimate control over the oath-taking process. But, mindful of the traditional 
power of the consuls, he allowed them to make the first move. Thus, Tacitus creates tension 
between the authority Tiberius actually possessed, and the deference to tradition the new 
emperor wanted to cultivate. Yet, by introducing the following sequence with ambiguus 
imperandi, Tacitus reminds us that Tiberius’ devotion to controlling Roman affairs is far from 
absolute. 
                                                      
62 The explanatory nam is plentiful in Tacitus, as one might expect. Perhaps the most prominent instance occurs in 
the second sentence of the Histories (nam post conditam urbem…, 1.1.1). Cf. Sailor (2008) 122: “nam…has much 
work to do, and the words that follow it assure that the reasons for beginning here and not elsewhere are big and 
important and fit into a grand scheme.” 
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The language used for the oath-taking itself, in verba Tiberii Caesaris iuravere, finds an 
almost identical antecedent in Augustus’ commemoration of his own accession to unprecedented 
power:63  
iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte sua, et me belli, quo vici ad Actium, ducem 
depoposcit; iuraverunt in eadem verba provinciae Galliae, Hispaniae, Africa, 
Sicilia, Sardinia. (Aug. Anc. 25)  
 
All of Italy of its own accord swore allegiance to me, and demanded that I be the 
general in the war which I waged victoriously at Actium. The Gallic and Spanish 
provinces, Africa, Cilicia, and Sardinia swore the same oath. 
 
Here, in his own version of events published for the world to see, Augustus states that the Italian 
oaths sworn in his name were the result of spontaneous support from the masses (sponte sua). 
Suetonius, on the other hand, implies top-down control: “[Augustus] excused the people of 
Bologna from joining in the oath-taking” (Bononiensibus quodque publice…gratiam fecit 
coniurandi) due to their longstanding patron-client relationship with Mark Antony (Suet. Aug. 
17.2). Peter Herrmann, who first noticed the discrepancy, insists that the biographer offers a 
factual corrective to the emperor’s propaganda.64 Leaving questions of historical accuracy aside, 
Suetonius’ dissenting version of events colors the Res Gestae passage in two ways: (1) it 
suggests that Augustus’ claim of receiving a voluntary sacramentum was disputed in antiquity; 
and (2), more importantly, it speaks to the high value the emperor placed on reputation for 
spontaneous acclamation. 
Why did Augustus want people to think that these oaths were voluntary? Most obviously, 
such a message, if believed, militates against allegations of coercion or tyranny. But there is a 
more proactive tactic at play here as well, for the phrase sua sponte appears to invoke nostalgic, 
                                                      
63 Cf. Cass. Dio 50.6.5, 57.3.2.  
64 Herrmann (1968) 78: [my translation] “It is beyond dispute that the same oath-taking of 32 BCE is meant in a 
brief remark in Suetonius. … This bit of information is important, since it corrects the characterization of voluntary 
oath-taking emphasized in the Res Gestae, and thereby comes closer to reality.” Cf. Pagán (2004) 14. 
 27 
historiographical memory of Rome’s early republican past. Livy, in his description of the 
installation of compulsory sacramenta during the Second Punic War, pays final tribute to a time 
when freshly levied troops pledged their lives to the state “of their own free will” (sua voluntate, 
2.38.4).65 It is easy to see why Augustus, who cultivated an image as restorer of Republican 
ideals, would want to tap into the same rhetorical vein, and align himself with Rome’s idealized 
past.66  
Perhaps nostalgic Livian notions of voluntary oaths appealed to Tiberius as well. Or 
perhaps Tiberius looked no further than Augustus’ own self-presentation. In either case, by 
running the sacramentum through the consuls (A. 1.7.2-3), and then allowing it to ripple outward 
after that (mox senatus milesque et populus, A. 1.7.3), Tacitus’ Tiberius gives the impression of 
broad and enthusiastic support for his principate, when in fact he was pulling the strings off stage 
(incipiebat). Such a balance between public emulation of Augustan propaganda and private 
machinations is unique to Tacitus’ account. Dio Cassius, for instance, has Tiberius taking an 
active role in securing power directly from the military: “For he had previously made sure of the 
soldiers in Italy by means of the oaths of allegiance established by Augustus…” (τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν 
τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ ὄντας τοῖς ὅρκοις τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Αὐγούστου καταδειχθεῖσι προκατέλαβεν, Dio Cass. 
57.3.2).67 Tiberian finesse is shown once again to be more Tacitean invention than consensus 
history. 
                                                      
65 Scholars largely accept the historicity of Livy’s account. See, e.g., von Petrikovits (1983) 191, Campbell (1984), 
Rüpke (1990) 77, Brice (2003) 54. Herrmann (1968) 60-89, however, presents evidence that some form of 
compulsory “Diensteid” proposed by Herrmann existed as early as the fourth century: in 378 BCE, the tribunes 
block the levy of troops (6.31.4-5); but in the following year, when the Patricians get their own men elected as 
tribunes, “no one can prevent [the Patricians] from enrolling three legions and administering the oath to them” (nullo 
impediente omnibus iunioribus sacramento adactis tres exercitus scriberent, Liv. 6.32.4). 
66 See Briscoe (1971) 262. 
67 Cf. Cass. Dio 50.6.6. 
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 In the first meeting with the senate following the oath, Tiberius wants to keep the focus 
on the recently deceased Augustus rather than on himself (“nothing did he allow to be discussed 
on the first day of the senate except the last rites of Augustus,” nihil primo senatus die agi passus 
nisi de supremis Augusti, 1.8.1). So it makes sense that, rather than dispense bribes, awards, or 
donatives in his own name upon succession, Tiberius is content merely to oversee the 
dispensation of Augustus’ legacies: 
legata non ultra civilem modum, nisi quod populo et plebei CCCCXXXV, 
praetoriarum cohortium militibus singula nummum, legionariis aut cohortibus 
civium Romanorum trecenos nummos viritim dedit. (A. 1.8.1)  
 
[Augustus’] legacies did not go beyond the limits of an ordinary citizen, except that 
he gave 43,500,000 sesterces to the people and plebs, individual donations of a 
thousand each to the soldiers of the Praetorian cohorts, and three hundred a man to 
the legionaries and the cohorts consisting of Roman citizens. (trans. Woodman 
(2004)) 
 
The civilian and military parties who receive these bequests represent many of the same groups 
who took the oath above (1.7.2-3). Implicit in Tiberius’ total focus on Augustus’ generosity is a 
decision not to reward the people and military for their loyalty from his own coffers, which 
would have initiated a reciprocal relationship between him and his new subjects. In other words, 
there is no direct connection between oaths and donatives in Tacitus’ account of Tiberius’ 
accession. In fact, during Tiberius’ reign, largitio is reserved for responding to and remedying 
specific crises; it is never used for securing loyalty.68 Such fiscal conservatism is consistent with 
displays of imperial stinginess throughout the Tiberius hexad.69 The word donativum does not 
even appear in the extant Annals until 12.41. Even Germanicus resists the use of bribery to 
soothe his mutinous troops until he has no other choice (A. 1.36-37).  
                                                      
68 For Tiberian miserliness in Tacitus, cf. A. 1.75; 2.42, 47-48; 4.13, 64; 6.45.1. 
69 A. 4.62.2, 6.45.1; cf. Suet. Tib. 46-48. 
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At the same first meeting with the senate, Tiberius bristles at a motion to enact an annual 
renewal of the sacramentum: 
addebat Messala Valerius renovandum per annos sacramentum in nomen Tiberii; 
interrogatusque a Tiberio num se mandante eam sententiam prompsisset, sponte 
dixisse respondit, neque in iis quae ad rem publicam pertinerent, consilio nisi suo 
usurum, vel cum periculo offensionis: ea sola species adulandi supererat. (A. 1.8.4) 
 
Messala Valerius added that the oath in Tiberius’ name should be renewed 
annually; and, when asked by Tiberius whether it was on his instruction that he had 
produced such a suggestion, he responded that he had spoken spontaneously and 
that in a matter which pertained to the state he would resort to no one’s counsel but 
his own, even at the risk of offense. (That was the only display of sycophancy left 
to be tried.) (trans. Woodman (2004)) 
 
In this would-be second oath scene of his young principate, Tiberius’ fear of appearing 
tyrannical is once again evident.70 Indeed, a dichotomy clearly existed between the undesirability 
of compulsory oaths (se mandante) on the one hand, and the respectability of voluntary (sponte) 
oaths on the other. Like Augustus in the Res Gestae, and Tiberius in his own accession (A. 1.7.2-
3), the new emperor here comes across as deeply concerned that he not be seen as exacting or 
even inviting oaths of loyalty.  
A decade or so previously in the Histories, Tacitus had provided confirmation that the 
practice of annually renewing the sacramentum was certainly enacted at some point under the 
Julio-Claudians (H. 1.55).71 Here, Tacitus is not so forthcoming: though it has usually been 
assumed that Tiberius rejects Messala’s proposal, this is by no means clear from the text as 
written.72 Perhaps, stylist that he was, he felt that the mere historical fact of the passage or 
                                                      
70 Pace Goodyear (1972) 138, who unduly assumes that in verba Tiberii Caesaris iuravere (A. 1.7.2) and 
renovandum per annos sacramentum in nomen Tiberii (A. 1.8.4) refer to the same oath.  
71 Pliny confirms the continuation of the practice of renewal in two letters to Trajan (Plin. Ep. 10.52, 53). Sherwin-
White (1966) 633 notes (rightly) that these letters record the renewal of the oath upon the anniversary of Trajan’s 
dies imperii (28 January), not the beginning of the consular year (1 January).  
72 Premerstein (1937) 60-62 argues that Tiberius resists instituting annual renewal of the loyalty oath throughout his 
entire reign, and that the custom does not begin until the reign of Caligula. Goodyear (1972) 148-49 agrees: “The 
context and the silence of our sources on any such practice during his reign indicate that Tiberius rejected the 
proposal. But yearly renewal of the oath of loyalty began under Gaius and became normal thereafter….” Herrmann 
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blockage of the proposal was too obvious to articulate—or too mundane. If I am right in 
understanding se mandante to refer to an actual articulated wish on Tiberius’ part for annual 
renewal, then it is quite difficult to image that the measure was not enacted at some point in 
Tiberius’ reign. Yet the sheer fact that it is impossible, based on Tacitus’ words alone, to 
determine for a certainty when the custom was enacted suggests that Tacitus’ primary concern 
lay not with the result of the confrontation between Messala and Tiberius, but with the fact that 
there was a confrontation in the first place. I would even suggest that Tacitus’ focus on conflict 
over result is mimetic of Tiberius’ own mind: the second Julio-Claudian emperor comes across 
as placing a greater value on appearing to uphold good Augustan values, such as the strength 
and independence of the senate, than on actually establishing the terms and frequency of the 
sacramentum. 
We may draw the following conclusions about the state of the sacramentum at the 
beginning of the Annals: (1) The sacramentum—both the one taken upon accession and the 
unanswered question of its annual renewal—is a prominent feature of Tacitus’ depiction of the 
start of Tiberius’ reign, and is therefore a prominent feature of the start of the Annals. (2) 
Tiberius makes no attempt to reinforce either civilian or military loyalty with personal gifts or 
bribes. (3) Like Augustus before him, Tiberius wants these oaths to appear voluntary, even if 
                                                      
(1968) 107-10, drawing primarily from crumbs of oblique evidence scattered throughout Cassius Dio, argues that 
“the annual repetition of the emperor-oath in the senate, in conjunction with the oath to the acta of the ruler, 
emerged already under Tiberius” (my translation). Briscoe (1971) 262. Stäcker (2003) 295 stakes out a much less 
precise, but more sensible, position: working backwards from the mentions of 1 January oath renewal in the 
Histories (1.55.1, primarily), he asserts cautiously that the institutionalization of the oath’s annual repetition 
occurred sometime before 69 CE, thus suggesting that Tacitus does not definitively confirm the existence of the 
renewal anywhere in the Annals. At the end of the Annals, however, during the reign of Nero, we receive a fairly 
clear terminus ante quem for the renewal of civilian loyalty oaths at least: quin et illa obiectabat [Capito], principio 
anni vitare Thraseam sollemne ius iurandum (“Moreover, he hurled other imputations too against him: that at the 
beginning of the year Thrasea would avoid the solemn oath,” 16.22; trans. Woodman (2004)). For the custom of 
offering annual inaugural prayers during Tiberius’ reign, cf. A. 4.70.1. If referring to the sacramentum, Gaius dig. 
50.16.233.1 dates the renewal to 3 January: post Kal. Ian. die tertio pro salute principis vota suscipiuntur (“oaths 
(vows?) for the emperor’s health and safety are taken up three days after the kalends”); cf. A. 4.17.1. 
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they are not. But Tiberius is no Augustus. The enduring effect of the propagandistic line of sua 
sponte (Aug. Anc. 25), Tacitus implies, is only as strong as each succeeding emperor’s ability 
and willingness to replicate Augustus’ example. 
 
Caligula 
 
Before we turn to Claudius, a brief word ought to be said about the accession of Tiberius’ 
successor and grand-nephew Caligula, whose entire brief reign was contained in the lost books 
of the Annals. According to Cassius Dio, Caligula “was afraid of both the people and the army” 
(φοβηθεὶς καὶ τὸν δῆμον καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, Cass. Dio 59.2). Thus, in addition to dispensing 
money in the name of his deceased predecessor as Tiberius had done, he contributed some of his 
own funds as well (Cass. Dio 59.3). There is no sense from Cassius Dio, however, that 
Caligula’s position was contingent upon such generosity. Furthermore, Suetonius’ quite different 
account emphasizes Caligula’s phenomenal popularity; no donatives are even mentioned and, 
based on the biographer’s bombast, hardly appeared necessary (Cal. 13-14). Thus, based on the 
extant accounts, there is little ground on which to argue for a significant departure from Tiberius’ 
accession. 
 
Claudius 
Though Annals 11-12 are devoted to Claudius’ reign, Tacitus’ depiction of his accession was 
contained in the lost books. Thus if we are to learn about that event, we must turn to our other 
sources: Josephus, Cassius Dio, Plutarch, and especially for the purposes of this study, 
Suetonius.  
Claudius’ reign was marked by the accumulation and distribution of considerable wealth. 
The accumulation was due in part to the fact that Claudius was the only Julio-Claudian emperor 
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(after Augustus) to undertake profitable foreign conquests.73 As for the distribution of wealth, we 
have evidence from throughout his principate of congiaria (“gratuities”) being granted to 
civilians, as well as stipendia (“salaries”) and donativa (“bonuses”) being granted to soldiers and 
veterans.74 The praetorian guard, the military body that first proclaimed Claudius emperor, was 
an especially frequent recipient of imperial gifts and honors. In a recent monograph, Osgood 
points to several dimensions of interdependence between the fourth emperor and his local 
army.75 It is indicative of the closeness of that relationship that Claudius was the first princeps to 
enact the practice of  holding military discharge ceremonies, granting stipends, and granting 
citizenship in Temple of Fides on the Capitoline Hill.76 
The etymological root of donativum (donare) suggests voluntary expressions of largess 
from emperor to soldier.77 And indeed, as we have seen in the foregoing discussion, Tiberius’ 
oath of allegiance coincided with granting gifts, but these two customs do not seem to have 
constituted an explicit transaction.78 According to Suetonius, that changed with Claudius. It was 
the fourth Julio-Claudian emperor who, in order to secure his imperial proclamation, first bought 
the soldiers’ loyalty outright:  
verum postero die et senatu segniore in exsequendis conatibus per taedium ac 
dissensionem diversa censentium et multitudine, quae circumstabat, unum 
rectorem iam et nominatim exposcente, armatos pro contione iurare in nomen suum 
passus est promisitque singulis quina dena sestertia, primus Caesarum fidem 
militis etiam praemio pigneratus. (Suet. Cl. 10.4) 
 
                                                      
73 For Claudius’ conquest and looting of Britain, see Griffin (1984) 202 and Osgood (2011) 84-106. 
74 For a summary of our knowledge of Claudius’ many expenditures, in the form of both donativa and congiaria, see 
Duncan-Jones (1994) 257 and Burgers (2001), esp. 105.  
75 For the many donatives Claudius paid to the Praetorians, see esp. Osgood (2011) 31, 35-37, 235-36, who also 
notes that the Praetorian Guard featured prominently in public displays of Claudius’ foreign military conquests 
(101).  
76 See Grant (1974) 155 and Helgeland (1978) 1502. 
77 Thus, the OLD defines it as “a sum of money given as a gratuity to each soldier by the Roman Emperor on an 
occasion of public rejoicing” (emphasis added). Cf. TLL v/1.1990.74. 
78 See pp. 27-28 above. 
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But on the following day, since the senate was slow in carrying out its plans due to 
the tedious bickering of those who held divergent views, while the populace, who 
were standing all around, called for one ruler expressly by name, [Claudius] 
allowed the armed assembly of the soldiers to swear allegiance to him, and 
promised each man fifteen thousand sesterces;79 being the first of the Caesars who 
resorted to bribery to secure the fidelity of the troops. (trans. Rolfe (1914), adapted) 
 
Josephus’ account of this scene, though silent on the subject of historical precedence, 
corroborates some of the core elements of Suetonius’ story. The centrality of Claudius’ payout in 
the securing of loyalty is evident:  
Κλαύδιος δὲ τῷ στρατῷ συλλεχθέντι διελέγετο ὅρκους λαμβάνων ἦ μὴν ἐμμενεῖν 
πίστει τῇ πρὸς αὐτόν, δωρεῖται τοὺς σωματοφύλακας πεντακισχιλίαις δραχμαῖς 
κατὰ ἕκαστον ἄνδρα, τοῖς τε ἡγεμόσιν αὐτῶν ἀνάλογον τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τοῖς ὅποι 
ποτὲ στρατοπέδοις ὑπισχνεῖτο τὰ ὅμοια. (Jos. AJ 19.4.2) 
 
But Claudius conversed with the soldiers gathered around him, as they swore to 
persist in their loyalty to him; upon which he gave this bodyguards five 
thousand drachmae apiece, and a proportionally appropriate amount to their 
captains, and promised to give the same to the rest of the armies wherever they 
were.80  
 
15,000 sesterces (Suetonius’ figure) was five times the normal annual pay of the already 
exceptionally well-compensated praetorian guard.81 Caligula had also payed the praetorians a 
donative upon his accession, but it was nowhere near that lavish—1,000 sesterces a head, 
according to Cassius Dio.82 The notion, as Suetonius claims, that Claudius’ donative functioned 
as a payment in exchange for an oath of loyalty goes a long way toward explaining the jump 
from 1,000 to 15,000. Furthermore, the appeal of such a large donative in the 40s CE makes 
complete sense, given what we know about larger trends in legionary salaries: between the reigns 
                                                      
79 Jos. AJ 19.247 puts the amount at 5000 sesterces; see Brunt (1955) 55n38. 
80 On the Josephus’ notice of the expansion of the oath to the provinces, cf. Osgood (2011) 32-34: “[T]he clear 
solution was for Claudius to do as he did with the [p]raetorians, and offer all of the troops substantial cash payments. 
News of the bounty would reach them, it can be surmised, just as they were asked to renew their oaths of loyalty in 
the name of the emperor.”  
81 Levick (1990) 32 astutely notes that “[t]he praetorians did not have only donatives in mind: they were concerned 
for the very survival of their corps if the principate as they knew it came to an end.” See also Osgood (2011) 35-36. 
82 Cass. Dio 59.2.1; see Osgood (2011) 36. Tiberius (A. 1.8.1) also paid the praetorians 1000 sesterces each, while 
the legionaries received only 300 sesterces.  
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of Augustus and Domitian, the legions received no pay raises.83 Thus, if they had any hope of 
receiving extra pay, they had to rely on extra perks and bonuses.84 According to Cassius Dio, 
Claudius, never forgetting how he won the praetorians’ loyalty in the first place, gave them a 100 
sesterces donative every year on the anniversary of his accession.85  
Suetonius’ account, though partially corroborated by Josephus and Cassius Dio, is not 
without its own internal obstacles to credibility. Two aspects in particular are difficult to 
reconcile. On the one hand, the need to resort to bribery for the first time (primus Caesarum, 
Suet. Cl. 10.4) suggests that Claudius was in a relatively weak position compared to his 
predecessors. On the other hand, both the common soldier who initially found Claudius hiding in 
the palace and acclaimed him emperor (10.2) as well as the common people (multitudine, Cl. 
10.4) willingly chose him—a fact which suggests that he was not entirely disliked. These two 
elements, when considered together, render a strange scene: the Claudius of Suetonius’ account 
was not seeking power, yet felt obliged to engage in unprecedented bribery in order to secure the 
loyalty of the soldiers who voluntarily chose—even forced themselves upon—him!  
Donna Hurley points out that, when we compare Suetonius’ account to those of Cassius 
Dio (60.1.3) and Josephus (19.4.2), the reluctance conveyed by passus est (Cl. 10.4) appears out 
of place: the historical Claudius was likely eager to secure power for himself86—or at least was 
complicit in acquiring it. If that is true, then Suetonius simply failed to convey adequately the 
                                                      
83 See Suet. Aug. 49.2 and Dom. 7.3 with Haynes (2013) 47-48. 
84 This financial reality renders questionable the insistence of Stäcker (2003) 389-96 that soldiers cared more about 
the symbolic fact of simply receiving a donative, than they did about its amount. 
85 Cf. Stäcker (2003) 398 [my translation]: “Under the Caesars of the first and second centuries CE, only Claudius is 
known to have perpetuated the anniversary of his accession to power with the awarding of a donative to the 
praetorians. … This otherwise apparently uncommon donative must have strengthened an already close relationship 
between Claudius and the praetorians.”  
86 Hurley (2001) 100. Cf. Osgood (2011) 30: “There can be little doubt that the Praetorians did accept Claudius as 
imperator, swear an oath of allegiance to him, and force the Senate to accept their acclamation. And there can be no 
doubt that, in the eyes of each other anyway, the cooperation of Claudius and the Praetorians was essential.” 
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disingenuousness of Claudius’ reluctance.87 Of course, Suetonius’ accounts of the emperors’ 
lives are inadequate in many demonstrable ways.88 Yet there is a solution which reconciles the 
apparently divergent aspects of the surviving accounts without necessarily invalidating any of 
them. Perhaps Suetonius believes that the soldiers chose Claudius precisely because, in the 
absence of any dignitas or military experience, Claudius had no choice but to bribe his way 
toward their respect. The passive Claudius is in a weak position—a fact amplified when he falls 
to his knees as he is saluted emperor! (prae metu ad genua sibi accidentem imperatorem 
salutavit, 10.2). Whether this portrait of a Claudius who is simultaneously weak, passive and 
power-grasping captures the facts of the real historical moment is impossible to say. What we 
can say is that the different aspects of the account cohere tolerably well internally and cannot be 
disproved by external sources.89 In short, the possibility of Suetonius’ narrative containing a 
truth-value that would have been recognizable to a larger Roman audience cannot be discounted. 
 
Nero 
 
It should be stressed at this point that accounts of Claudius’ life can help us fill in historical gaps, 
but they cannot tell us how Tacitus would have written his Claudian accession narrative. Yet that 
does not render Suetonius’ biography useless, even in a historiographical study such as this one. 
First of all, there are some arguments from probability that deserve to be made—though not 
pressed: For instance, we might reasonably suspect that, given the attention he paid to oaths in 
his earlier work, the Histories, Tacitus would have addressed the subject of praetorian oaths in 
                                                      
87 Hurley (2001) 100. 
88 Indeed, according to Hurley (2001) 100-1, Suetonius is only technically correct when he writes that Claudius 
primus Caesarum fidem militis etiam praemio pigneratus (Suet. Cl. 10.4): he is the first emperor “to promise a large 
gift in the context of the initial oath but not the first to treat the military with calculated generosity.” For the 
calculated generosity of past emperors, see A. 1.36, Suet. Tib. 48.2, Cass. Dio 59.2.1. 
89 Cf. Campbell (1984) 187 and Stacker (2003). 
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his lost account of Claudius’ accession. Furthermore, we might even be reasonably safe in 
assuming that, given the forcefulness with which Suetonius declares Claudius the first emperor 
to purchase oaths, Tacitus would have weighed in on the matter as well. Ultimately, such 
speculation must remain just that. There are, however, rather more concrete connections to be 
drawn between Annals 12-16 and Suetonius’ Claudius: Tacitus’ depiction of Nero’s accession, 
as we shall see, contains clear evidence that, at the very least, the sort of Claudian precedent 
Suetonius describes at Cl. 10 (a) has been accepted by Tacitus as factual and (b) has been carried 
over into the reign of Nero. 
Nero, like his adoptive father, is made emperor by the praetorian guard in the immediate 
aftermath of an imperial assassination. It is no wonder, then, that Nero resorts to the same tactics 
of bribery: 
tunc medio diei tertium ante Idus Octobris, foribus palatii repente diductis, 
comitante Burro Nero egreditur ad cohortem, quae more militiae excubiis adest. 
ibi monente praefecto faustis vocibus exceptus inditur lecticae. dubitavisse 
quosdam ferunt, respectantis rogitantisque ubi Britannicus esset: mox nullo in 
diversum auctore quae offerebantur secuti sunt. inlatusque castris Nero et 
congruentia tempori praefatus, promisso donativo ad exemplum paternae 
largitionis, imperator consalutatur. (A. 12.69) 
 
Then, in the middle of the day, on the third before the Ides of October, with the 
doors of the Palatium suddenly flung open, in the company of Burrus, Nero 
emerged toward the cohort which, in military fashion, was present as lookout. 
There, at the prefect’s warning, he was welcomed by festive voices and placed in a 
litter. (They say that some hesitated, looking around and asking repeatedly where 
Britannicus was; but soon, with no one to authorize differently, they followed what 
was being offered.) Carried to the camp, and after some preliminary words suited 
to the moment (and the promise of a donative on the example of his father’s 
lavishness), Nero was hailed as “Commander.” (trans. Woodman (2004)) 
 
Though the sacramentum is not mentioned in this passage explicitly, it is quite clear that the 
acclamation itself (consalutatur) is contingent upon the ablative absolute promisso donativo. 
Tacitus further informs us that the young Nero’s generous donative has been inspired by 
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Claudius’ example (ad exemplum paternae largitionis). Since, as we saw above, Tiberius 
eschewed giving donatives in his own name upon succession (A. 1.7), and since the accounts of 
Caligula’s reign give no indication of any deviation from the Tiberian example, the phrase ad 
exemplum paternae largitionis strongly suggests that Tacitus, like Suetonius, did in fact 
characterize Claudius’ donatives as novel and innovative in a lost passage of the Annals. 
paternae (OLD s.v. 1) certainly implies that the example only extends back one generation.90 
Furthermore, the lack of explanation or elaboration regarding what precise example Claudius set 
implies that the reader already knows about the sacramentum-donativum contract from the lost 
Claudian books.—Or, to give the same idea a Tacitean flavor: by remarking on the fact that Nero 
was merely following his father’ example, Tacitus implies that Nero did nothing remarkable. 
Throughout the rest of the extant Annals, Tacitus provides snapshots of a Neronian world 
in which rampant largess (largitio) has become normalized.91  In a particularly striking example 
from before Nero was even emperor (51 CE), the sycophantic senate flattered a fourteen-year-old 
Nero by awarding him the office of consul six years in the future, in the meantime granting 
proconsular powers and the extra-legal title “Prince of the Youth of Rome” (princeps iuventutis, 
A. 12.41). And, as if to legitimize these premature measures, “a donative was also given to the 
soldiery in Nero’s name, and a gratuity was presented to the city populace” (additum nomine eius 
donativum militi, congiarium plebei, A. 12.41). Eight years later (59 CE), when Nero killed his 
mother in a jealous attempt to consolidate power, he heaped several posthumous charges on her 
head. Implicit in the listing of these charges is the idea that donativa were the proper reward for 
sacramenta:  
quod consortium imperii iuraturasque in feminae verba praetorias cohortis 
idemque dedecus senatus et populi speravisset, ac postquam frustra habita sit, 
                                                      
90 For a similar usage of the adjective in Tacitus, cf. 3.86. 
91 Cf. A. 13.18, 31. Nero, prone to generous acts himself, does not tolerate largitio in others: A. 15.35, 44, 48; 16.19.  
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infensa militi patribusque et plebi dissuasisset donativum et congiarium 
periculaque viris inlustribus struxisset. (A. 14.11) 
 
[He charged] that she had hoped for partnership in command; for the praetorian 
cohorts to swear allegiance to a female; and for the same dishonor on the part of 
the senate and people; and after she had been thwarted, in her hostility to the 
soldiery, fathers, and plebs, she had deprecated the donative and gratuity and 
contrived dangers for illustrious men. (trans. Woodman (2004))92  
 
The way in which the relationship between the sacramentum and donativum is embedded within 
a larger point about Agrippina’s anger, suggests that that relationship had become deeply 
ingrained in society. Again, the fact that the relationship is not remarked upon is itself 
noteworthy.  
 
If we accept the picture presented by Tacitus and Suetonius that the donativum and sacramentum 
became inextricably linked, then it is easy to see how institutions would undergo a 
transformation. As J.B. Campbell puts it, “the payment to the troops at the start of the reign 
became now virtually an obligation, not a gift, and tied the emperor more closely to the support 
of the army.”93 Any Augustan-era illusion that the sacramentum was a spontaneous expression of 
grassroots support must finally have dissipated when Claudius decided to buy that oath 
wholesale (Suet. Cl. 10.4).  
Peter Herrmann opines that, relative to the Julio-Claudian era, the oaths of the Histories 
are quite lacking in meaningful or authentic expressions of loyalty.94 Yet I would caution against 
too neatly drawing such a distinction between the two works. Instead, I would argue that Tacitus’ 
                                                      
92 The grip of the sacramentum to Nero weakens as a result of the murder; cf. A. 15.67. 
93 Campbell (1984) 187-88: “The regular association of the donative with imperial accession and the introduction of 
intended heirs, and its use in times of political crisis to cement the loyalty of the army, inevitably focused attention 
on this aspect of bribing the soldiers for political support.” See also Stäcker (2003) 369-70: “Die Ausschüttung von 
Donativen durch den Kaiser beruhte grundsätzlich auf Freiwilligkeit, doch schon von dem Prinzipat des Tiberius an 
wurde zumindest das Donativ aus Anlass des Herrschaftsantritts zu einer derart festen Einrichtung, daß sich ein 
Princeps dieser kaum entziehen konnte.” 
94 Herrmann (1968) 112.  
 39 
rendering of the Julio-Claudian era contains within it some of the explanations as to why Tacitus 
had presented a sacramentum in crisis in his earlier large-scale work. Rather than view a neat 
dichotomy between the sincerer oaths of the Annals and the cheaper ones of the Histories, we 
ought to see the problems with the sacramentum in the Histories as in a continuum with, and 
emanating from, the Julio-Claudian accession narratives of the Annals. When Tacitus’ Tiberius 
inherited Augustus’ relationship with the army, he essentially sought to preserve that institution. 
But when Claudius took power under extraordinary circumstances and at the army’s mercy, it is 
not hard to understand how the balance of power between emperor and soldier would be 
significantly and permanently altered. In a very real sense, then, the situation which Galba 
inherits upon his accession is distinctly Julio-Claudian. 
  
PART 3: The sacramentum and the Rupture of 69 CE 
 
 
ANNALISTIC HISTORIES 
 
 
initium mihi operis Servius Galba iterum Titus Vinius consules erunt. (H. 1.1.1)95 
 
Criticizing Tacitus for beginning his work at the start of a consular year can be traced back well 
into the nineteenth century.96 Many have claimed that Tacitus would have been better served to 
have begun with, say, the death of Nero in June 68, or with the accession of Vespasian in July 
69.97 Ronald Syme was, to my knowledge, the first champion of a 1 January opening, defending 
                                                      
95 Cf. Dialogus 17.3: illum Galbae et Othonis et Vitellii longum et unum annum (“that one long year that saw Galba, 
Otho, and Vitellius”). Tacitus introduces the only other year in the extant Histories, 70 CE, thusly: interea 
Vespasianus iterum ac Titus consulatum absentes inierunt (“Meanwhile, Vespasian once again and Titus entered 
into the consulship in absentia,” 4.38.1). 
96 See Mommsen (1870) 228, Hirschfeld (1890) 363, Seeck (1901) 227, Courbaud (1918) 33, all cited by Syme 
(1958) 145n5. 
97 Hainsworth (1964) suggests that Tacitus sidestepped 68 CE entirely in order to avoid the still-sensitive issue of 
Verginius Rufus. Chilver (1979) 33-34 opines that starting the Histories on 1 July 69 with the proclamation of 
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it as “vital and inevitable,” since “that day starts the action on the Rhine.”98 Yet this sort of 
reasoning, as laudatory as it was intended to be, robs Tacitus of all authorial discretion. Had the 
historiographer wanted to frame his work differently, he certainly had the skill and presumably 
had the freedom to do so. Even more fundamentally, the selection of a starting point is a 
fundamental task of any historian, for every history has to begin somewhere.99 Thus, the question 
ought not to be: when should Tacitus have started his narrative? Rather, we must ask: why did 
Tacitus decide to start when he did, and what does that say about how we interpret book 1 and 
the work as a whole? 
Within the last generation, the structure of the extant Histories has come to be viewed as 
an expression of Tacitus’ flexible, highly-literary adaptation of annalistic historiography.100 The 
                                                      
Vespasian “would have produced a monstrosity,” yet still finds fault with the decision to start on 1 Jan. 69, rather 
than with Nero’s death in June 68, arguing that “T[acitus] was faced with difficult problems of adjustment when he 
selected a starting point only a fortnight before Galba’s death.” Cf. Chilver (1957) 29. Feeney (2007) 191 also 
believes that starting in 68 would have been preferable. 
98 Syme (1958) 145: “Where else should the work begin with? If at the death of Nero, much that preceded Nero’s 
death would have to go in, namely Vindex, Verginius, and the proclamation of Galba, with a vast military and 
political imbroglio. On the other hand, the official date of the accession of Vespasian (1 July 69) was no good at 
all—it truncated the story of the Rhine and Danubian armies and two invasions of Italy in a single year.” 
99 Cf. White (1973/2014) 5-7 on the distinction between “historical stories” and “chronicles”: “Chronicles are, 
strictly speaking, open-ended. In principle they have no inaugurations; they simply ‘begin’ when the chronicler 
starts recording events. … Stories, however, have a discernible form… The historian arranges the events in the 
chronicle into a hierarchy of significance by assigning events different functions as story elements in such a way as 
to disclose the formal coherence of a whole set of events considered as a comprehensible process with a discernible 
beginning, middle, and end” (6).  
100 Some examples: Damon (2003) 77: “The first chapter of the Histories is a masterpiece of indirection. … 
[Tacitus’] affiliation to the annalistic tradition is directly declared (1.1n. consules), but even here the message is 
oblique: the annalistic framework, with its presumption of the significance of the republican yearly cycle, is in 
constant tension with the imperial and dynastic realities of the period.” Pagán (2006): “Like any good annalistic 
history, the first sentence of the Histories states the names of the eponymous consuls who took office on January 1, 
69.” Joseph (2012) 37: “Starting with the Histories on January 1, 69, with the assumption of the consulship by Galba 
and Vinius, seems to place Tacitus’ work in the tradition of Republican annalistic historiography.” Despite this 
realization, most scholarship on Tacitus’ relationship with the annalistic tradition has unsurprisingly been focused on 
the Annals (cf. annales nostros, A. 16.16). Yet, as tempting as it is to place the Annals within an annalistic tradition, 
Tacitus’ precise relationship with the annalists is unclear, seeing as he never cites any of them, ancient or more 
contemporary, by name (Gowing (2009) 18-21). But Tacitus does leave crumbs. In Annals 4, Tacitus famously 
apologizes that “my annals” (annales nostros) constitute an in arto et inglorious labor compared with the annalists 
of old (qui vetere populi Romani res composuere), since they contain relatively little of what makes the Republican 
annalistic chroniclers exciting, namely battles and military action (A. 4.32.1). Interpretations differ: Woodman 
(1998) 131 thinks that the implicit apology is genuine, and refers specifically to the fact that A. 4-16 is markedly less 
bellicose than A. 1-3; inglorius, in his view, is not ironic, and may express anxiety about a perceived inability to 
achieve the same sort of gloria Sallust sought (cf. Sal. Cat. 1.1-4, 2.9); cf. Levene (2009b). However, Marincola 
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recognition that sophisticated and stylizing historiographers such as Tacitus engage and adapt 
traditional annalistic models can be traced back to Judith Ginsburg’s seminal study of the 
structure of the Annals. On Tacitus’ approach to the beginnings of years, she writes: “Tacitus is 
simply not usually interested in the inauguration of the magistrates as a temporal event at the 
beginning of the narrative year, or, in fact, in consular activities.”101 Rather, she argues, he tends 
to focalize the start of the year through an event of thematic relevance. One example, discussed 
by Ginsburg, will suffice. 24 CE is ushered in by the typical announcement, in ablative absolute, 
of that year’s consuls (Cornelio Cethego Visellio Varrone consulibus, A. 4.17.1). But that bare 
introduction serves as mere prelude to that year’s thematic opening. For Tacitus comments that 
when the pontiffs and priests offered the expected “vows for the emperor’s safety” (pro 
incolumitate principis vota, A. 4.17.1),102 they commended Germanicus’ young sons, Nero and 
Drusus, to the gods as well.103 By mentioning these two boys, Tacitus has introduced a central 
theme of 24 CE (and many of the years of Tiberius’ reign): Tiberius’ jealousy of the House of 
Germanicus. From the ceremonial vows, the historian deftly pivots to Tiberius’ fear that the 
senate’s decision to favor the boys sprang from the influence of Agrippina and her faction (A. 
4.17.2). A broader narrative of imperial paranoia and senatorial prosecutions continues to spiral 
outward from there. Thus, Tacitus’ invocation of the vota of 3 January exists solely and precisely 
                                                      
(1997) 251 argues that inglorius is disingenuous: the lack of opportunity for easy historiographical glory afforded by 
the subject matter makes his Annals that much more impressive, and thus deserving of glory. More recently, Sailor 
(2008) 263: “[W]hile by lamenting the inferiority of his material Tacitus may seem from one perspective to rank 
Annals below its Republican competition, from another he elevates it above the vain game of glory-seeking and 
situates it instead in the realm of serious business.” Joseph (2012) sees a connection between T’s nobis in arto et 
ingloriosus labor and Vergil’s opening of Georgics 4 (in tenui labor; at tenuis non gloria). The intertext “activates” 
for the reader the notion that there is glory to be found. 
101 Ginsburg (1981) 14. 
102 Ginsburg (1981) 19n18 notes that this vow took place on 3 January; cf. Gai. Dig. 50.16.233 and Suet. Tib. 54.1. 
Whether this oath constitutes a sacramentum is not entirely clear, but if Cass. Dio 57.24.1 is to be trusted, the vota 
Tacitus likely has in mind were those sworn to Tiberius after 10 years in power in order to renew his status; cf. 
Koestermann (1965) 83. 
103 Ginsburg (1981) 23; for a rundown of some of Tacitus’ favorite year-introducing topics and themes in the 
Tiberian hexad, see pp. 10-30. 
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to serve a higher narrative purpose. As Ginsburg observes, this particular ceremony “will never 
again engage the historian’s attention. He is not interested in it for its own sake; in the year in 
question it takes on thematic significance.”104 
What Ginsburg discovered about the beginning of the year in the Annals has relevance 
for the Histories as well. It is true, as we saw above, that the book begins with a relatively 
colorless naming of the consuls of 69. Scholars have argued (rightly) that the consular 
introduction constitutes one small part of the larger attempt at self-justification and framing 
found in the preface (1.1.1-3).105 Yet that is not the full picture. There are no fewer than two 
additional moments of annual inaugurations in the book, both of which filter the year’s opening 
through the sacramentum motif. Let us examine both passages within their surrounding contexts. 
It will be noted that the first passage below begins with a restatement of the consular year 
(1.11.3) after a long digressive survey on the state of Rome in 68 CE (1.4.1-11.2).106 Only this 
time, it takes on a more menacing tone, preparing us for the mutiny and oath-breaking in the very 
next sentence: 
hic fuit rerum Romanarum status, cum Servius Galba iterum Titus Vinius consules 
inchoavere annum sibi ultimum, rei publicae prope supremum. [12.1] paucis post 
kalendas Ianuarias diebus Pompei Propinqui procuratoris e Belgica litterae 
adferuntur, superioris Germaniae legiones rupta sacramenti reverentia 
imperatorem alium flagitare et senatui ac populo Romano arbitrium eligendi 
permittere, quo seditio mollius acciperetur. [2] maturavit ea res consilium Galbae 
iam pridem de adoptione secum et cum proximis agitantis. (1.11.3-12.2) 
 
This was the state of Roman affairs, when consuls Servius Galba (for the second 
time) and Titus Vinius a year that was their last, and nearly the state’s last. [12.1] 
A few days after the kalends of January, word was sent from Belgium by the 
procurator Pompeius Propinquus that the legions of Upper Germany had broken 
                                                      
104 Ginsburg (1981) 23. Tacitus frames many other beginnings of years in the Annals to similar thematic purpose.  
105 See, most notably, Marincola (1999) and the recent, thorough discussion by Sailor (2008) 119-82. 
106 Pagán (2006) 200-1 aptly observes that, with the future tense erunt (1.1.1), “Tacitus announces that he is about to 
digress before beginning the work proper, as if to say, ‘By the time I get around to the beginning of this work, Galba 
and Vinius will be consuls’ (200). … Iterum [1.11.3] indeed: this is the second mention of Galba’s second 
consulship. The sense of repetition is inescapable (201).” For analysis of Tacitus’ digressive survey, see Damon 
(2003) 98-100. 
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their respect for the oath of allegiance in demanding a new emperor, and that, in 
order that their mutiny be treated more leniently, they were entrusting the authority 
of choosing [a replacement] to the senate and people of Rome. [2] This event 
accelerated Galba’s plan, which he had been working on for some time now in his 
own mind and with his closest advisers, to adopt a successor.  
  
inferioris tamen Germaniae legiones sollemni kalendarum Ianuariarum 
sacramento pro Galba adactae, multa cunctatione et raris primorum ordinum 
vocibus, ceteri silentio, proximi cuiusque audaciam exspectantes, insita mortalibus 
natura propere sequi quae piget inchoare. … [3] at in superiore exercitu quarta ac 
duoetvicensima legiones isdem hibernis tendentes ipso kalendarum Ianuariarum 
die dirumpunt imagines Galbae. … [4] ac ne reverentiam imperii exuere viderentur, 
senatus populoque Romani obliterata iam nomina sacramento advocabant. (1.55.1, 
3-4) 
 
Yet the legions of Lower Germany were compelled to taken the solemn kalends-
of-January oath to Galba, though with considerable hesitation. There was a 
smattering of voices in the front ranks; the rest were silent, everyone looking to 
those around them for boldness: it is ingrained in human nature to follow eagerly, 
while shrinking from making a beginning. … [3] But, in the army of Upper 
Germany, the Fourth and Twenty-Second legions, sharing the same winter quarters, 
on the very same day, the kalends of January, smashed Galba’s portraits. … [4] 
And lest they seem to be casting off their respect for authority, they called upon in 
oath the names—already then in disuse—of “Senate and the People of Rome.” 
 
In the first passage, Tacitus announces the German legions’ refusal to swear an oath to 
Galba (1.12.1). Then, changing gears, he introduces a long, unbroken sequence of unrest at 
Rome, ending eventually in Otho’s coup and Galba’s beheading (1.12.2-43.2). In the second 
passage, Tacitus returns to the same Germans and the same would-be oath. Only this time 
Tacitus fills in considerably more detail, as he proceeds to relate how the refusal to swear the 
oath leads to the imperial acclamation of Vitellius, and from there to Valens and Caecina 
marching unruly armies from the German provinces into Italy (1.55-70). Thus, twice in Histories 
1, Tacitus invokes the same unfulfilled, disrupted sacramentum in order to begin spinning a 
narrative of betrayal, mutiny, and civil violence. The Year of Four Emperors was, therefore, in a 
very real sense triggered by a broken oath. 
 44 
The prominent treatment of oaths in the Histories has not gone unnoticed, though 
scholars tend to believe that the annalistic structure of the work naturally lends itself to rituals of 
inauguration. This is not dissimilar from Syme’s notions of the inevitability of 1 January 69 as a 
start-date.107 J.B. Campbell, for instance, in an otherwise worthy discussion of the military oath 
throughout Roman history, implies that Tacitus’ focus on the sacramentum was a documentary 
function of the realities of that year’s events.108 Similarly, Peter Herrmann treats Tacitus’ 
frequent invocation of oaths if they were an inevitable or expected part of the narrative: “[The 
oath] is a fixed accompaniment, indeed requirement for each elevation, of each change of rule, 
and of each taking of a partisan stance in the changing constellations of this year….”109 On a 
historical level, Campbell and Herrmann are probably right. But such views underestimate the 
ability of any ancient historian—especially one as clever as Tacitus—to construct meaning via 
repetition of motif and language, and to mold inherited records of the past into a unique 
narrative. Oaths were indeed, so far as we can gather, sworn at the start of every year, and at the 
start of every new rule.110 But there is usually no reason to mention them; their very constancy 
and predictability render it unnecessary. However, in 69 CE, Tacitus chooses to emphasize an 
unfulfilled sacramentum because its unfulfillment perfectly represents a major theme of the 
extant Histories: the repeated rending and realignment of military (and political) loyalties. 
 
                                                      
107 See p. 40 above. 
108 Campbell (1984) 25: “Since the sacramentum mentioned the name of the reigning emperor, a priori each 
new emperor would be obliged to exact the oath anew at his accession. This was all the more desirable if that 
accession was accompanied by violence and civil war. There is much evidence in Tacitus’ account in the 
Histories of the civil wars in 68-9, where he frequently refers to the swearing in of soldiers.” 
109 Translation is mine. Herrmann (1968) 111: “[Der Eid] wird zu einer festen Begleiterscheinung, ja Voraussetzung 
jeder Erhebung, jedes Herrschaftswechsels und jeder Parteinahme in den wechselnden Konstellationen dieses 
Jahres….” 
110 See p. 29n69 above. 
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In the following two sections, I argue that the rupture of Roman society into large-scale, multi-
front civil war, which Tacitus frames in terms of broken and unfulfilled sacramenta (1.12, 1.55), 
is the direct result of Galba’s decision to violate the sacramentum-donativum contract that had 
developed over the course of the Julio-Claudian period. In CONFLICT AT HOME, I argue that the 
rise of Otho is the direct result of the soldiers in the city seeking a restoration of the 
“sacramentum-donativum contract” that Galba violated by refusing to pay the praetorian guard 
and urban cohort the donative they had been promised. In CONFLICT IN PROVINCIAL GERMANY, I 
argue that the legions also expected a donative, and that Galba’s stinginess is thus a serious 
factor in the eventual rise of Vitellius. 
 Before turning to these sections, the relationship between the Annals and Histories must 
be briefly addressed. My argument above (PART 2) regarding the Julio-Claudian sacramentum-
donativum contract centered around Tacitus’ apparent recognition and perhaps even promotion 
of that concept. Obviously, the Annals, which were written approximately ten years after the 
Histories, did not serve as a source for Tacitus’ 69 CE narrative. Rather, I would suggest that 
both works, taken together, reveal a historian preoccupied for years with the sacramentum and 
the donativum as historical, cultural, and literary forces. 
 
CONFLICT AT HOME 
 
 
The conflict between oaths and their proper reward starts near the beginning of Tacitus’ survey 
of the political and military landscape the Long Year (1.4-11). After stating the aims of this 
survey (1.4.2-3), Tacitus relates early signs of trouble for the new emperor Galba (1.5). In order 
to preserve its full context, I have reproduced the chapter in full: 
miles urbanus longo Caesarum sacramento imbutus et ad destituendum Neronem 
arte magis et impulsu quam suo ingenio traductus, postquam neque dari donativom 
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sub nomine Galbae promissum neque magnis meritis ac praemiis eundem in pace 
quem in bello locum praeventamque gratiam intellegit apud principem a legionibus 
factum, pronus ad novas res scelere insuper Nymphidii Sabini praefecti imperium 
sibi molientis agitatur. [2] et Nymphidius quidem in ipso conatu oppressus, sed 
quamvis capite defectionis ablato manebat plerisque militum conscientia, nec 
deerant sermones senium atque avaritiam Galbae increpantium. laudata olim et 
militari fama celebrata severitas eius angebat asperantes veterem disciplinam 
atque ita quattuordecim annis a Nerone adsuefactos, ut haud minus vitia principum 
amarent quam olim virtutes verebantur. accessit Galbae vox pro re publica 
honesta, ipsi anceps, legi a se militem, non emi; nec enim ad hanc formam cetera 
erant. (H. 1.5.1-2) 
 
The city’s soldiers—steeped in a longstanding oath-relationship to the Caesars and 
led to desert Nero more by cunning and pressure than by its own character—learned 
that the donative promised to them under Galba’s name would not be given; that 
the same opportunity for great services and rewards would not be available to them 
in peacetime as it had been in war; and that, under an emperor who had been created 
by the legions, they would not be favored. Susceptible as the soldiers were to revolt, 
they were further agitated by the wickedness of the prefect Nymphidius Sabinus, 
who was scheming to become emperor. [2] Indeed, Nymphidius was stopped in the 
very act, but, even though the head of the mutiny had been removed, many of the 
soldiers had a guilty conscience. There was no shortage of people who spoke 
disparagingly of Galba’s old age and stinginess. His severity, formerly praised and 
celebrated among soldiers, distressed those who scorned ancient discipline and had 
grown so accustomed to the last 14 years under Nero that they loved the vices of 
emperors no less than they used to fear their virtues. Another factor was Galba’s 
quip that he conscripts soldiers rather than purchases them—a credit to the state but 
personally pernicious, since the rest of his life did not conform to this standard. 
 
The many events, moods and political maneuvers of 68 CE described in this chapter are 
told essentially from the perspective of a disaffected soldiery. The soldiers, feeling scorned and 
taken for granted, have come to understand (intellegit) that the donative, which they clearly 
expect to receive, is not forthcoming from an emperor with a public persona (vox) that proudly 
trumpets such an old-fashioned (pro Republica) outlook on the subject (legi a se militem, non 
emi).111 Interestingly, we do not know, based on this account alone, whether Galba ever actually 
approved such a donative or whether he ever actually planned to pay it. Tacitus even disguises 
with a passive verb (promissum) the identity of the man who promised the donative in the first 
                                                      
111 This epigram also appears at Suet. Gal. 16.1, Plut. G. 18.2, and Cass. Dio 64.3.3. 
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place, emphasizing instead that the oath was pledged “in the emperor’s name” (sub nomine 
Galbae).  
In his parallel account in the Galba, Plutarch spends four chapters (G. 8-9, 13-14) 
detailing the involvement and culpability of Nymphidius Sabinus, whose unfulfillable promise 
explicitly leads to the destruction of Nero and then of Galba.112 By emphasizing the impossibility 
of fulfilling Nymphidius’ promise, Plutarch shifts the blame off of Galba and positions the 
prefect as the primary villain. Tacitus, by contrast, presents the prefect’s influence as “over and 
above” (insuper) the more fundamental anxieties provoked (a) by the absent donative, in which 
Nymphidius plays no explicit part, (b) by diminished opportunity for self-enrichment in 
peacetime, and (c) by anxieties over favoritism. Tacitus does acknowledge Nymphidius’ role 
briefly in the middle of the passage above,113 but then immediately refocuses attention on 
Galba’s reputation for old-fashioned morals and miserliness,114 a recurring theme throughout 
book 1.115 For Tacitus, then, the new emperor’s failure to make good on the promise is a much 
graver mistake than making the promise in the first place. Galba, in other words, not Nymphidius 
Sabinus, is the man on Tacitus’ hook.  
Each of the first six words of the passage above—miles urbanus longo Caesarum 
sacramento imbutus—carries weight. By now it is hopefully clear that the historian’s use of the 
term sacramentum, at the very moment we learn that Galba will not be paying the donativum 
                                                      
112 Cf. Damon (2003) 104: “…T[acitus] reduces his story to a minimum: he sought supreme power and failed. 
Plutarch, by contrast, allots four substantial chapters (G. 8-9, 13-14).” 
113 He does return, however, to Nymphidius again at 1.6.1. 
114 The old-fashioned morals of Galba were clearly an essential part of the broader historiographical tradition. The 
pithy epigram which Tacitus relates, legi a se militem, non emi (“that he conscripted soldiers, he did not buy them,” 
1.5.2), finds close parallel in Plut. G. 18.2, Suet. Gal. 16.1, and Cass. Dio 64.3.3.  
115 Tacitus returns, for instance, to the common soldiers’ dissatisfaction with the lack of donative when Galba 
announces his intention to adopt Piso on 10 January 69: constat potuisse conciliari animos quantulacumque parci 
senis liberalitate (“There is general agreement that they could have been won over by a tiny act of generosity from 
the stingy old emperor,” 1.18.3). 
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promised in his name, is no coincidence. Elsewhere in the Tacitean corpus when imbutus is used 
to describe a condition of allegiance or loyalty, the historian opts for the ablative favore 
instead.116 Here, sacramento pointedly invokes the ritual act which created that condition of 
loyalty in the first place.117 But, as we are soon told, Galba never adequately paid for that oath 
(neque dari donativom sub nomine Galbae promissum). In other words, he is in breach of the 
sacramentum-donativum contract. The stacked modifiers longo, Caesarum, and imbutus all 
together express the ideas of longevity and stability.118 The plural Caesarum in this context 
certainly refers to the Julio-Claudians as a group, under whom the sacramentum ritual was 
adapted from its earlier Republican form and had been institutionalized for generations. Thus, 
Tacitus emphasizes (a) the antiquity of the bond between emperor and soldier stretching back to 
Augustus, and, consequently, (b) the seriousness of that bond’s disruption. The miles urbanus is 
situated within a broader historical and cultural framework that speaks to fundamental questions 
of how loyalty between emperors and armies has traditionally been constructed. 
But what is the miles urbanus? The term is not a technical one, nor is its precise meaning 
readily obvious. Yet Tacitus gives us enough information to deduce their identity. Just above, 
Tacitus uses the same term (urbanum militem, 1.4.2) in clear contrast with the patres and the 
urban populus on the one hand, and with the legiones and duces in the provinces on the other. 
This leaves only the praetorian guard and the urban cohort. Thus, the miles urbanus of 1.5.1 must 
                                                      
116 Cf. 2.85.1; A. 15.59.4. The various forms of imbuo (OLD s.v. 2) used by in the Tacitean corpus primarily express 
either a commitment to learning (omni eruditione, D. 2.2; elementis studiorum, D. 19.5; grammatica musica 
geometria, D. 13.7; domestica disciplina, D. 34.1; incorrupta eloquentia, D. 34.4; bonis artibus, A. 15.45.2) or a 
commitment to violence, often internecine (sanguine, 1.83.4; civili praeda, 3.15; licentia, 3.49; caede nobili, 4.42; 
licentia saevitiaque, 4.72; caede, A. 1.18.3; praeda, A. 1.36.1;  discordiis, A. 11.16.2; armis civilibus aut domesticis 
discordiis, A. 13.4.1). 
117 This oath presumably occurred around the time Galba was proclaimed emperor by the praetorian guard, likely 
upon his arrival in Italy. Murison (1993) 27-30 offers 20 September 68 as a terminus post quem for Galba’s arrival 
in Rome, and estimates that arrival was likely in late October of that year.  
118 Cf. 1.16.2: Nero, quem longa Caesarum serie… (“Nero, whom, after a long sequence of Caesars…”). 
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refer generically to both of these resident armies. According to Cynthia Damon, “the 
undifferentiated reference…reflects reality, since the two corps, though under the command of 
the praetorian and urban prefects respectively, lived together in the castra praetoria in Rome.”119  
Such concerns may seem pedantic, but are in fact vitally important for understanding the 
plot-progression of Histories 1. Our ability to identify these soldiers in precision allows us to 
track their movements throughout the narrative just as an ancient reader no doubt could have. As 
we shall see throughout the rest of this section, the men whom Tacitus calls the miles urbanus, 
and whose long commitment to the sacramentum Galba refuses to honor with a donativum, are 
the very members of the praetorian guard and urban cohort who turn Otho into the second 
emperor of 69 CE.120  
Otho knows how to exploit the disaffection of the miles urbanus. Even before the coup 
begins to materialize, the ostentatiously generous Otho “hands out a tip of 100 sesterces to each 
and every member of the urban cohort on duty” (cohorti excubias agenti viritim centenos 
nummos divideret, 1.24.1). Otho entrusts the planning of the revolt’s early stages to a non-
military man, a freedman named Onomastus. Onomastus’ first order of business is to bribe 
various praetorians and cohort auxiliaries—first the “bodyguards” (speculatores), then “members 
of the company” (manipulares), and even into the “higher ranks” (primores militum, 1.25.1-2).121 
                                                      
119 Damon (2003) 101: “In H. T[acitus] uses miles urbanus of praetorian and urban cohorts together (1.5.1, 1.14.1, 
2.19.1, 2.94.1), of the urban cohorts alone (89.2, 3.69.1), and in contexts where the Praetorians alone seem relevant 
(2.19.1); he differentiates the urbans from the praetorians at 1.20.3, 1.74.3, 1.87.1, 1.89.2, 2.21.4, 2.93.2.” 
120 On the Othonian coup generally, see esp. Morgan (1993a), Ash (1999) 23-36 and Keitel (2006) 228-29. 
121 Speculatores were special adjutants under the emperors: see Suet. Cal. 44, Aug. 74, Cl. 35, Gal. 18, Otho 5; cf. 
Tac. H. 2.73. Chilver (1979) 86: “Under the Principate there were still speculatores in the provinces, apparently ten 
to each legion…but the most important unit was one used close to the princeps in Rome. … This unit was 
considered part of the praetorian guard…” For the ongoing role of the speculatores in the coup, see 1.24.2, 27.2, 
33.1, 35.2. manipulares and primores militum are probably not technical terms (Chilver), though certainly refer to 
members of the urban cohort and praetorian guard (Suet. Otho 5.2). 
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Only then, once these members of the miles urbanus are on board, does the “rot” (tabes) spread 
to the legions, as they too join the cause (1.26.1).122  
Otho’s lobbying efforts with the disaffected miles urbanus pay off: as the anti-Galba 
movement continues to mature, a gathering of twenty-three speculatores proclaim Otho emperor 
(1.27.5). Galba’s regime, apparently recognizing that things have gotten out of hand, now renews 
the donative’s offering. Piso, Galba’s recently adopted heir and surrogate, closes a pleading 
speech to the soldiery from the Palace steps thus: “You will receive the same donative from us 
for loyalty as you would from others for villainy” (a nobis donativom ob fidem quam ab aliis pro 
facinore accipietis, 1.30.3). Piso’s pitch, which smacks of desperation to prevent seditio rather 
than an earnest attempt to restore fides,123 receives mixed, but in no way enthusiastic reviews: 
“though the bodyguards slipped away, the rest of the cohort did not spurn the assembly’s 
speaker” (dilapsis speculatoribus cetera cohors non aspernata contionantem, 1.31.1). Yet 
Galba’s tribunes fail to capitalize on Piso’s speech and win back anyone’s loyalty in the 
praetorian barracks (1.31.2-3). Apparently, Galba’s decision not to give a donative in the first 
place is, for the soldiers, a bell you cannot unring. On the eve of Galba’s murder, when Otho’s 
support among the praetorian guard and urban cohort has reached one-hundred percent (haud 
dubiae iam in castris omnium mentes, “the minds of everyone in the camps were doubtless made 
up,” 1.36.1), a “flock of common soldiers” (gregarius miles) lifts Otho onto a platform and 
pledges him their allegiance (1.36).  
The phrase miles urbanus (1.5.1), it turns out, is deliberately inclusive. Because of its 
inclusivity, we can trace a direct line of causality from Galba’s initial failure to honor the 
                                                      
122 On mutiny as disease in Tacitus, see Manolaraki (2003) 68-93, Woodman (2006) and Woodman (2012) 162-80. 
On the role of the legions in Otho’s coup, see the following section. 
123 Cf. Damon (2003) 162, who notes that the offer is made “in terms too vague to be effective for long.” 
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sacramentum-donativum contract (1.5.1); to the rise of Galba’s more generous challenger, Otho 
(1.24.31); and finally to the enthusiastic oaths taken in Otho’s name (1.36-38). This 
sacramentum scene (1.36-38), to which we turn now, merits particular consideration as both the 
terminus of this narrative arc (1.5-38) and as an attempt by the aggrieved soldiers themselves to 
address its root cause. Tacitus sets the scene vividly (1.36.1): Otho’s fierce supporters place him 
on a platform, using their bodies as a physical buffer between their chosen leader and the officers 
hostile to the coup. We are told that, where Otho now stands, a golden statue of Galba has just 
recently been removed (1.36.1). Such imagery of succession is blunt.124 Next, the self-
empowered and passionate miles urbanus take it upon themselves to resurrect the emperor-
soldier relationship: 
strepere cuncta clamoribus et tumultu et exhortatione mutua, non tamquam in 
populo ac plebe variis segni adulatione vocibus, sed ut quemque adfluentium 
militum ad adspexerant, prensare manibus, complecti armis, conlocare iuxta, 
praeire sacramentum, modo imperatorem militibus, modo milites imperatori 
commendare. [3] nec deerat Otho protendens manus adorare volgum, iacere 
oscula, et omnia serviliter pro dominatione. (1.36.2-3) 
 
Everything resounded with shouts, common, and mutual encouragement—not, as 
if among their people and plebs, with the changeable cries of aimless adulation,125 
but rather, whenever they noticed someone coming toward them, they grasped his 
hands, embraced his arms, drew him close, and dictated the oath of allegiance, 
talking up the [sc. new] emperor to the soldiers and the soldiers to the emperor. [3] 
Nor did Otho fail to stretch forth his hands, pay respect to the crowd, throwing 
kisses and doing everything with servility rather than with dominance.  
 
Tacitus describes Otho’s passive role in this episode as slavish (serviliter). praeeo, an 
exceedingly strange verb for soldiers rather than commanders to be the subject of, connotes an 
intense level of religious fervor, and speaks to the soldiers’ enthusiasm.126 The miles urbanus, by 
taking matters into their own hands and instructing one another to take the sacramentum, 
                                                      
124 Cf. 3.13 and the discussion in Ch. 2, pp. 78-84. 
125 The elegant phrase borrowed from Damon (2003) 175. 
126 Damon (2003) 176. The significance of praeeo in oaths will be discussed more fully in Ch. 2, pp. 64-66. 
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collectively assume a dominant and active role surpassing even the (allegedly) voluntary 
sacramentum of Augustus’ rise in 32 BCE (Aug. Anc. 25). Damon correctly observes that “the 
soldiers were now acting the commander’s part.”127 But, somewhat paradoxically, they take 
control of the situation not so that they might exceed their station, but rather so that they might 
resume their station as it existed before the disruption of the sacramentum-donativum contract. 
“Imbued” as they are with the “long-term tradition of swearing oaths to the Caesars” (1.5.1), it 
makes perfect sense that they would actively and voluntarily revert to the oath once imperial 
generosity is restored. And it is not a stretch to say that, in a very real sense, the soldiers of Rome 
orchestrate not only a restoration of a Julio-Claudian-era relationship, but a return to Nero 
himself. Otho was, after all, a product of the Neronian court. And, in fact, much of Otho’s initial 
success in syphoning off supporters from Galba derived from his resemblance to Nero.128 
 Understanding fully what has won him his support, Otho is sure to touch on the 
miserliness of the Galbans when he delivers a speech to the newly-sworn-in crowd of supporters. 
After emphasizing the greed of Galba’s supporters, the freedman Icelus and consul Titus 
Vinius129 relative to Nero’s freedmen Polyclitus, Vatinius, and Aegialus, Otho asserts: 
“Nowadays, Galba keeps us in subjugation as though we were his property and holds us cheap as 
if the property of another. One of his houses would cover the cost of the donative which you 
were never given and which is the source of daily recriminations” (nunc et subiectos nos habuit 
tamquam suos et viles ut alienos. Una illa domus sufficit donativo, quod vobis numquam datur et 
cotidie exprobratur, 1.37.5). Thus, Otho brilliantly argues that Galba’s unneeded stinginess in 
fact constitutes a devaluation (viles) of the soldiers themselves.  
                                                      
127 Damon (2003) 176. 
128 Cf. 1.13.3-4, 22.1-2. 
129 T. Vinius was, along with Galba, the consul of 69; cf. 1.1.1, 11.3. Tacitus relates that he and Cornelius Laco 
dominated Galba throughout his short reign; cf. 1.6.1.  
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That such sentiments appeal to the soldiers suggests that, while Tacitus’ soldiers may not 
want to feel oppressed (nunc et subiectos nos habuit tamquam suos), they do crave a reciprocal 
relationship with their emperor (viles ut alienos). In that sense, mutiny, revolt, and disobedience 
may at times function as little more than expressions of discontent in the absence of appropriate 
reciprocity. Later in book 3, soldiers’ hatred of feeling “cheap” (vilis) recurs in a similar context. 
When the Vitellian turncoat Caecina fails—in fact, never even attempts—to lead his loyal 
legions in an oath to Vespasian (3.13.1), those legions employ the language of commerce to 
decry being commoditized and undervalued: integros incruentosque, Flavianis quoque partibus 
viles, quid dicturos reposcentibus aut prospera aut adversa? (“What are we, healthy and 
unbloodied though we are, supposed to tell the Flavians, who will hold us cheap, when they 
demand to see our balance sheet of wins and losses?”).130 Furthermore, the prominence of the 
adjective vilis at the ends of chapters deepens the motif’s scope. For instance, at the very end of 
book 1, when Otho delivers another, much hollower speech than the one at 1.37-38, the audience 
responds with servile flattery. Tacitus has a bleak diagnosis: vile iam decus publicum (“the 
dignity of the state was now held cheap,” 1.90.1). Again, at the end of book 2, as Bassus and 
                                                      
130 The translation is my own, though the phrase “demand to see the balance sheet” is from Wellesley (1972) 96, 
who explains “reposcere literally = ‘to demand payment of a debt, or the account of a sum entrusted’.” Indeed, OLD 
s.v. reposco 2b “to demand an account” claims H. 3.13. The soldiers’ entire collectivized speech is replete with 
economic terms and metaphors (underlined): huc cecidisse Germanici exercitus gloriam ut sine proelio, sine vulnere 
vinctas manus et capta traderent arma? quas enim ex diverso legiones? nempe victas; et abesse unicum Othoniani 
exercitus robur, primanos quartadecimanosque, quos tamen isdem illis campis fuderint straverintque. ut tot 
armatorum milia, velut grex venalium, exuli Antonio donum darentur? octo nimirum legiones unius classis 
accessionem fore. id Basso, id Caecinae visum, postquam domos hortos opes principi abstulerint, etiam militem 
auferre. integros incruentosque, Flavianis quoque partibus viles, quid dicturos reposcentibus aut prospera aut 
adversa? (“Has the glory of the German army fallen so low that we should surrender our weapons into captivity and 
our hands bound, without so much as a battle or a wound to show for it? What sort of legions do they have in the 
other camp? Defeated ones! The Othonian army’s only source of strength, the men of First and Twenty-Fourth 
Legions, are gone. In any case, we scattered and laid low those men on the very same fields. All this, so that 
thousands of armed soldiers be given as a gift to that exile Antonius Primus like a herd of slaves? I’m sure eight 
legions would be a nice addition to a single fleet! That is what Bassus wanted, it is what Caecina wanted, after they 
robbed the emperor of his villas, gardens and money: to rob him of his army, too! What are we, healthy and 
unbloodied though we are, supposed to tell the Flavians, who will hold us cheap, when they demand to see our 
balance sheet of wins and losses?” 3.13.2-3).  
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Caecina plot to betray Vitellius, Tacitus links the betrayal of Galba to the cheapening of the 
concept of loyalty itself: prodito Galba vilem mox fidem (“loyalty was soon held cheap after they 
betrayed Galba,” 2.101).131 
 
CONFLICT IN PROVINCIAL GERMANY 
 
 
Students of Roman Imperial history and the succession of emperors, going back to at least the 
biographer Suetonius, have naturally thought of Otho as preceding Vitellius—which he of course 
did, in terms of reign order. However, Tacitus’ format (literary annalistic history, as opposed to 
biography) allows him to approach the events from another perspective—namely, that both Otho 
and Vitellius, virtually simultaneously and independent of one another, capitalized on the same 
discontent which the lack of a Galban donative caused. In the previous section, we saw that Otho 
and the miles urbanus, provoked by Otho’s many bribes, pioneered a workable domestic solution 
to the betrayals of the Galban regime.132 In this section, we will explore Tacitus’ strategies for 
linking the conflict in Germany to that urban narrative.  
To whom was the donative mentioned at 1.5.1 promised? Tacitus names only the miles 
urbanus. This term, as we have seen, must encompass all the common soldiers of Rome’s 
permanent military presence, and nothing more. Yet non-urban military personnel attached 
themselves to Otho’s coup as well. Tacitus records in his survey of 68 CE that, after Galba 
arrived in Rome, the city was crowded with an unfamiliar army—namely, the Seventh (Galban) 
                                                      
131 For the identification of the parameters and nature of this section, as well as an excellent analysis of its contents, 
see Damon (2003) 98-100. Keitel (2006) 226-36 had shown extensively that the motif of fides marks Galba’s 
relationship with his amici, such that Galba is, in many ways, an upstanding leader surrounded by disloyal servants: 
“Tacitus attributes to Galba a genuine cura rei publicae in choosing Piso over Otho (1.13.2). … “But while Galba 
rails against the poison of self-interest, the adoption scene is encircled by passages describing the low motives of his 
advisors (as we have seen), of the general public, and of senators” (226-27). Cf. Shotter (1991) 3324, cited by 
Keitel: “cura rei publicae is a term of wider application than fides: indeed fides in most cases is to be subsumed into 
it.” 
132 Equitable, that is, for the time being: cf. 1.80-85. 
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Legion and another legion full of recent conscripts from the naval fleet (6.2). As Otho’s coup 
gained momentum, some legionaries, apparently members of the Seventh Legion, got caught up 
in it (1.26.1).133 Later, at Otho’s acclamation, it was the naval legion’s acceptance of the oath 
(sacramentum eius accepit) that made Otho believe in his own strength (1.36.3). While we might 
easily understand the participation of these non-urban legions to have stemmed from peer 
pressure or the like, might we also understand that the empire’s many legionaries were expecting 
a donative as well, and were dissatisfied with Galba when it was not forthcoming?  
According to our other sources for these events, they certainly were, on both counts. 
Though Cassius Dio mentions only the discontentment of the praetorian guard (64.3), Suetonius 
quite explicitly connects the Vitellian challenge in the German provinces to the absence of a 
Galban donative: 
atque eo quidem nomine omnis, qui ubique erant, exacerbavit. … sed maxime 
fremebat superioris Germaniae exercitus fraudari se praemis navatae adversus 
Gallos et Vindicem operae. ergo primi obsequium rumpere ausi Kal. Ian. adigi 
sacramento nisi in nomen senatus recusarunt. (Suet. Gal. 16.2) 
 
Thus the troops became exasperated against him in all quarters. … But most of all, 
the army in Upper Germany was incensed against him, as being defrauded of the 
rewards due to them for the service they had rendered in the insurrection of the 
Gauls under Vindex. They were, therefore, the first who ventured to break into open 
mutiny, refusing upon the kalends of January to take any oath of allegiance, except 
to the senate. 
 
Plutarch, though less explicit than Suetonius, certainly supports such a narrative:  
οἱ δὲ πρότερον ὑπὸ Οὐεργινίῳ γενόμενοι, τότε δὲ ὄντες ὑπὸ Φλάκκῳ περὶ 
Γερμανίαν, μεγάλων μὲν ἀξιοῦντες αὑτοὺς διὰ τὴν μάχην ἣν ἐμαχέσαντο πρὸς 
Οὐΐνδικα, μηδενὸς δὲ τυγχάνοντες, ἀπαρηγόρητοι τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἦσαν. (Plut. G. 
18.3) 
 
But the army which had formerly served under Verginius, and was now serving 
under Flaccus in Germany, thinking themselves deserving of great rewards on 
account of the battle they had fought against Vindex, and getting nothing, could not 
be appeased by their officers. (trans. Perrin (1926)) 
                                                      
133 Scholars doubt whether the Galban legion was still in Rome during Galba’s coup; see Damon (2003) 109.  
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As we saw in the previous section, Tacitus introduces the Vitellian uprising twice (1.12.1, 55.1). 
Donatives play no explicit role in either passage. Yet, as we saw earlier in this chapter, Tacitus 
implicitly links the uprising in the north (1.12, 55.1-3) to events in Rome (1.5) by repetitively re-
inaugurating the consular year around the same motif (oaths). Since the praetorian oath was 
wrapped up in grievances over donatives, it stands to reason that the provincial oath was as well.  
Tacitus further heightens the connection between the German and Roman oaths through 
the carefully worded phrase rupta sacramenti reverentia (1.12.1).134 Damon notes that these 
three words constitute an adaptation of the more common rumpere foedus.135 She adds, 
insightfully, that “by applying rupta instead to the abstract noun reverentia, T[actus] refers the 
particular act of breaking an oath to a more general ethical collapse.”136 By the same token, the 
difference between Tacitus’ rupta sacramenti reverentia and Suetonius’ obsequium rumpere in 
the same historical context (Suet. Gal. 16) is that Tacitus takes the longer view: whereas 
obsequium denotes the soldiers’ obedience to a particular emperor (in this case Galba), 
sacramenti reverentia denotes both current allegiance and the tradition of swearing allegiance to 
                                                      
134 During the Second Punic War (206 BCE), P. Cornelius Scipio calls into question how to address one particular 
batch of mutineers: “As ‘soldier?’ You, who have rejected my command and the auspices, you who have broken the 
sanctity of the oath?” (An milites? qui imperium auspiciumque abnuistis, sacramenti religionem rupistis, Liv. 
28.27.4). OLD s.v. reverentia 1b “a feeling of restraint in the presence of a superior, etc., awe, deference, respect, 
etc.” is attested 19 times in the Tacitean corpus. The vast majority of its attestations in Latin occur between 50-150 
CE. 
135 For rumpere foedus in Latin epic, see Vessey (1974) 28. The Roman mind seems to have linked the concept of 
foedus with that of fides: accipe daque fidem foedusque feri bene firmum (“…” Enn. Ann. 32 Skutsch). Aeneas, 
whom Dido famously calls perfide (“treacherous,” Verg. A. 4.336) denies having married Dido thusly: nec coniugis 
umquam / praetendi taedas aut haec in foedera veni (“…” Verg. A. 4.337-39; cf. 112). For discussion of this 
connection, see Hellegouarc’h (1972) 23-40 and Samuels (2014) 481-82. 
136 Damon (2003) 126 further observes: “reverentia functions as a kind of ethical brake, blocking actions that an 
individual or group is otherwise eager for: reverentia matris keeps Nero from indulging in passions (A. 14.13.2), 
reverentia ducis keeps the Vitellians from changing sides (H. 3.41.2), reverentia foederis keeps the Parthian king 
Vologaeses from avenging a Roman insult (A. 15.1.1)”  
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all emperors since Augustus.137 Tacitus’ decision to express the beginning of the Vitellian 
challenge from the perspective of an abstract crisis links the German legions’ mutiny quite 
closely with the earlier, Julio-Claudian minded formulation: miles urbanus longo Caesarum 
sacramento imbutus (1.5.1). Thus, both Rome’s miles urbanus and Germany’s provincial 
legionaries tap into the oath-crisis in its broadest sense. Tacitus means for the sacramentum-
donativum contract to apply to the German legions as well.   
 
The rippling effect—geographically and diachronically—of Galba’s stinginess is largely a 
subject for my discussions of the Vitellians, Flavians, and Batavians in chapters 2-4. Yet some 
early effects are alluded to already in the sweeping survey of the entire Mediterranean world of 
68 CE (1.4-11). In this survey, Tacitus sums up the mood and military condition of every region 
and province of relevance. He concludes by issuing a dire warning of things to come: “the 
unarmed provinces and especially Italy itself, vulnerable as they were to enslavement at anyone’s 
hand, were about to turn into the spoils of war” (inermes provinciae atque ipsa in primis Italia, 
cuicumque servitio exposita, in pretium belli cessurae erant 1.11.3). This ominous statement 
introduces a theme that will command the reader’s attention as the plot of 69 CE advances: 
soldiers and armies seeking to enrich themselves through violence perpetrated against the more 
vulnerable members of the Roman world. Indeed, Chapter 3 explores how the reduction of 
fellow Romans into payable war-time commodities will become a key method by which generals 
purchase and maintain the loyalty and discipline of their armies. It is no coincidence that this 
prescient prediction immediately precedes Tacitus’ first of several announcements that Galba lost 
                                                      
137 Plutarch’s account, while not interested in oaths or reverence per se, shares with Tacitus an explicit concern for 
the bid picture: ὥσπερ οὐ Γάλβαν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως ἄρχοντα καὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι φεύγοντες (“It is as though we were averse, 
not to Galba, but to all rule and obedience,” G. 22.4; trans. Damon (2003)). 
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the loyalty of the German legions (1.12). Nor is it a coincidence that, when the Vitellian 
narrative of violence and plunder begins in earnest, Tacitus re-states an even fuller version of 
oath-related chaos and disillusionment (1.55). In both cases, Tacitus is prompting a connection to 
be drawn: unending death and plunder in Germany, Gaul, and northern Italy of books 1-4 can all 
be traced back to Galba and a failure to honor the sacramentum-donativum contract. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In the foregoing discussion, I examined the oath-scenes of early January 69 from several 
overlapping perspectives: (1) as the focal point of a lexical nexus Tacitus creates between 
sacramentum, seditio, and fides in order to highlight their interconnectedness; (2) as an aspect of 
Tacitus’ career-long interest in the function of accession oaths, manifested later in Annals 1.7-8; 
(3) as an inaugural moment of substantial thematic significance in the Histories’ annalistically 
structured narrative; (4) as the beginning of a sacramentum-donativum crisis that promises to 
outlive Galba; and (5) as the common denominator of the principates of both Otho and Vitellius. 
By staking out these positions, I hope to have demonstrated that oaths constitute a fundamental 
component of Tacitean historiography.  
Also in the foregoing discussion, I made the case that Galba’s decision not to pay the 
promised donative ought to be seen against a Julio-Claudian backdrop, whereon successive 
principes had allowed the sacramentum to become increasing commoditized. Galba’s failure to 
keep either the principate or his life ultimately stem from a failure to respect recently developed 
customs regarding the realities of how loyalties are acquired in a post-Augustan world. This 
Julio-Claudian backdrop, and Galba’s troubled relationship with it, helps us understand why 
Tacitus ultimately decided to begin his narrative on 1 January 69. The Roman world did not 
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fundamentally change when Nero committed suicide. After all, in the post-Neronian (but pre-
Histories) world of 68 CE, donatives were still being granted as usual. It was only when the 
soldiers of the empire, legions and praetorians alike, were faced with the prospect of swearing 
allegiance to a man stingier than any in recent memory that the true period of tumult and 
uncertainty—and with it Tacitus’ story—began.   
As we shall see in Chapters 2-4, Galba’s failure to live in his own times initiates a period 
of unrest and disorder in the Roman world. This breakdown transcends inter-personal and inter-
factional conflict: it realigns the expectations of soldiers such that the wealth of entire cities can 
barely sate their desires, and gives rise to a new faction in the East better adapted to the times. 
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Chapter 2 
 
The Success of the Flavian sacramenta 
 
What accounts for the Flavians’ successes and ultimate victory in the civil wars of 69 CE?138 
One answer, Tacitus tells us directly and repeatedly, is a healthy share of fortuna (“luck,” “good 
fortune”).139 Even before the Flavian challenge begins, Vespasian (2.74.2)140 and Mucianus 
(2.76.1) state that a successful challenge of Vitellian authority will be subject to fortune’s 
approval. After Vespasian’s acclamation (2.73-86), the centrality of luck in Flavian affairs 
continues unabated throughout book 3,141 as the Flavians win significant victories at the Second 
Battle of Cremona (3.23.3) and the Campus Martius (3.82.3).142 However, such a simple 
explanation of cause, when offered up by an intellect as active as Tacitus’, ought to alert the 
reader to look for further, less-explicit argumentation. So what other attributes, beyond mere 
chance, might have aided the Flavians?  
This chapter argues that the Flavian leadership, Vespasian and his right-hand man 
Mucianus in particular, demonstrate a strong aptitude and willingness to administer the 
sacramentum in order to realign, solidify and expand the loyalties of the armies of the Eastern 
                                                      
138 For a lengthy and in-depth discussion of who constituted the “Flavian party” (partes Flavianae), see Nicols 
(1978) esp. 86-174. 
139 For Vespasian’s relationship to fortuna, see, e.g., Scott (1968) 70-84, Kajanto (1981) 502-58, Nicols (1978) 132, 
Levick (1999) 67, Griffin (2000) 2, Davies (2004) 172-75. For the difference between fortuna and fatum, see Levene 
(1993). On the fate (fatum) driving Vespasian’s successes, see especially Davies (2004) 211-221. 
140 Et prout velint, plus minusve sumi ex fortuna (2.74.2); Ash (2007) 288 provides a simultaneously idiomatic and 
literal translation of this difficult passage: “‘and just as people wish, they can advance more boldly or cautiously, 
depending on how they fare’ (lit. ‘more or less of the way can be taken, according to fortune’).”  
141 For the importance of fortuna to the Flavian rise to power, cf. 2.1.12, 82.2; 3.2.4, 5.2, 9.5, 17.2, 18.1, 18.2, 32.3, 
59.2, 60.2, 64.1, 79.2. For Vitellian lack of fortuna, cf. 2.97.1. For both Vespasian (1.10.3; 2.1.2, 80.2, 81.3; 3.43.1, 
46.3, 49.1) and Vitellius (1.62.2, 68.1, 77.1), Tacitus uses fortuna to denote imperial power itself; see Damon (2003) 
123. For fortuna as monetary fortune, see 2.84.2 (Mucianus), 2.86.4 (soldiers). 
142 See also 2.7.1.  
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Mediterranean. The successful inauguration of the Flavian challenge does not merely coincide 
with a series of oaths sworn to Vespasian; rather, the oaths themselves, as orchestrated by the 
Flavian leadership, contribute to and in large measure create the marked stability and scope of 
the partes Flavianae. After having secured the loyalty of their soldiers through well-executed 
oaths, Vespasian and Mucianus follow a moderate path with regard to donatives, neither paying 
an obscene amount nor foregoing the custom entirely. Thus, they sidestep the faults of recent 
emperors—from Claudius to Otho—and make an important first gesture toward restabilizing 
Roman military society.  
Furthermore, as we shall see, Tacitus draws attention to the great skill and intelligence of 
the Flavians in the matter of oaths by highlighting the Vitellians’ relative ineptitude and 
ignorance. According to Cynthia Damon, one way to measure the difference between the 
Vitellians and Flavians is to examine how the two factions relate to the fundamental Roman 
concept of fides (“loyalty”): Vitellius, she observes, “seems not so much vicious as confused 
about this fundamental virtue, but the emperor’s confusion proved fatal….”143 Conversely, “the 
Flavian record on fides in the surviving books is presented with less moralizing, more 
calculation.”144 I would suggest that Damon’s insightful observations apply also to the 
sacramentum, the precise moment of loyalty’s inception. Vespasian and his associates are better 
at forming relationships with their armies than the Vitellians are, because they possess a vastly 
                                                      
143 Damon (2006) 265. 
144 Damon (2006) 265 gives two examples of the Flavians’ “pragmatic” attitude toward fides: “[1] More typical of 
the Flavian attitude is Mucianus’ canny advice to Vespasian at the outset of their bid for power. When someone 
pushes you towards a risky undertaking, says Mucianus, you should ask yourself whether he is putting his own 
safety at risk (2.76.1: ipse qui suadet considerandus est, adiciatne consilio periculum suum). A simple profession of 
fides, it is implied, will not suffice. Mucianus is at this very point urging an extremely risky undertaking on 
Vespasian, and the narrative, as we will see below, gives plentiful evidence of his having linked his fate to 
Vespasian’s. [2] This pragmatic form of fides is also demonstrated by Antonius Primus, who, after urging the 
commanders of the Danube legions to move quickly against Vitellius rather than wait for Mucianus and the legions 
of the east, says that he himself will put the plan into effect: idem suasor auctorque consilii ero (3.2.4: ‘I will both 
urge and carry out the plan’). Like Mucianus, he follows through.” 
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greater understanding of the importance of the sacramentum and how to administer it to their 
advantage. 
 
 
PART 1: The Inauguration of the Flavian Challenge 
 
 
THE VITELLIANS DO NOT UNDERSTAND SACRAMENTA 
 
The extended acclamation sequence of Vespasian in the East (2.73-81) reveals a stark contrast 
between the savviness of the Flavians and the ignorance and incompetence of the Vitellians in 
matters of commander-soldier relations. This contrast hinges primarily on Tacitus’ use of the 
sacramentum as a transitional device between two narrative panels, wherein the same pivotal 
scene of oath-swearing in the East is told from a Vitellian perspective at the end (2.73) of a long 
Vitellian panel (2.57-73), and then told again from a Flavian perspective at the beginning (2.74) 
of a subsequent Flavian section of the narrative (2.74-86).  
The Vitellian panel mainly consists of Vitellius’ lugubrious march to Rome, fresh off his 
victory against Otho. The panel ends when “scouts from Syria and Judaea reported that the East 
had been administered an oath to [Vitellius]” (speculatores e Syria Iudaeaque adactum in verba 
eius Orientem nuntiavere, 2.73). Vitellius responds to the apparent fealty with “haughtiness” 
(superbia) and “complacency” (socordia). Tacitus elaborates: 
tum ipse exercitusque, ut nullo aemulo, saevitia libidine raptu in externos mores 
proruperant. (2.73) 
 
[Vitellius] himself and his army, as though without rival, erupted into patterns of 
behavior more associated with foreigners and marked by savagery, debauchery and 
plundering.”145 
 
                                                      
145 Trans. Wellesley (2009). 
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In hindsight, Vitellius’ recklessness and credulity is “almost unbelievable” (vix credibile 
memoratu, 2.73), for the emperor had heard about Vespasian and the potential threat he posed 
(2.73). Tacitus thus infuses this first exchange between the Flavians and Vitellians with a pointed 
contrast. The new emperor, who has just arrived at the capital of his empire, ought to be the 
Roman in this scenario. However, by ignoring the external threat and thus failing to possess 
constructive metus hostilis, Vitellius has marked himself as someone in a state of moral 
decline.146 Vespasian, the future emperor and dynasty founder on the periphery of the empire to 
whom Tacitus shifts in the very next sentence, already possesses the potential to be the better 
Roman simply by default.  
 The Flavian panel (2.74-86) now begins by backtracking a few weeks earlier to describe 
what actually happened with the oath that was reported to Vitellius in the foregoing chapter 
(2.73). This time, the oath is focalized through Vespasian and his legions:  
at Vespasianus bellum armaque et procul vel iuxta sitas viris circumspectabat. 
Miles ipsi adeo paratus ut praeeuntem sacramentum et fausta Vitellio omnia 
precantem per silentium audierint. (2.74.1) 
 
But Vespasian, however, considered carefully the prospect of war, arms and forces 
positioned both near and far. His own soldiers were so prepared to follow him that 
they listened to him in silence as he led them in an oath of allegiance to Vitellius 
and prayed that all the emperor’s affairs be well-omened. 
 
Vitellius’ scouts were right about one thing: this passage makes absolutely clear that the oath 
was in fact, as they reported, “administered” (adactum, 2.73) by Vespasian. But in every other 
respect, Tacitus reveals that Vitellius’ socordia and superbia were misplaced.  
A deeper explanation of the vocabulary of oath-scenes is in order. It was standard 
practice for the commander first to take the oath himself, and then to administer it to his 
                                                      
146 For a clear expression of the concept and phrase, cf. Sal. Jug. 41.2 with Lintott (1972) 627 and Levene (2000) 
178-80. Cf. also Sal. Hist. 1.12 (metus Punicus). 
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underlings.147 Quite often, however, Tacitus’ (and others’) descriptions of sacramenta omit the 
commander’s own personal oath, while compressing the commander’s directives to his army into 
a neat, idiomatic phrase: in verba adigere (literally: “to compel someone [acc.] to say words of 
allegiance to someone [gen.]”).148 In many cases, the soldiers’ assent and participation in the 
oath as administered is left unstated but can easily be inferred from context.149 However, in cases 
where assent is not implied, as at 2.74.1, formulations such as iurare (“to swear”) or dicere 
sacramentum (“to say the oath”), with the swearer as subject, and/or silentium, all may be 
employed to indicate that the oath has or has not been acceded to.150 Such formulations 
commonly either downplay or outright negate top-down administration. An episode in Livy 
elucidates the essential semantic distinction between iurare (vel sim.) and in verba adigere (vel 
                                                      
147 For a fuller description of the oath “fanning out” from the higher to the lower ranks—and, in this case, from 
Rome to the provinces—see the oaths of allegiance sworn to Tiberius at the start of his reign (A. 1.7.2), and to 
Germanicus during the German revolt (A. 1.34.1), with Goodyear (1972) 254. Pliny also provides a clear description 
of a similar non-military scenario: stabant candidati ante curulem principis ut ipse ante consulis steterat, 
adigebanturque in verba in quae paulo ante ipse iuraverat princeps, qui tantum putat esse in iure iurando, ut illud 
et ab aliis exigat (“The candidates stood before the prince’s chair, as he previously stood himself before the 
consul’s, and were directed to take the oath in the same words as their prince had recently used—for he believes the 
act of swearing so important that he expects everyone to do as he did,” Plin. Pan. 77.2; trans. Radice).  
148 For examples of this phrase, see TLL i/678.72-693.23. The use of adigo in oath-phrases abounds in Tacitus’ 
major works and in the Histories especially. Tacitus quite often includes the recipient of the oath in the genitive: 
2.14, 2.80, 3.13, 3.43.1, 4.21.1, 4.59.3, 4.61, 4.70.5; A. 1.34.1; cf. Suet. Ves. 6.3. Sometimes, though less commonly, 
the precise type of oath being sworn (i.e., ius iurandum, sacramentum) is supplied: 1.76.2; 2.55.1, 79; 3.58.2; A. 
1.37.1; cf. Caes. BC 1.76.3, 2.18.5.  
149 An example occurs in this very section of Histories 2, when Tiberius Alexander administers an oath to his 
Egyptian legions (2.79.1). Similarly, the success of Vespasian’s and Mucianus’ dutiful efforts on Otho’s behalf in 
early 69 is implied: Iudaicum exercitum Vespasianus, Syriae legiones Mucianus sacramento Othonis adegere 
(“Vespasian administered the loyalty oath to the Judaean army, Mucianus to the legions of Syria,” 1.76.2). For the 
implied success of adigere outside of Tacitus, cf., e.g., Caes. BC 1.76.3 and Liv. 4.5.2. Livy describes an ancient 
past when questioning an oath, once administered (cum sacramento adacti sint), had not yet even been considered 
(Liv 3.20.4-5). 
150 This was evident in some of the oaths we saw in the previous chapter; cf. iuravit in mea verba tota Italia sponte 
sua (“All of Italy, of its own accord swore an oath in my name,” Aug. Anc. 25); iurare in nomen suum passus est 
(“Claudius allowed them to swear an oath to him,” Suet. Cl. 10.4). For iurare vel sim. in the Histories to express the 
oath-taker’s own agency, cf. 1.56.2, 76.1; 2.16, 79, 80.1-2 (see pp. 73-76 below); 4.59.2. For the combination of 
sacramentum dixit and silentium to express reluctance, cf. 4.31.2 discussed at Ch. 4, pp. 166-68. In the case of 
Aquitania’s defection to Vitellius soon after Otho’s accession, it appears that the issue is one of simple mutiny, 
rather than refusal of administered oaths: ne Aquitania quidem, quamquam ab Iulio Cordo in verba Othonis 
obstricta, diu mansit. Nusquam fides aut amor (“Not even Aquitania stayed long, though they had bound by oath to 
Otho. Nowhere was there either loyalty or affection,” 1.76.1). For this sense of obstringere (OLD s.v. 4 “to bind”), 
cf. 1.54.3; A. 1.14. 
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sim.) perfectly: Titus Manlius Torquatus physically assaults his father’s enemy, the tribune 
Marcus Pomponius, in the latter’s home. In the course of the attack, Manlius threatens that 
“unless [Pomponius] swears in the words [Manlius] himself dictates” (nisi in quae ipse 
concepisset verba iuraret, 7.5.5), he, Manlius, would stab him to death. So Pomponius, afraid for 
his life, “swore the oath he was administered, and afterwards publicly declared that he had been 
compelled by force to relinquish his undertaking,” (adiurat in quae adactus est verba; et, prae se 
deinde tulit ea vi subactum se incepto destitisse, Liv. 7.5.6).151 The two iterations of adigere—
adactus est and vi subactum—hint at the gradations of coercion the verb might convey: adactus 
est is best defined as “was administered” (OLD s.v. 9b), whereas the stronger vi subactum more 
closely approximates adigere as “to cause a person to take an oath” (OLD s.v. 9a). Often, “to 
compel” or even “to force” is more accurate.152 These distinctions are subtle, but vital, for they 
get at the nature of the relationship between administrator and administrated. In any given oath 
passage, context may be required to discern precisely the degree of forcefulness conveyed by 
adigere —i.e., does it mean “administer” to a willing audience or “force” an oath against one’s 
will? In either case, one thing is always clear: in verba adigere denotes the will of the 
commander, not the soldier.153 
Vespasian’s legions make even less of a show of accepting what was administered than 
Pomponius did: the silence (silentium, 2.74.1) of the miles indicates not acceptance under duress, 
but flat-out refusal. The verb praeeo, used in imperial Latin for dictating all manner of oaths and 
                                                      
151 Trans. adapted from Foster (1924).  
152 The OLD does not seem to recognize that the more forceful idea of “compelling” might be present in adigere in 
an oath context.  
153 This “rule” no longer holds when adigere takes a reflexive object, with soldiers as subject. Cf., e.g., legiones…se 
ipsae in verba Vespasiani adigunt (“the legions voluntarily take the oath of allegiance to Vespasian” (4.70.5), 
discussed in Ch. 4, p. 186. 
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prayers (OLD s.v. 3 “to dictate”),154 indicates that the soldiers ought to be repeating aloud what 
Vespasian says.155 Polybius, our best positive evidence on proper (albeit Republican) 
sacramentum procedure, confirms that the army’s vocal participation was a standard 
requirement.156 It is evident, then, that the soldiers’ failure to voice their assent to the oath as 
administered constitutes defiance of the oath’s content.157 That defiance does not, however, 
constitute a rebuke of the administrator himself, Vespasian. For Tacitus attributes the silence to 
the fact that the soldiers were “attached” (paratus) to their general.158 Therefore, this peculiar 
mixture of disobedience and obedience results from not wanting to openly contradict someone so 
dear to them, even as their inner hatred of Vitellius prevents full compliance.159  
                                                      
154 Cf. 1.36.2 [sacramentum], Plin. Ep. 10.96 [prayer], Plin. Pan. 64-65 [non-military oath]. Damon (2003) 176 
remarks that the two instances of the verb in Tacitus are the only two “used of a soldier’s oath of obedience to his 
commander…Both [at 1.36.2] and at 2.74.1 T[acitus] adds the religious solemnity of praeire to the taking of the 
soldier’s oath”; cf. recitaret (“read out”) at 4.59.2. 
155 The best evidence that praeeo necessarily entails repetition is Plin. Pan. 64.4, where the panegyrist praises Trajan 
for standing before a seated consul and taking an oath of office: nescio iam, nescio, pulchriusne sit illud quod 
praeeunte nullo, an hoc quod alio praeeunte iurasti (“For my part, I cannot judge which is the more splendid: the 
fact that you took the oath with no precedent before you, or that you took the words from another’s lips,” trans. 
Radice (1969)). Incidentally, Pliny’s surprise suggests that the one administering the oath ought to be superior in 
authority. 
156 Ἐπιτελεσθείσης δὲ τῆς καταγραφῆς τὸν προειρημένον τρόπον, ἁθροίσαντες τοὺς ἐπειλεγμένους οἱ προσήκοντες 
τῶν χιλιάρχων καθ᾽ ἕκαστον στρατόπεδον, καὶ λαβόντες ἐκ πάντων ἕνα τὸν ἐπιτηδειότατον, ἐξορκίζουσιν ἦ μὴν 
πειθαρχήσειν καὶ ποιήσειν τὸ προσταττόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων κατὰ δύναμιν. οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ὀμνύουσι καθ᾽ 
ἕνα προπορευόμενοι, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ δηλοῦντες ὅτι ποιήσουσι πάντα καθάπερ ὁ πρῶτος (“The roll having been 
completed in this manner, those of the tribunes in each legion on whom this duty falls collect the newly enrolled 
soldiers, and picking out of the whole body a single man whom they think the most suitable make him take the oath 
they he will obey his officers and execute their orders as far as is in his power. The the others come forward and 
each in his turn takes his oath simply that he will do the same as the first man,” Polyb. 6.21.1-3; trans. Paton 
(2011)). 
157 Pace Nicols (1978) 71, who suggests that the soldiers’ silence resulted not from frustration or resentment, but 
from knowledge that the oath was only a prelude to Vespasian’s acclamation: “The soldiers, seemingly aware that 
they would not be held to this oath for long, remained silent when it was administered.” However, this interpretation 
is difficult to reconcile with the fact that up until this point the plans and aspirations of Vespasian, Titus, and 
Mucianus have been kept secret from the soldiers. Davies (2004) 203 remarks on Vespasian’s piety towards 
Vitellius for even attempting to administer the oath. Ash (2007) 285 suggests that the soldiers realize that Vespasian, 
simply going through the motions, expects silence.  
158 Ash (2007) 285 translates: “were so attached to him.” 
159 Pace Morgan (1994b) 119: “[T]he fact that Vespasian’s troops did not appreciate taking the oath of allegiance to 
Vitellius is no ringing endorsement of their own general; mere silence is not encouraging.” 
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How was it that the truth of the oath (2.74) did not translate to Vitellian action (2.73)? 
Given the Roman custom of the oath-taker repeating the words of the oath-giver, these scouts—
presumably men who themselves at one time or another have been made to swear an oath of 
loyalty—ought to have recognized the aberration from normal ritual practice and reported the 
silence to their emperor. But, somehow, they miss the point entirely, relating only “that the East 
had been administered an oath of allegiance to [Vitellius]” (adactum in verba eius Orientem). 
Tacitus gives no reason to doubt that the scouts were actually present to observe the scene 
unfold. Their sin, then, is one of omission: “that the East had been administered an oath of 
allegiance” is, of course, true, but it is not the whole truth; the soldiers’ response, or in this case 
lack thereof (silentium), ought to have been the leading headline.  
It is not particularly surprising that Vitellius would believe such an incomplete and 
erroneous report.160 One can easily see how Tacitus’ charges of arrogance and complacency 
(superbiae socordiaeque, 2.73) may easily have led to distraction and an unwillingness to ask the 
necessary follow-up questions. Eleni Manolaraki has shown that Vitellius exhibits a similar 
visual and ethical blindness toward the horrors of the Bedriacum battlefield a mere three chapters 
earlier (2.70). Rather than look at and interpret the carnage for himself, he relies on and accepts 
as true the glorifying rhetoric of his tour guides, Caecina and Valens.161 Thus, there is plenty of 
blame for the intelligence blunder to go around. A clear failure to observe and/or understand the 
                                                      
160 On one level, Vitellius’ failures of interpretation participate in a larger Tacitean phenomenon. O’Gorman (2000) 
13: “Tacitus’ reader follows the characters (sometimes the narrator) in the act of reading, not always coming to the 
same conclusion; the differences as well as the parallels are suggestive. In particular, Tacitus continually represents 
his characters in the act of misreading; the failure of interpretive skills seems to be a dominant feature of Tacitus’ 
Imperial Rome” (emphasis in original). 
161 Manolaraki (2005) 245, 256-61: “The oversimplified and glorified version of the battle, presented to the princeps 
by his subordinates, lulls him into a false sense of security that proves fatal to him and his party.” For further 
discussion of the literary significance of 2.70, see also Keitel (1992), Morgan (1992), Woodman (1998) 70-85.  
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proper execution of the sacramentum ritual existed throughout—perhaps everywhere 
throughout—the Vitellian regime.162  
The transition from the Vitellian (2.57-73) to Flavian (2.74-86) panel exhibits a high 
degree of rhetorical skill on Tacitus’ part. By closely juxtaposing the Vitellians’ ill-informed 
stupidity (2.73) with the mood of discontent in the Flavian East threatening to cut Vitellius’ reign 
short (2.74), the historian not only provides a neat transition from the Western to the Eastern 
theater, but also deftly suggests that the Vitellians are not equipped to handle what Vespasian 
and his supporters have in store for them.163  
 
MUCIANUS, OATH-GIVER EXTRAORDINAIRE164 
 
 
Unlike the clueless Vitellians, the Flavians know their way around a sacramentum. This 
distinction between the two regimes is, for Tacitus, key to understanding the means of Flavian 
success, as well as understanding the nature of the relationship between the Flavian soldiery and 
its leadership. 
                                                      
162 Vitellius exhibits the same sort of disinterest in the details when he hears of a rebellion against his in Africa 
(2.58-59). Damon (2006) 267: “In the Corsican incident [1.80-85], Otho turns a blind eye to murders done on his 
behalf. Tacitus reports the same reaction in Vitellius in connection with a rebellion in Africa, where the procurator 
appointed to Mauretania by Nero and retained by Galba and Otho, Lucceius Albinus, became restive under Vitellius 
and threatened to invade Spain. He was also rumored to be sporting the insignia and name of a king (2.58). 
Eventually, however, his followers, dismayed at the thought of facing Vitellius’ German legions, have a change of 
heart, whereupon Albinus, three key officers, and Albinus’s wife are killed (2.59.1). Vitellius heard the report and 
did nothing: nihil eorum quae fierent Vitellio anquirente: brevi auditu quamvis magna transibat (“However 
important events were, Vitellius accorded them but a brief hearing, inquiring into none of the things that were being 
done,” 2.59.1). Here again, Tacitus’s language—the paradoxical antithesis brevi … magna—conveys his conviction 
that there should have been an investigation into these deaths.” 
163 In order to achieve this effect, Tacitus may have tampered with received chronology. According to Ash (2007) 
282, Tacitus allows an implausibly little amount of time for news of Vitellius’ victory over Otho to bounce around 
the Mediterranean: “It is now [i.e., when news of the sacramentum reaches Vitellius] sometime between the 
battlefield visit (c. 23 May) and Vitellius’ arrival in Rome (on or before 18 July). After Otho’s suicide on 17 April, 
time was required for news (even by sea) of Vitellius’ victory to reach Syria and Judea, for the provinces to react, 
and for agents to make the return journey to notify the emperor about the oaths. These speculatores arrive 
suspiciously quickly, and Vitellius himself should know that an imperial challenge was always possible, even if 
oaths had been sworn.” Ginsburg (1981) passim has demonstrated the historian’s willingness and skill at 
restructuring and juxtaposing events for rhetorical effect. 
164 For the career of Mucianus, see esp. Nicols (1978) 105-6 and Levick (1999) 53. 
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A close examination of the complicated acclamation process reveals that Tacitus assigns 
the bulk of the credit for its success to Mucianus, governor of Syria and Vespasian’s key ally in 
the East.165 Tacitus tells us in an early character sketch that “by a subtle gift for intrigue 
[Mucianus] exercised great influence on his subordinates, associates, and colleagues, and he was 
the sort of man who found it more congenial to make an emperor than to be one” (sed apud 
subiectos, apud proximos, apud collegas variis inlecebris potens, et cui expeditus fuerit tradere 
imperium quam obtinere, 1.10.2). And in fact, though Vespasian was a thoughtful man capable 
of tremendous circumspection, he needed Mucianus’ confidence and vision.166 This dependency 
is rendered dramatically when Vespasian and Mucianus, along with a select group of confidants, 
meet (apparently) near Mt. Carmel, on the Syria-Judaea border, to strategize and to hash out their 
concerns:167  
his pavoribus nutantem et alii legati amicique firmabant et Mucianus, post multos 
secretosque sermones iam et coram ita locutus… (2.76.1) 
 
As Vespasian was faltering because of these anxieties, he was being heartened by 
his legates and friends, including Mucianus, who, after many private conversations, 
also spoke the following words in their presence…  
 
In the long speech that follows,168 Mucianus declares his impassioned support for Vespasian’s 
cause, exhorts Vespasian to take the imperial throne for himself (ego te, Vespasiane, ad 
                                                      
165 Mucianus remained Vespasian’s close ally long into Vespasian’s reign. He ultimately would hold the consulship 
three times (64, 70, and 72), a rare honor granted previously only to Marcus Agrippa and L. Vitellius, the emperor’s 
father; see Nicols (1978) 106n47. On Mucianus’ impressive literary career, see Ash (2007b).  
166 Tacitus circles back to make this point often in these chapters: Vespasianus bellum armaque et procul vel iuxta 
sitas vires circumspectabat (“Vespasian looked around at the war and its arms and the might situated both far and 
near,” 2.74.1); modo in spem erectus, aliquando adversa reputabat (“at one point buoyed by hope, and then mulling 
over his problems” 2.74.2); versabatur ante oculos Germanici exercitus robur (“the strength of the German army 
turned before his eyes,” 2.75.1). Cf. Levick (1999) 45: “Real hesitation on Vespasian’s part, in the face of Vitellius’ 
legionary strength, and the fear of assassination on the order of Galba or Vitellius, was natural, and it is found, most 
impressively, in Tacitus who contrasts the deliberation of Vespasian and his main ally, the governor of Syria, with 
the determination of their officers.” 
167 Tacitus does not hint at the location of this meeting until after Mucianus’ speech (2.78.3-4), and only then implies 
it. On the likelihood of Mt. Carmel or its environs as the spot of this meeting, see especially Nicols (1978) 71-72. 
168 On the speech as a whole, see Aubrion (1985) 384-90. 
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imperium voco, “I call you, Vespasian, to power,” 2.76.2), and unequivocally subordinates 
himself to the future emperor.169 The speech hits home, as “the rest (ceteri) crowd around 
Vespasian,” exhorting him and invoking past omens (2.78.1). 
A precise understanding of who says what to whom at the meeting is crucial for 
understanding the pivotal role Mucianus plays in these preliminary steps toward imperial 
acclamation. The only people named as present for these events are Vespasian, Mucianus, and an 
anonymous list of “other legates and allies” (alii legati amicique, 2.76.1).170 coram (“in their 
presence,” OLD s.v. 2b), in this context, refers not to a contio (“general assembly”) of soldiers, 
but rather to a concilium (“meeting”) of officers. And, since coram is clearly the antithesis of 
secretos,171 the secretos…sermones must refer, therefore, to private, possibly even one-on-one 
conversations Mucianus had with Vespasian before he addressed the concilium. After the speech 
concludes, the other officers present at the concilium, again referred to as ceteri (“the rest [sc. of 
the officers besides Mucianus]”), respond extremely positively to Mucianus’ call for Vespasian 
to take the throne, even going so far as to cite prophecies and the movement of the stars (2.78.1). 
Thus, Mucianus’ decision to call Vespasian to the throne was a calculated act, planned in 
                                                      
169 Ash (2007) 283 points out that in Jos. BJ 4.592-600 “the soldiers use some similar material while persuading 
themselves to intervene for Vespasian.” Nicols (1978) 115 suggests that Mucianus “was not in the position to 
promote his own cause even if he had wanted to do so,” as he did not commander a fighting army, and could not 
compete with the benefits a capable son like Titus confer. Though Tacitus does concede that Vespasian’s army was 
the more seasoned of the two, he describes both as formidable: tres, ut supra memoravimus, ipsi Vespasiano 
legiones erant, exercitae bello; quattuor Mucianus obtinebat in pace, sed aemulatio et proximi exercitus gloria 
depulerat segnitiam, quantumque illis roboris discrimina et labor, tantum his vigoris addiderat integra quies et 
inexperti belli ardor (“Vespasian had three legions, practiced in war; Mucianus acquired four in peacetime, though 
competitiveness and the fame of the neighboring army had dispelled their laziness; however much strength 
dangerous situations and hard work had given Vespasian’s army, an uninterrupted period of repose and a passion for 
the first taste of war had given Mucianus’ army energy in equal measure,” 2.4.4). 
170 On the individual identities of legati amicique, see Nicols (1978) 99-113, esp. 112-13: “[T]hese men were the 
fathers, grandfathers and uncles of the emperors Trajan, Hadrian, Antonius Pius, Marcus Aurelius, and Commodus. 
In this sense the leading members of the governing class for the next century and a half all traced the first 
prominence of their families to Vespasian’s officers in 69.” 
171coram (OLD s.v. 2b) “in the presence of many, publicly, openly”; cf. Chilver (1979) ad loc. 
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consultation with Vespasian, and intended to cement support among the rest of the officer class. 
Mucianus and Vespasian are now one step closer to their ultimate objective. 
However, when the actual business of consolidating support for an imperial bid begins, it 
is neither Vespasian nor Mucianus who make the first move:  
initium ferendi ad Vespasianum imperii Alexandriae coeptum, festinante Tiberio 
Alexandro, qui kalendis Iuliis sacramento eius legiones adegit. (2.79) 
 
The first move to confer Vespasian imperial power began at Alexandria, at the 
speedy urging of Tiberius Alexander, who compelled his legions to swear the oath 
of allegiance on 1 July.172 
 
Tacitus provides few details and even less context for this momentous event. How exactly, for 
instance, does Tiberius Alexander relate to Mucianus’ and Vespasian’s plans? We have been told 
that Alexander “had made common cause” (sociaverat consilia, 2.74.1) with Vespasian.173 But it 
is unclear whether he numbered among the alii legati amicique at Mt. Carmel.174 Further crucial 
information is not forthcoming either (e.g., how did the soldiers respond to the oath’s 
administration? were they willing participants?). 
Tacitus’ decision to treat the Egyptian oath less as the start of a dynasty and more as an 
obligatory data point becomes clear in the following sentence. While the historian acknowledges 
the importance the 1 July oath holds as the official beginning of Vespasian’s rise to power, he 
simultaneously undercuts its actual importance, by emphasizing another event that occurred in 
Judaea two days later:  
isque primus principatus dies in posterum celebratus, quamvis Iudaicus exercitus 
V nonas Iulias apud ipsum iurasset, eo ardore, ut ne Titus quidem filius 
exspectaretur, Syria remeans et consiliorum inter Mucianum ac patrem nuntius. 
cuncta impetu militum acta non parata contione, non coniunctis legionibus. (2.79) 
                                                      
172 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009). 
173 Ash (2007) 286: “the pluperfect implies that Flavians had been planning for some time (contra Flavian 
propaganda).” 
174 Heubner (1968) 256 assumes that Vespasian only learned of the Egyptian oath after it happened. Nicols (1978) 
72 is skeptical. Cf. Ash (2007) 285, 308-9.  
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This date was subsequently celebrated as the first day of his principate, though on 
3 July the Judaean army had sworn the oath before Vespasian himself with such 
passion that they did not even wait for his son Titus, who was returning from Syria, 
where he acted as an intermediary between Mucianus and his father in their 
negotiations.175  
 
Suetonius’ version of this event confirms Tacitus’ remark that 1 July was held in official 
commemoration: Tiberius Alexander praefectus Aegypti primus in verba Vespasiani legiones 
adegit Kal. Iul., qui principatus dies in posterum observatus est (“Tiberius Alexander, prefect of 
Egypt, compelled his legions to swear an oath to Vespasian on 1 July, which date was 
subsequently observed as the first day of the principate,” Suet. Ves. 6.3).176 Obvious verbal 
commonalities between the Suetonian passage and H. 2.79 demonstrate that, on this plot point at 
least, Tacitus seems to have paid lip service to some version of official Flavian history. 
Suetonius then proceeds to state blandly that “then on 11 July the Judaean army swore the oath 
before Vespasian himself (Iudaicus deinde exercitus V. Idus Iul. apud ipsum iuravit, Suet. Ves. 
6.3), implying that the Judaean oath was merely the second, and therefore less significant event 
in the march toward war.177 Tacitus, on the other hand, downplays the 1 July oath by contrasting 
unfavorably its officially-recognized status (in posterum celebratus) with the genuine passions 
(eo ardore) of the soldiers on 3 July in Judea.178 Furthermore, Tacitus’ rare precision in dating 
provides enough evidence that one event did not influence the other. As Nicols notes, if we 
accept Tacitus’ dating, “the distance between Alexandria and Caesarea, about 500 km by sea, 
                                                      
175 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009). 
176 For a general reconstructed timeline of events in the East in the Spring and Summer of 69 CE, see especially 
Levick (1999) 43-64. 
177 While it is certainly true that Suetonius does not choose to emphasize the Judaean oath in any way, it is also true 
that the lack of elaboration, even of pivotal events, is common throughout his short biographies. 
178 primus principatus dies in posterum celebratus is a reference to fact that 1 July 69 was the day Vespasian 
retroactively chose as his dies imperii and the beginning of his tribunician power, Griffin (2000) 13n40 explains: 
“Vespasian’s dies imperii and his tribunicia potestas were numbered from 1 July 69, but the latter is not attested on 
documents of 69 and first appears on a diploma of 7 March 70 (ILS 1989). On Vespasian’s dies imperii, see also 
Barzanò (1980), Levick (1999) 67 and 70. 
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would seem to argue for independent acclamations.”179 For Tacitus, the Judaean oath represents 
an alternative—and preferable—moment to mark the start of the Vespasianic era.180 
Tacitus further bolsters the relative significance of 3 July by investing the scene with 
remarkable psychological detail: 
dum quaeritur tempus locus, quodque in re tali difficillimum est, prima vox, dum 
animo spes timor, ratio casus obversantur, egressum cubiculo Vespasianum pauci 
milites, solito adsistent<es> ordine ut legatum salutaturi, imperatorem salutavere: 
tum ceteri adcurrere, Caesarem et Augustum et omnia principatus vocabula 
cumulare. mens a metu ad fortunam transierat: in ipso nihil tumidum, adrogans 
aut in rebus novis novum fuit. ut primum tantae altitudinis obfusam oculis 
caliginem disiecit, militariter locutus laeta omnia et adfluentia excepit (2.80.1-2). 
 
While the right time, right place, and—the most difficult thing of all in such 
circumstances—the first voice was being sought, while hope and fear, reason and 
chance were being turned over in their minds, a few soldiers, who standing at their 
posts in order to give Vespasian the customary salute as legate as he emerged from 
his bedroom, instead saluted him as emperor. Thereupon other gathered around and 
heaped on him the title “Caesar” and “Augustus” and the terminology of the 
principate. The entire mood shifted from fear to fortune.181 In Vespasian himself 
there was no element of swollen pride, arrogance or novel behavior in the face of 
novel events. As soon as dizziness that had blurred his vision after such a great 
elevation had cleared, he spoke to them as a solder as he received a whole torrent 
of congratulations. (trans. Ash (2007), adapted) 
 
Vespasian is a soldier through and through, and responds to the legionaries’ praise as though he 
were one of them. That he “spoke to them as a soldier” (militariter locutus, 2.80.2) echoes 
Tacitus’ assessment of a man who “was fierce on campaign and took the lead on marches” (acer 
militiae anteire agmen, 2.5.1).182 Though no oath appears in 2.80, Tacitus tells us in the previous 
chapter (2.79; see above) that the Judaean troops also swore a sacramentum to Vespasian on 3 
July. iurasset implies spontaneity on the part of the legions, which is in turn corroborated by 
                                                      
179 Nicols (1978) 72. 
180 Suetonius (Ves. 6.3) leaves a gap of ten days between the oaths, thus keeping the possibility open for a cause and 
effect relationship: first, the Egyptian oath on 1 July, “then” (deinde) the Judaean oath on 11 July. 
181 Here I follow Ash (2007) 311, who, after noting the difficulty over whether to construe mens as referring to 
Vespasian or his soldiers, suggests that “[i]t is perhaps best to take mens as the collective state of mind amongst the 
Flavians, including Vespasian.” 
182 Ash (2007) 86 translates acer militiae as “every inch a soldier” or “energetic with regard to military service.” 
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Tacitus’ characterization of the sudden salutation (cuncta impetu militum acta non parata 
contione, non coniunctis legionibus, “everything happened at the soldiers’ initiative; no assembly 
had been convened and the legions had not been marshalled,” 2.79).183 It is evident, therefore, 
that Vespasian did not orchestrate anything; everything good just fell into his lap. No wonder he 
found the whole ordeal dizzying (tantae altitudinis obfusam oculis caliginem).  
While Vespasian was reeling from the magnitude of what had happened in Judaea, 
Mucianus took full advantage of the sudden salutatio by administering an oath of his own in 
Antioch. Thus, it was Mucianus who defined the relationship between Vespasian and his 
enthusiastic supporters as one between an emperor and his subjects, rather than between fellow 
soldiers, as was Vespasian’s instinct:  
namque id ipsum opperiens Mucianus alacrem militem in verba Vespasiani adegit 
(2.80.2). 
 
For awaiting that very thing [i.e., the soldiers’ salutatio], Mucianus swore his 
eager army to allegiance with Vespasian… 
 
Tacitus elects not to mention, as he transitions from Vespasian to Mucianus in a brief phrase 
(namque id ipsum opperiens), that Vespasian and Mucianus currently reside in two different 
places entirely (Caesarea and Antioch, respectively).184 This omission of information creates the 
effect that Mucianus is “hovering” over events as they unfold. The participle opperiens 
(“awaiting”) signals, moreover, a reclamation of agency from the soldiery,185 while underscoring 
Mucianus’ premeditation, planning, and overall orchestration of events.186 We will recall that the 
verb adigere (“to administer an oath” OLD s.v. 9b), though fairly common in Tacitean and other 
                                                      
183 A salutatio (<saluto, OLD s.v. 2) is “a formal morning call paid by a client on his patron” or “a similar call paid 
on the Emperor” (OLD s.v. 2). Obviously, the latter is meant at 2.80.1. For further salutations in Tacitus, cf. A. 4.60, 
11.22; D. 9.2. For more on the Republican salutatio, see Hug (1920) 2060-2072, Friedländer (1922) I 228-30, Kroll 
(1933) II 65-68, Sumi (2005) 2-3.   
184 See Levick (1999) 47. 
185 Cf. impetu militum (4.79). 
186 Ash (2007) 312. 
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oath-passages, is by no means obligatory. Thus, it is reasonable to posit that its use here 
emphasizes Mucianus’ relatively high degree of agency as the oath’s administrator. His agency, 
however, was not of the coercive sort, for the modifier alacrem (“eager”) clearly indicates that 
the soldiers did not require much prompting.  
Mucianus follows up the solicitation of the sacramentum with an eloquent speech to the 
general public at the theater of Antioch (Antiochensium theatrum, 2.80.2), thereby widening the 
pool of oath-takers. By holding this contio, Mucianus arrogates to himself a role typically 
fulfilled by the emperor himself.187 This does not mean that Mucianus is attempting to usurp 
Vespasian’s incipient authority: in his long speech before the salutatio (2.76-78), the former 
unequivocally and publicly subordinates himself to the latter. Rather, Vespasian, the 
consummate soldier, relies upon Mucianus’ eloquence in order to perform adequately and fully 
the tasks of the office to which he, Vespasian, aspires.  
Mucianus’ conscious and strategic efforts in the realms of oaths and oratory help trigger a 
chain reaction of support for Vespasian throughout the East. Pledges of loyalty to the emperor-
to-be pour in from all over—first from the rest of Syria (Syria omnis in eodem sacramento fuit, 
“All of Syria had sworn the same oath,” H. 2.81.1), then from every eastern province (quidquid 
provinciarum adluitur mari Asia atque Achaia tenus quantumque introrsus in Pontum et 
Armenios patescit, iuravere, “all the provinces along the sea as far as Asia and Achaea and 
everything inland toward Pontus and Armenia, swore the oath,” H. 2.81.2). The verbs and 
phrases used to describe these oaths (in eodem sacramento fuit; iuravere) imply a lack of the top-
down orchestration which usage of adigere (2.80.2) denotes—or, at the very least, deemphasize 
Mucianus’ direct involvement. Through this shift in language, Tacitus insinuates that Mucianus’ 
                                                      
187 Cf. Sumi (2005) 228: “The evidence for contiones under Augustus, fragmentary though it is, suggests that 
Augustus was the predominant but not exclusive orator at public meetings.”  
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decision to seize the moment in Antioch (2.80.2), coupled with his rhetorical abilities, have 
sparked a chain reaction of official expressions of loyalty to Vespasian all over the Eastern 
Mediterranean. This sequence of events demonstrates how important a timely, well-ministered 
sacramentum can be for the health and growth of an imperial challenge. 
 
The value of Mucianus’ skills of oath-administration is proven again in book 4, when Tacitus 
describes the critical role the Syrian governor played in defusing a mutiny at the praetorian camp 
at Rome. This mutiny narrative, though brief, has a clear structure: the chaotic civil war and 
consequent reshuffling of armies has created an extremely dangerous situation which threatens 
the stability of the Flavian regime (4.46.1); but Mucianus, by applying great skill and sensitivity 
to the situation unites many discontented soldiers under Vespasian (4.46.2-4).  
 Tacitus is laconic and direct about the stakes: inter quae militaris seditio prope exarsit 
(“meanwhile, a mutiny nearly flared up in the ranks,” 4.46.1). On the one hand, several cohorts 
of praetorians, formerly in service to Vitellius, were demanding to be reenlisted under the new 
regime. On the other hand, formerly-Vitellian legionaries, who had been promised a promotion 
to praetorian status, were demanding that they be paid commensurate with that higher rank. 
Tacitus remarks that attempting to disperse the men would have led to violence, while there was 
not enough money to pay them all. Whoever steps in to fix this situation has his work cut out for 
him. 
 It is under these conditions that Mucianus enters the barracks, and proceeds to dissolve 
the mutinous passions by creating divisions along two lines. First, he strips the former Vitellians 
of their armor and makes them compare their rags to the Flavians’ fierce array. Second, he splits 
up the Vitellian forces into their constituent parts by place of origin (e.g., Germany, Britain). By 
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thus isolating the unruly legions and thereby frightening them with thoughts of being singled out 
for execution, Mucianus manages to bring the disparate factions together under one common 
allegiance: 
prensare commanipularium pectora, cervicibus innecti, suprema oscula petere, ne 
desererentur soli neu pari causa disparem fortunam paterentur; modo Mucianum, 
modo absentem principem, postremum caelum ac deos obtestari, donec Mucianus 
cunctos eiusdem sacramenti, eius<dem> imperatoris milites appellans, falso 
timori obviam iret; namque et victor exercitus clamore lacrimas eorum iuvabat. 
isque finis illa die. (4.46.3) 
 
They hugged their comrades, hung on their necks and sought farewell kisses, saying 
that they ought not be left alone nor suffer a different fate in the same matter. They 
appealed first to Mucianus, then to the absent emperor, and finally to the gods in 
the sky, until Mucianus confronted their misplaced fear by calling everyone soldiers 
of the same allegiance (sacramenti) and the same emperor. For then even the 
victorious army allayed their tears with applause. And so the day ended.  
 
Though the particular details and circumstances of this episode obviously differ in numerous 
ways from Vespasian’s acclamation narrative (2.73-81), Mucianus’ tactics here recall, in broad 
terms, those used in that earlier episode to assert control over a dangerously chaotic situation: 
once Mucianus is assured that the discontented legions will be well-disposed toward 
intervention, as their begging (obtestari) indicates, he responds swiftly by administering a 
sacramentum in the name of Vespasian. The repetitive language of inclusiveness (cunctos 
eiusdem…eiusdem) recalls Mucianus’ earlier determination to enlist as many supporters of 
Vespasian as possible in the immediate aftermath of the salutatio in Judaea (2.80-81). And, as 
was the case in the eastern provinces, Mucianus is once again an independent agent, acting on 
the emperor’s behalf (absentem principem) but on his own initiative.  
Mucianus has succeeded in downgrading a possible mutiny into soldiers humbly 
“pleading for continued service and a salary” (militiam et stipendia orant, 4.67.4)—essentially 
asking to be included in the new Flavian world. Rather than hand out any punishments or 
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rewards en masse, he treats the men on an individual basis—“by which safest remedy the 
consensus of a crowd is diminished” (quo tutissimo remedio consensus multitudinis extenuator, 
4.67.4)—enlisting some, while discharging others (honorably or dishonorably as the case may 
be). Mucianus’ ability to galvanize support while simultaneously remaining sensitive to the just 
desserts of each person and group is impressive, and one not possessed by every leader in the 
Histories.188  
 
THE NEGATIVE EXEMPLUM OF CAECINA (3.13) 
 
 
With so many civil war factions and so many operators within each of them, the oath scene is a 
common occurrence in the Histories. In such scenes, Tacitus shows time and again that the 
success of an attempt to shift soldiers’ loyalties from one emperor or leader to another depends 
on the charisma and skill of the man who administers the oath. The administrator must act at the 
right time and place; he must say the right words to the right people. If he fails to do any or all of 
these things, the mercurial nature of the civil war soldiers will assert itself. One such particularly 
disastrous failure at the top appears in book 3 in the run-up to the Second Battle of Cremona. 
Close analysis of Caecina’s failure to shift his soldiers’ allegiances from Vitellius to Vespasian 
helps explain why Mucianus’ efforts in book 2 are so effective. Whereas Mucianus uses timely 
sacramenta to lend legitimacy and stability to a nascent Flavian faction, Caecina, a Vitellian 
turncoat who wants to bring his soldiers along with him as he defects to the Flavian side, fails in 
                                                      
188 Mucianus’ sensitivity to each individual’s just desserts contrasts, for instance, with Otho’s sloppy response to the 
Corsican uprising (2.16). Damon (2006) 267 summarizes: “The island’s procurator, Decumius Picarius, being ill-
disposed to Otho, decided to contribute Corsica’s (puny) resources to Vitellius. The islanders, fully aware of the 
danger posed by Otho’s nearby fleet, assassinated Picarius and his entourage while they were in the baths. The 
victims’ heads were taken to Otho as proof of the island’s loyalty to him. The islanders “were neither rewarded by 
Otho nor punished by Vitellius; in the vast cesspool of the age, they were mixed in with greater crimes” (neque eos 
aut Otho praemio adfecit aut puniit Vitellius, in multa conluvie rerum maioribus flagitiis permixtos,” 2.16.3). The 
editorializing appended to this narrative emphasizes the shameful fact, characteristic of the “cesspool” that was 
Rome under Otho and Vitellius, that criminal acts had no consequences.” 
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many respects and suffers dramatically for those failures. Intratextual correspondences between 
the two scenes prove that a mass-participation sacramentum is conspicuous in its absence in 
Caecina’s camp.  
 With Vespasian and his many armies now bidding for power, and Lucilius Bassus, the 
commander of the fleet at Ravenna, already having defected to the challenger (3.12), Caecina, 
one of Vitellius’ two top lieutenants (Valens is the other),189 sees the precipitous weakening of 
his master’s position and also attempts defection. Much like Mucianus, who convinced 
Vespasian to seek the throne at a small concilium (“meeting”) surrounded by his legati amicique 
(“legates and friends,” 2.76.1), Caecina focuses his initial efforts of persuasion on a selective 
assembly of men, rather than convening a more public contio (3.13.1). After that, their tactics 
diverge: whereas Mucianus later engages common soldiers by leading them in a sacramentum 
(Mucianus alacrem militem in verba Vespasiani adegit, 2.80.2) and then promptly delivering a 
stadium-sized speech (2.80.2), Caecina leaves the majority of the common soldiers out in the 
cold, a slight to which they do not take kindly: 
at Caecina, defectione classis volgata, primores centurionum et paucos militum, 
ceteris per militiae munera dispersis, secretum castrorum adfectans in principia 
vocat. ibi Vespasiani virtutem viresque partium extollit: transfugisse classem, in 
arto commeatum, adversas Gallias Hispaniasque, nihil in urbe fidum; atque omnia 
de Vitellio in deterius. mox incientibus qui conscii aderant, ceteros re nova 
attonitos in verba Vespasiani adigit; simul Vitellii imagines dereptae et missi qui 
Antonio nuntiarent. [2] sed ubi totis castris in fama proditio, recurrens in principia 
miles praescriptum Vespasiani nomen, proiectas Vitellii effigies aspexit, vastum 
primo silentium, mox cuncta simul erumpunt. (3.13.1-2) 
 
But Caecina, after knowledge of the fleet’s defection had been disseminated, called 
an elite selection of centurions and a few soldiers (the rest scattered at their duties) 
to a secret camp meeting at headquarters. There he extolled the virtue of Vespasian 
and the strength of his faction, saying that the fleet had fled, supplies were low, 
Gaul and Spain were hostile, and the City was completely disloyal—everything, 
according to him, was going worse for Vitellius. Then, as those who were in the 
plot took the lead in swearing allegiance to Vespasian, Caecina made the others do 
                                                      
189 The significant role Valens plays in the Histories will be discussed in depth in Ch. 3, pp. 120-37. 
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the same190 while they were still shocked by the sudden turn of events. At the same 
time, Vitellius’ portraits were torn down and the news sent to Antonius. [2] 
However, the treasonable act became the talk of the entire camp, and as the men 
rushed back to the headquarters building they saw that Vespasian’s name had been 
written up and Vitellius’ portraits thrown down. At first, there was a great hush, 
then one great explosion of protest.191 
 
The sentence mox incipientibus…adigit (3.13.1) implies some degree of planning and 
orchestration of events, and suggests that Caecina understood, on some level, the importance 
oaths play in ensuring loyalty. Caecina’s fatal flaw, however, was his assumption that the 
soldiers would simply fall in line without their commander communicating with them. No 
attempt is made to persuade or manipulate the majority absent from the meeting into swearing 
allegiance to Vespasian. In fact, the majority of the common soldiers are not even told about the 
change of management; they have to find out about it when the images (imagina, 3.13.1; effigies, 
3.13.2) of their beloved Vitellius have been replaced and a new name has been written above the 
commander’s tent.192  
The soldiers’ reactions to these revelations come in two stages: first silence (primo 
silentium, 3.13.2), then chaos (mox cuncta simul erumpunt, 3.13.2). Earlier in this chapter, we 
observed that Vespasian’s men reacted with a sort of pregnant, menacing silence when led in an 
oath of allegiance to Vitellius (2.74.1).193 The present, Vitellian silence (3.13.2) is similar, 
inasmuch as it also constitutes a response to an immediate military commander attempting to 
                                                      
190 Cf. Thayer’s translation: “those who were privy to the plan being the first to take [the oath].”  
191 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009), who, betraying his differing interpretation of silentium than my own, 
adds “menacing” before “hush.” 
192 On the imperial portraiture on military standards (signa) and its public display as function of legionary loyalty, 
see Campbell (1984) 96-99, and esp. von Petrikovits (1983) 192: “Several pieces of evidence show that the 
sacramentum was connected with the standards in whose presence the oath was sworn. Such a custom is attested by 
the representation of the coniuratio of the Italians in whose midst a military standard stood, and Seneca (Ep. 95.35), 
Tacitus (4.31.8) and Tertullian (Apol. 16.8) show the same for the Imperial Roman army.” For soldiers’ reverence 
for the standards, cf. also Jos. BJ 6.316 and Cass. Dio 40.18. It makes perfect sense, then, that tearing down these 
symbols in order to signal displeasure or revolt is a common occurrence in the Histories: cf. 1.36.1, 41.1, 55.2; 
2.85.1; 3.12.2, 31.2. On the narrative function of military iconography in the Histories, see esp. Ash (1999) 58 and 
Manolaraki (2003) 120-22.  
193 See pp. 65-66 above. 
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dictate to the soldiers their higher allegiance. Beyond that, there are two ways to interpret the 
tone of the Vitellians’ silence. First, we might view the vastum primo silentium as the first stage 
of oppositional defiance against Caecina’s actions, and the ensuing tumult (mox cuncta simul 
erumpunt) as merely the next stage of that defiance; Caecina, in that case, presumably could 
have done little or nothing to stop the eruption. However, I advocate a second interpretation, that 
the vastum primo silentium constitutes an initial shock akin to the one felt by the men at 
Caecina’s preliminary meeting who were “stunned by talk of revolt” (ceteros re nova attonitos, 
3.13.1). At this small gathering, Caecina was quick to take charge of the situation: with the help 
of some co-conspirators (conscii), he led the unsure men (attonitos) in a new oath of allegiance 
(in verba Vespasiani adigit). But, when the common soldiers, who were not privy to the 
information shared at the small meeting, show similar hesitancy and shock, manifested in their 
silence (silentium), the absence of a similar attempt to administer an oath in that moment—in 
itself an “act of silence,” if you will—reveals Caecina’s leadership ability suspect.194  
Caecina’s oath-administering efforts with the dumbstruck “elite selection of centurions 
and a handful of common soldiers” (primores centurionum et paucos militum, 3.13.1) echo 
Mucianus’ large-scale response to the Judaean soldiers’ salutatio almost verbatim:  
namque id ipsum opperiens Mucianus alacrem militem in verba Vespasiani adegit 
(2.80.2). 
 
For awaiting that very thing [i.e., the soldiers’ salutatio], Mucianus swore his eager 
army to allegiance with Vespasian 
 
mox incientibus qui conscii aderant, ceteros re nova attonitos in verba Vespasiani 
adigit. (3.13.1) 
 
                                                      
194 Cf. Tacitus’ anxious words at the beginning of the Agricola: memoriam quoque ipsam cum uoce perdidissemus, 
si tam in nostra potestate esset obliuisci quam tacere (“we would have lost even memory itself along with our voice, 
if it were as easy to forget as it is to be silent,” Agr. 2.3). For a recent discussion of this passage, see Haynes (2012).  
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Then, as those who were in the plot took the lead in swearing allegiance to 
Vespasian, Caecina made the others do the same,195 while they were still shocked 
by the sudden turn of events. 
 
Furthermore, the legati amicique (2.76.1), whose counterparts in the Caecina narrative are the 
ceteros re nova attonitos, Tacitus also referred to as ceteri (2.78.1). These intratextual 
correspondences reinforce the sense that Caecina had a chance to perform as effectively as 
Mucianus, but failed. The silentium would have been the perfect time for Caecina to sing 
Vespasian’s praises and hope for a groundswell of support—or at least say something to mollify 
them and thereby mitigate the imminent backlash. Caecina, however, fails to do anything of the 
sort, and the men of legio V not only refuse to follow along in his plan of defection, but 
denounce him as an opportunist and a traitor and clap him in irons (3.14).196  
While the Caecina episode clearly reinforces the importance of effectively-administered 
sacramenta in ensuring loyalty, we must also bear in mind that Mucianus’ men were already 
dissatisfied with Vitellius, whereas Caecina’s legions had no qualms with the current regime. 
Caecina’s mistakes aside, this episode also illustrates that, in Tacitus’ literary universe the oath 
of allegiance cannot in itself create loyalty or engender good will, but rather must follow upon 
already existing feelings of affection. In other words, loyalty is not manufactured; it is exploited. 
As we have seen, Mucianus understood this perfectly well: before the soldiers themselves have 
expressed any interest in throwing off the Vitellian yoke, he confines his pro-Vespasian 
strategizing to a small cadre of men in his own class. Then, once one group of common soldiers 
in one place express an authentic desire for a change in emperor, Mucianus pounces, turning a 
                                                      
195 Cf. Thayer’s translation, cited by Ash (2007) ad loc.: “those who were privy to the plan being the first to take 
[the oath].” 
196 Manolaraki (2003) 119-22 analyzes this episode as a “loyal mutiny”: “The Vitellians’ counter-mutiny indicates 
that they gradually seize the moral high-ground, and they prove better men than their own leaders. This is an 
excellent vantage point to gauge their collective portrait, but it is more than that: the episode illustrates that, in the 
fractured world of a civil war, a rebellion can be acceptable, and even admirable, as an attempt to restore normality” 
(121). 
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fairly spontaneous groundswell of support into a real regional movement. Mucianus’ tool to 
effect this transition—from semi-orchestrated, “spontaneous” acclamation to the formalization of 
an Eastern coalition loyal to a new imperial challenger—is the sacramentum. 
Caecina’s failed defection is, for Tacitus, no idle exercise in the theoretical importance of 
well-administered oaths; its negative impact on the Vitellian principate is immediate and 
enormous. On the eve of the attempted defection, Tacitus comments that, had Caecina been loyal 
(si adfuisset fides, 3.9.2), he could have repelled the Flavian incursion into Italy.197 Now, because 
of Caecina’s oath-related failings, the leaderless Vitellian forces of northern Italy are especially 
vulnerable to Flavian attack. This time, it is Primus who pounces: ubi haec comperta Antonio, 
discordes animis, discretos viribus hostium exercitus adgredi statuit (“once Primus learned what 
had happened, he decided to attack the enemy army while their attitudes were at variance and 
their strength was divided,” 3.15.1). Soon, a Flavian victory at Cremona (3.26-35) would break 
the Vitellians’ back for good. 
 
Despite Caecina’s dissatisfaction with Vitellius, his particular failings—ignorance of, and 
inattention to his soldiers’ thoughts and needs; proclivity toward inaction—anticipate the 
metaphorical deafness of Vitellius after the Second Battle of Cremona.198 When news of defeat 
reaches the Vitellian camp, Vitellius, rather than take control of the situation through 
communication and persuasion, forbids that anyone even discuss it (3.54.1). Later, when the 
situation at Rome begins to deteriorate as Primus’ army closes in, Tacitus makes use of the 
                                                      
197 After describing a mutiny on the Flavian side (3.10-11), Tacitus transitions to the “mutiny” of Caecina’s 
legionaries with the following: exitiosiore discordia non suspicionibus volgi, sed perfidia ducum turbabantur (“they 
were wracked by even more dangerous discord—more dangerous not because of the suspicions of the mob, but 
because of the treachery of the generals,” 3.12.1). 
198 On the sensory deficiencies of Vitellius, see Woodman (1979), Morgan (1992), Haynes (2003) 71-111, 
Manolaraki (2005).  
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vocabulary of communication in order to depict the breakdown of functioning imperial authority: 
when those surrounding the emperor advocate leadership and action, Vitellius turns a “deaf ear 
to their recommendation to bravery” (surdae ad fortia concilia aures, 3.67.1); then, in response 
to the news that the legions and cohorts stationed at Narnia, north of the city, have deserted over 
to the Flavians, Vitellius, along with his son and other members of his household, goes out in 
public dressed in mourning attire. The soldiers in the city show their discontentment with his 
weak leadership by means of their “menacing silence” (minaci silentio, 3.67.2). In the end, the 
inert, inattentive and clueless emperor is overpowered by the literal voice of the people. When 
Vitellius attempts to give his dagger of imperium to the consul in abdication, the people roar in 
opposition (reclamantibus), whereupon an even louder shout (maior…clamor) forces the 
emperor back toward the Palatium (3.68.2-3). Such improper balance of the noise levels between 
ruler and subject—i.e., that Vitellius is improperly timid and the people improperly able to 
overpower him in turn—is mimetic of the wider breakdown of discipline and good governance. 
The fact that the end of Vitellius’ reign hews so closely to the failures and challenges of the 
traitor Caecina, provocatively presents Vitellius’ abdication as a kind of defection. Certainly, like 
Caecina, the emperor has let his men down. Thus Tacitus’ indictment of Vitellius is subtle but 
devastating: in the end the emperor is little better than his own traitorous lieutenant. 
 
THE FLAVIAN ACCLAMATION AND THE “PARALLEL TRADITION” 
 
 
Tacitus’ careful and sustained focus on the importance of the sacramentum lends a complexity to 
his acclamation narrative not found in the parallel tradition. Suetonius, for instance, makes no 
distinction between the salutatio in Judaea and Mucianus’ Syrian oath. Instead, the biographer 
conveys Vespasian’s rise in one generic sentence: Iudaicus deinde exercitus V. Idus Iul. apud 
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ipsum iuravit (“Thereupon the Judaean army swore their loyalty to the man himself five days 
after the ides of July,” Suet. Ves. 6.3).199 We may note also that the verb iurare (as opposed to 
adigere) gives the agency to the soldiers; no mention is made, therefore, of any coordinated 
effort on the part of the elites. Suetonius, moreover, relates Mucianus’ role in the acclamation 
process only in passing, blandly lumping him in with the other eastern governors and kings who, 
vaguely, “considerably furthered the enterprise” (plurimum coeptis contulerunt, Ves. 6.4). 
Josephus’ and Cassius Dio’ accounts are even more alien to Tacitus’, for these Greek historians 
relate only imperial acclamations. No oath ritual of any kind is ever even mentioned explicitly.200   
To varying degrees, all three parallel accounts vest common soldiers with considerable 
influence over the course of events. This means a considerable diminishment of Mucianus’ role. 
Neither Suetonius nor Josephus mention him at all during the acclamation.201 Cassius Dio 
acknowledges that the Judaean salutation stemmed partially from a perception among the 
legions that Mucianus wanted Vespasian to be emperor (64.8.4). But what precisely Mucianus 
did to give the soldiers that impression is left unstated. After the acclamation, he vanishes 
altogether.202  
It is the court historian and Flavian partisan Josephus who provides the fullest and most 
extreme “bottom-up” version of the acclamation.203 According to his account in The Jewish War, 
when Vitellius arrived in Rome, he plundered it without mercy (BJ 4.586-87). As a result, the 
Judaean legions took it upon themselves to proclaim a reluctant Vespasian emperor: 
                                                      
199 Cf. Ash (2007) 310. 
200 Jos. BJ 4.601: ἀναγορεύουσι (“they issue a public proclamation”); Cass. Dio 64.8.4: ἀνεῖπον αὐτὸν αὐτοκράτορα 
(“they proclaim him emperor”).  
201 Josephus’ Mucianus does appear BJ 4.605, but at this point, the acclamation process has already ended.  
202 Cass. Dio 64.8.4 further differs from Tacitus in stating that Mucianus held on during the acclamation to the hope 
he would enjoy an equal share of power with Vespasian. For the Tacitean Mucianus’ willing public subordination to 
Vespasian, see his speech at the concilium of officers (2.76.1-78.1).   
203 Josephus’ status as officially sanctioned Flavian historian is secure: cf. Jos. Vit. 363; Beard (2003) 544. 
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τῷ δὲ φροντὶς μὲν ἦν πάλαι περὶ τῶν ὅλων, οὔτι γε μὴν αὐτὸς ἄρχειν προῄρητο, 
τοῖς μὲν ἔργοις ἑαυτὸν ἄξιον ἡγούμενος, προκρίνων δὲ τῶν ἐν λαμπρότητι 
κινδύνων τὴν ἐν ἰδιωτείαις ἀσφάλειαν. ἀρνουμένῳ δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἡγεμόνες 
ἐπέκειντο καὶ περιχυθέντες οἱ στρατιῶται ξιφήρεις ἀναρεῖν αὐτὸν ἠπείλουν, εἰ μὴ 
βούλοιτο ζῆν ἀξίως. πολλὰ δὲ πρὸς αὐτοὺς διατεινάμενος ἐξ ὧν διωθεῖτο τὴν ἀρχὴν 
τελευταῖον, ὡς οὐκ ἔπειθεν, εἴκει τοῖς ὀνομάσασι. (Jos. BJ 4.601-4) 
 
Their general had long been concerned for the public weal, but had never purposed 
his own promotion; for, though conscious that his career would justify such claim, 
he preferred the security of private life to the perils of illustrious station. But on his 
declining, the officers pressed him more insistently and the soldiers, flocking round 
with drawn swords, threatened him with death, if he refused to live with dignity. 
After forcibly representing to them his many reasons for rejecting imperial honors, 
finally, failing to convince them, he yielded to their call. (trans. Thackeray 
(1997))204 
 
Scholars have generally viewed Tacitus’ acclamation narrative as a corrective against the sort of 
pro-Flavian propaganda represented here.205 To make this point, they quite rightly cite Tacitus’ 
notices that Vespasian was plotting with Mucianus to take the throne for himself already during 
Otho’s reign (2.1-7).206 Long before any salutations or oaths, Vespasian and his fellow officers 
had taken note of the common soldiers’ desire to challenge the Othonian and Vitellian factions 
(2.7.1) and made the conscience decision to revolt, instead  “putting off military action until the 
time was right” (arma in occasionem distulere, 2.7.2).207   
                                                      
204 The other two extant accounts, Dio Cassius and Suetonius, are of little use in corroborating Josephus due to their 
brevity. Cassius Dio’s epitomizer preserves a greater role for Mucianus, but still vests the soldiers with the final say 
(64.8).  
205 Unlike Josephus, Suet. Ves. 5 and Cass. Dio 65.8.3 both assert Vespasian’s intentions to seize imperial power 
during the Otho-Vitellian conflict. 
206 Most cogently and recently, Ash (2007) 33: “T[acitus] uses a range of techniques to demonstrate to his readers 
that he is no tame Flavian puppet. The most cogent involves the arrangement of events with the narrative. So, 
although pro-Flavian accounts of Vespasian’s rise to power judiciously post-date his challenge as the only possible 
response to Vitellius’ ‘decadent’ principate (Jos. BJ 4.588-604), T[acitus] makes it clear that Otho is still princeps 
when the seeds for the Flavian challenge are first planted (2.7.1).” See also Briessmann (1955); Chilver (1956) 203-
4; Chilver (1957) 29-35; Townend (1961) 59; Ferrill (1965); Nicols (1978) 87-99; Chilver (1979) 162, 233; Morgan 
(1994b) 199n6; Ash (2007) 284, 309. Martin (1981) 92 argues that the ends of books 2 and 3 also contain jabs at 
Josephan propaganda. For analysis of Josephus as Flavian court historian, see esp. Beard (2003) 543-58.  
207 According to Tacitus, Titus was the first member of the Flavian family to contemplate defecting (2.1); see Nicols 
(1978) 94 and Levick (1999) 44. Yet Mucianus and Vespasian, with Titus’ help, had already “upon Nero’s death” 
(exitu…Neronis) set aside their resentment and began working “together to their mutual benefit” (in medium, 2.5.2). 
On the (largely tendentious) belief among modern historians that Vespasian had designs on imperial power already 
during Nero’s lifetime, see Weber (1922), Chilver (1979) 34. 
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Yet viewing Tacitus’ account of Flavian ascent as a mere corrective against pro-Flavian 
propaganda is insufficient, since Histories 2 does not entirely refute Josephus’ account of eager 
soldiers and a timid Vespasian. In fact, the final picture Tacitus paints is one of revision, not 
refutation. We will recall from earlier in this chapter that Tacitus pays meticulous attention to (a) 
the ways in which the various oaths are sworn, and (b) to the different stages of the acclamation 
process. Indeed, by stressing both the salutatio (which, admits Tacitus, sprang organically from 
the soldiers) and the Eastern oaths (which Mucianus orchestrated after months of plotting with 
Vespasian), Tacitus sidesteps a false binary: did the soldiers coerce Vespasian, or did Vespasian 
coerce the soldiers? Neither would be would be wholly accurate. Tacitus’ narrative—unlike 
Josephus’, Suetonius’, or Cassius Dio’s—is complex, for it portrays the process of imperial 
acclamation as a delicate balance of interests in all segments of military society. Whether 
Tacitus’ account is true to events as they actually occurred can of course never be known. 
Nevertheless, his “all of the above” approach to agency, coupled with the sheer length and 
complexity of the events as narrated, lends the narrative a high degree of verisimilitude and 
cements it as one of the central moments of the extant Histories. 
 
 
Part 2: A Return to Moderation 
 
 
From the very beginning of the Histories, fairness in matters of money is a primary 
preoccupation of the military mind. When Galba refused to pay the soldiers the donative which 
was owed to them by both promise and precedent, many of his supporters turned to the more 
generous Otho. Now, as Vespasian and the Flavians inaugurate their challenge with the 
customary oaths of allegiance (2.73-81), they must decide how to address issues of 
compensation. Will they follow Galba’s example and defiantly and proudly withhold all 
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monetary rewards? Galba’s swift demise argues against it. Or, like Otho and Vitellius, will they 
honor the pre-Galban precedent of lavishing gifts on their army and effectively purchasing their 
loyalty? True, Otho had successfully wrested supporters away from Galba by being more 
generous with his money and favors. But, it is equally true that the soldiers’ desire for 
increasingly higher compensation for their loyalty did not cease simply because Otho was in 
power. When a mutiny broke out in Rome at the praetorian barracks, 5,000 sesterces were 
offered to each man to placate them—the highest single per capita cash-for-loyalty exchange 
since Claudius’ accession. “Only then,” remarks Tacitus, “did Otho dare enter the camp” (tum 
Otho ingredi castra ausus, 2.82.3).208 Vitellius failed to learn the lesson of Otho’s reign. When 
he finally arrives in Rome, his failure to instill discipline in the milites and rein in their 
expectations for further reward, coupled with his rampant wasteful spending (2.94.3-95.3), 
breeds chaos in the ranks: conscius sibi instare donativom et deesse pecuniam omnia alia militi 
largiebatur (“aware that the donative was upon him and that he was out of money, Vitellius 
lavished the soldiers with every manner of gift,” 2.94.2).209 Vespasian, however, faced with the 
unappealing and so far disastrous alternatives of extreme parsimony and extreme generosity, 
forges a more moderate path in the East.   
The mobilizing of the war-effort against the Vitellians is impressive, thorough, and 
orderly.210 With brevity and precision, Tacitus lists some of the early accomplishments and deeds 
of the aspiring regime: troops were levied; veterans were recalled; arms were manufactured and 
coins minted.211 Vespasian himself took a hands-on approach—inspecting his troops, offering 
                                                      
208 For further discussion and analysis of this extended mutiny narrative (1.80-85), see Haynes (1996) 188, Ash 
(1999) 31, and Manolaraki (2003) 112-50, who argues that it is “a narrative shorthand of the Histories itself.” 
209 Cf. 2.94.1.  
210 On Josephus’ account of the preparation for war (BJ 4.630), see Nicols (1978) 73. 
211 What propagandistic role these coins may have played is unclear; see Nicols (1978) 96. 
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encouragement and censure as needed. He promoted many men to the high ranks of prefect, 
procurator, and senator. These were the “outstanding men” (egregios viros, 2.82.2), recruited 
primarily from the provinces, who would constitute the new aristocracy of the empire in the new 
era.212 In typical Tacitean fashion, this long, praising list “has a sting in the tail”:213 the historian 
adds that “for certain men it was luck rather than virtue” (quibusdam fortuna pro virtutibus fuit, 
2.82.2) that accounted for their promotion. Still, all in all, it is clear from the start that 
Vespasian’s challenge is built on solid ground. 
It is into this atmosphere of competency that Tacitus broaches the subject of 
compensation. Vespasian was not afraid to offer non-monetary incentives when he wanted to 
secure loyalty and expand his army. His currently active legions, for example, were instructed 
“to entice the praetorians who hated Vitellius with the prize of readmission to their service” (ut 
praetorianos Vitellio infensos reciperandae militiae praemio invitarent, 2.82.3). The rewards for 
loyalty extended up the ladder as well: in the months and years following the civil wars, 
Vespasian’s many legates and officers were rewarded prestigious promotions and adlections to 
priesthoods.214 Nor was he shy about exacting money from his subjects when needed.215 But, 
says Tacitus, when it came to direct cash give-outs, the Vespasian and Mucianus showed 
commendable restraint:216  
                                                      
212 See Levick (1999) 170-83. 
213 Ash (2007) 321. 
214 See Nicols (1978) 99-124, esp. 108: “That these men received such rewards is consistent with what Tacitus says 
about how important the legati amicique were to Vespasian’s decision to revolt (H. 2.76.1; 81.3).”  
215 See esp. Griffin (2000) 30-32. Levick (1999) 48 suggests that “[t]o finance operations Vespasian must have 
raided the Judaean war-chest.” 
216 What would have constituted a “modest donative” (donativom…modice)? According to Cass. Dio 65.22.2, 
Mucianus gave each soldier a mere 100 sesterces when he entered Rome, “one-ninth of a year’s wage” (Nicols 
(1978) 129). Levick (1999) 95 seems to accept Suetonius’ figure of 100, and notes that this is only a tiny fraction of 
the amount which Nymphidius Sabinus promised in gifts in Galba’s name: 1,250 sesterces to each legionary; six 
times that much to each member of the praetorian guard. Augustus, a plausible candidate of moderation, doled out 
300 sesterces to each legionary and cohort in his will.216 Perhaps Vespasian followed his example. For the Flavian 
donative of 69 CE, see also Flaig (1992) 465-69. 
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donativom militi neque Mucianus prima contione nisi modice ostenderat, ne 
Vespasianus quidem plus civili bello obtulit quam alii in pace, egregie firmus 
adversus militarem largitionem eoque exercitu meliore. (2.82.2) 
 
Mucianus had not shown the soldiers more than a modest donative at the initial 
assembly. Nor did Vespasian offer more in civil war than others have in times of 
peace; he was impressively and firmly opposed to bribing his soldiers, and therefore 
had a better army. 
 
According to Ash, “the implicit point of comparison for exercitus melior…is Vitellius’ 
army, flawed through bribery, and although the primary sense of melior is ‘more efficient,’ it 
also has a moral tone.”217 Ash is certainly correct that Tacitus means to make a value judgment. 
On the point of the phrase’s implied referent, however, I suggest that Tacitus is seeking to make 
a more generalized statement concerning the state of bribery in the Year of Four Emperors and 
perhaps even Imperial Rome more generally. Large-scale bribery, as we saw in Chapter 1, had 
already been commonplace for decades when someone in the Galban administration 
(Nymphidius Sabinus?) first offered lavish sums of money to Galba’s followers; if he had not 
been unduly generous with his promises, Galba would not have been in a position to refuse 
payment. Vespasian and Mucianus, conversely, are on the same page on this issue. Together, 
they decline to make the mistake of their civil war predecessors. Tacitus plainly admires the 
decision: meliore is not only unabashedly positive, it has wide-reaching implications for a 
promising future. After all, as Tacitus famously writes, Vespasian was the only emperor who 
changed “for the better” (in melius, 1.50.4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
217 Ash (2007) 322. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chapter has been a meditation on Flavian success. As such, it has focused primarily on the 
positive qualities of competent people. Vitellian failure and ineptitude have been invoked, but 
only in order to give shape and meaning to the successes of their Flavian rivals. All this 
positivity could (rightly) make a student of Tacitus nervous—where does Tacitus negate all this 
success? When does the darkness creep in? One answer to questions such as these will be found 
in Chapter 3, where a decidedly immoderate Antonius Primus will be shown to represent a 
darker side of Flavian competency. Primus is Flavian competency and success run amok; his 
exercitus is decidedly not melior. Second, we ought to bear in mind that genuine recognition of 
competence does not necessarily equal moral approbation. Nevertheless, there is no denying that 
the Flavian acclamation presents the first, best indication that Galba’s cavalier disregard for the 
institutions of imperial military society is not permanent, that the rupture of January 69 can be 
healed. 
The success of the Tacitean Flavians rests in large part on their understanding of how 
oaths ought to work. Tacitus, alone among the extant sources of the Flavian acclamation, shows 
that Vespasian and (more so) Mucianus work together to engineer a delicate balance between 
complementary strategies. On the one hand, they cultivate the pre-existing enthusiasm and 
affection of the soldiery for their commander. They do not stamp out the treasonous rejection of 
the Vitellian oath. Nor do they attempt to force a Flavian oath down the soldiers’ throats the first 
chance they get. Instead, they allow ill-will toward Vitellius to fester, while they shore up 
support among the officer corps and then patiently wait for an organic expression of loyalty to 
spring from the common soldiers. Such an expression ultimately arrives in the form of an 
imperial salutatio in Judaea. Though Vespasian is stunned into inaction, Mucianus takes over 
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and, by overseeing the administration of a series of sacramenta, turns one localized salutation 
into a region-wide coalition of support. 
While there is no denying the overall skill on display here, there is something decidedly 
hollow about it. True, Vespasian, Mucianus, and their supporters together have managed to 
orchestrate some version of an ideal outcome. But the fact that these well-organized, oath-
respecting legions never participate in the action to come, deflates somewhat the value of their 
achievement. The geographic insularity of the Flavian acclamation creates the sense that the 
whole affair is like a test case, a lab experiment that proves that the oath, under the right 
conditions, can thrive. 
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Chapter 3  
 
The Calculations of Civil War 
 
 
Soldiers’ desires for self-enrichment may assume many forms. In Chapter 1, we saw Galba’s 
army demand to be given a gift for their loyalty above and beyond their salary—an 
understandable desire, given the recent tradition of receiving donatives that had been in place 
since Claudius’ accession. Yet there is another type of acquisitiveness, born out of Rome’s long 
history of foreign conquest, which frequently motivates the behavior of the civil armies of 69 
CE: the desire for plunder (praeda).218 Though it is the donative which secures soldiers’ initial 
loyalties, in the Histories it is often the license to plunder which commanders must grant in order 
to maintain that loyalty. For, if they do not, mutiny—the rending of the sacramentum—is often 
just around the corner. 
 There is an important distinction to be made between wanting the rewards of plunder, 
and wanting to engage in plunder. The former is common throughout Roman historiographical 
literature. When Roman forces seized a city by force, it was ideal practice to systematically loot 
the wealth of that city such that entire army shared in the profits, regardless of who actually did 
the pillaging.219 If the general failed to oversee the distribution of profits, as he was duty-bound 
to do, unrest ensued.220 One of Rome’s most storied periods, the Second Punic War, furnishes an 
excellent example. In 206 BCE, the soldiers on campaign with P. Cornelius Scipio in Spain run 
                                                      
218 For plunder and greed in the civil war armies of the Histories, Ash (1999) remains the most important treatment; 
see esp. 111, 159-60. For the role of Roman greed in its foreign conquests, see most recently Adler (2011) 119-20, 
136-38. Sallust (as Mithridates) provides us with perhaps the frankest expression of traditional Roman greed and 
acquisitiveness in foreign affairs: namque Romanis cum nationibus populis regibus cunctis una et ea vetus causa 
bellandi est: cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum (“For the Romans, there exists one ancient reason for going to 
against all nations, peoples and kings: the profound desire for imperial power and riches,” Hist. fr. 5) 
219 Cf. Plb. 10.15.4-16.9 with Ziolkowski (1993), who shows that the Polybian ideal rarely held true in practice. 
220 On the general’s duty and expectation of sharing wartime profits, see Shatzman (1972). 
 94 
out of money.221 Even though Scipio owes his own army several years’ worth of back-pay, he 
spends most of the plundered wealth buying Spanish loyalty. This lack of pay and of a share of 
the plunder, coupled with the long length of service and a lack of supplies, drives the soldiers to 
mutiny at the Spanish town of Sucro. Our sources agree that the mutineers did not use their 
newfound freedom to plunder or attack anyone.222 Instead, they peacefully petition for 
restitution. Ultimately, Scipio gives them their back-pay and promises to forgive them their 
disobedience so long as they formally end their mutiny by swearing a new oath of loyalty.223  
Tacitus’ civil-warriors do not merely want the plunder and monetary rewards attending to 
military success; they also want to plunder and to wreak further devastation (murder, rape, 
arson). In some of the most horrific moments of the Histories, violence is even sought as an end 
in itself. When confronted with armies of this sort, what is a general to do? In this chapter, we 
will examine how two of the military leaders of the Histories—the Flavian Antonius Primus and 
the Vitellian Fabius Valens—handle this violent brand of greed. Whereas Valens attempts to 
curb the desire for violence and ultimately fails to control his army and stave off mutiny, Primus 
recognizes the necessity of giving the soldiers an outlet for their violent impulses, even 
harnessing their passions in service of Vespasian’s cause. Large-scale mutiny is avoided. Primus’ 
army mercilessly plunders and murders its way to victory, paving the way for Vespasian’s 
eventual triumphant entrance into the capital. Ultimately, Tacitus’ treatment of the violence and 
greed of Primus’ army leaves his readers with an uneasy realization: the success of the Flavian 
acclamation may have been, in many respects, an exemplary display of moderation and a return 
to more traditional military mores, but the success of the Flavian victory over Vitellius not only 
                                                      
221 For a discussion of role of money in this mutiny, see esp. Eckstein (1987) 202-203, Chrissanthos (1999) 89. 
222 Chrissanthos (1999) 89. 
223 Liv. 28.29; Plb. 11.30. 
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strains good Roman morality and tradition, but even, as we will see, strains Roman identity 
itself.  
 
 
PART 1: Antonius Primus, raptor largitor 
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, it was the Eastern legions—first in Egypt, then in 
Vespasian’s own Judaea, then in Syria and everywhere else—who swore the first oaths to the 
soon-to-be new emperor (2.79-81). But Vespasian was also counting on support from the legions 
in Illyricum (2.74.1). After the acclamation, his wish was granted.224 First to join were the three 
Moesian legions.225 They had been deeply devoted to Otho, and upon learning of their emperor’s 
defeat at the First Battle of Cremona, ripped up Vitellius’ banners, and then, we are told, 
immediately proceeded self-indulgently to grab all the cash on hand and divvy it up among 
themselves (2.85.1). Clearly, Vespasian’s political future was not their first concern.226 Next, the 
formerly Othonian legions of neighboring Pannonia,227 who were also “holding onto the sorrow 
and rage from Cremona, joined Vespasian without hesitation, particularly because of the 
forcefulness of Antonius Primus” (dolorem iramque Bedriacensis pugnae retinentes, haud 
cunctanter Vespasiano accessere, vi praecipua Primi Antonii, 2.86.1). It is in this off-handed 
                                                      
224 Vespasian hoped to secure the allegiance of the Danubian legions when the Flavian bid was still in the planning 
stage, but did not actually do so until after the acclamation; cf. 2.74.1. For the differing chronologies of events in the 
parallel tradition, cf. Suet. Vit. 15.1, Vesp. 6.3 and Jos. BJ 4.619, with Ash (2007) 331. 
225 These were the Third Gallic (III Gallica), Seventh Claudian (VII Claudia), and Eighth Augustan (VIII Augusta); 
see Chilver (1979) 18. Tacitus notes that Vespasian was confident in the loyalty of Gallica III because it had 
recently moved to Moesia from Syria (2.74.1). Nicols (1978) 132 observes that “Tacitus, in comparison to [the] 
description of events on the Rhine in January [1.55-60] and in Judaea in the [s]pring [2.1-8, 74-86], gives no details 
about the defectio of the III Gallica from Vitellius in Augustus 69; not one name is mentioned nor is the spread of 
the revolt from the legio III to the other Moesian legions explained.”  
226 Ash (2007) 331 calls the cash-grab a “grubby and opportunistic outbreak, certainly no idealistic swelling of 
support for Vespasian.” 
227 XIII Gemina and VII Galbiana. Note the distinction between the VII Claudia (based in Moesia) and VII Galbiana 
(based in Pannonia). See Chilver (1979) 18 and Ash (2007) 335. 
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way228 that Tacitus introduces the main protagonist of book 3 and the member of the Flavian 
party most directly responsible for victory against Vitellius. Tacitus’ Primus is an opportunist 
and a survivor:229 though convicted of fraud and stripped of senatorial rank under Nero (2.86.1), 
he was restored to good standing by Galba, only to attempt to betray Galba for Otho (2.86.2)! 
Otho ignored him; so, when Vitellius’ fortunes began to slip, he threw his support behind 
Vespasian (2.86.2). Tacitus then caps Primus’ career with a pithy character sketch:230 
strenuus manu, sermone promptus, serendae in alios invidiae artifex, discordiis et 
seditionibus potens, raptor largitor, pace pessimus, bello non spernendus. (2.86.2) 
 
Physically energetic and a ready talker, he made an art out of cultivating hatred 
against others and was powerful against riots and mutinies; a generous plunderer; 
a scoundrel in peacetime, but a force to be reckoned with in war. 
 
 
RAPTOR LARGITOR 
 
The most dynamic of all the “lieutenants” of all four emperors,231 Primus is also the most 
consequential Flavian in the extant narrative, since it is he who delivers the decisive blow to the 
Vitellians.232 (Mucianus arrives in Rome with his legions after Vitellius’ execution (4.11); 
                                                      
228 Ash (2007) 335 aptly calls this “appended abl. of manner” [vi praecipua Primi Antonii] a “playful touch.” For the 
life and career of Antonius Primus, see Nicols (1978) 38-39, Ash (1999) 147-65, Levick (1999) 49-53, and Morgan 
(2006) 189-90 and passim. 
229 The parallel tradition does not treat Primus march into Italy anywhere near as extensively as Tacitus does. 
Morgan (2006) 190 sums it up nicely: “…Dio provides material on a few episodes; Suetonius skips over almost 
every event between September and November, referring to explicitly to the sack of Cremona only in his Life of 
Vespasian; and Josephus contributes an interesting snippet or two.” 
230 Master (2012) 86 highlights the full sentence (labantibus…spernendus) as a prime example of Tacitus’ tendency 
to place the bulk of the important information in successive dependent clauses following the main clause: “A series 
of predicate adjectives and nouns and a final gerundive display a variety of figures of speech and structuring devices 
including chiasmus, parallelism, and variatio. There are individual moments of balance, for example, strenuus 
manu, sermone promptus and raptor largitor, but the overall structure of the sentence is unevenly weighted and 
lacking in harmony.” Cf. O’Gorman (2000) 4 on A. 2.5.1: “The subordinate clause…is the predominant feature of 
both narrative and historical explanation.” See also Martin (1981) 221. 
231 The other “lieutenants” are Fabius Valens, Aulus Caecina, and Mucianus. The term “lieutenant” is this context is 
non-technical; it refers to these men’s subordinate status to the emperors and future emperors they serve.  
232 According to Tacitus, Vespasian himself recognized this fact; cf. 4.80.2. Damon (2006) 273: “There is no willful 
blindness in Vespasian but rather a careful search for the right balance among due reward for merit, the claims of his 
other supporters, and his own safety and authority.” 
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Vespasian does not even arrive in Italy until after the text breaks off.) Though Primus’ rival, 
Mucianus, will eventually squeeze him out of Vespasian’s inner circle,233 any discussion of 
Tacitus’ depiction of the Flavian regime must seriously consider the man who, more than any 
other, did the heavy lifting to bring that regime into existence.  
Yet for all he did to advance Vespasian’s cause, Primus’ decision to slash southward into 
Italy without Mucianus’ army defies Vespasian’s more cautious plan to starve Vitellius into 
submission (3.8.2).234 This decision to go it alone was either “unknown to Vespasian or against 
his direct orders” (quae ignara Vespasiano aut vetita 3.8.2).235 In either case, Vespasian had in 
fact issued orders to Primus to stay put and wait for Mucianus (3.8.2); Mucianus had also sent 
letters to similar effect (3.8.3). Yet both men fail to slow Primus, who successfully pursues a 
violent resolution all on his own. This sort of cavalier behavior comes as no surprise: as we saw 
in the character sketch above (2.86), Primus serves many men but always himself first.  
The strong-willed Primus is capable of stirring his soldiers to action with his eloquence 
and forceful personality. For instance, in order to convince his army to follow him in an 
offensive movement down into Italy, Primus delivers a speech with such passion that “he 
persuaded even the wary and prudent, while the rest of the rabble praised him as the only man 
and general they had, spurning the others’ inactivity” (ut cautos quoque ac providos permoveret, 
volgus et ceteri unum virum ducemque, spreta aliorum segnitia, laudibus ferrent, 3.3).236 These 
                                                      
233 Immediately after Vitellius’ execution, Primus had the “greatest power” (summa potentiae, 4.2.1), but once 
Mucianus came to town, that began to change (4.11.1). Mucianus, long Primus’ bitter rival, manipulated Vespasian 
into excluding the war-hero from civilian governance (3.52-53; 4.80).  
234 That is, by withholding delivery of essential Egyptian grain. Levick (1999) 53 seems to accept the historical 
accuracy of Tacitus’ formulation. For a skeptical discussion of the historical plausibility and seriousness of 
Vespasian’s strategy, see Griffin (2000) 5, Morgan (2006) 187-89. 
235 ignara here has a passive sense (=ignota); see Wellesley (1972) 85. According to Bassols de Climent (1951) 15, 
“El uso de ignarus con acepción pasiva (es decir, en vez de ignotus) no es clásico.” However, cf., e.g., Sal. Jug. 
18.6, 52.4 (cited at TLL vii/1.275.80-276.12). 
236 Tacitus describes Primus’ impassioned style of delivery as follows: haec ac talia flagrans oculis, truci voce, quo 
latius audiretur… (“he said these and similar things with flashing eyes and a fierce voice, so that he could be heard 
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same skills also come in handy for quashing the seditious activity of money-minded soldiers. In 
one episode, early in the campaign, Primus’ Seventh Galban Legion become spooked when they 
mistake approaching allied cavalry for hostiles. Seized by vengeful panic, they call for the 
unpopular Tampius Flavianus237 to be put to death, “scream[ing] that he was a relative of 
Vitellius, a traitor to Otho, and the one who stole their donative!” (propinquum Vitellii, 
proditorem Othonis, interceptorem donativi clamitabant, 3.10.2).238 When Flavianus responded 
to these accusations with abject supplication and uncontrollable sobbing, the legions were even 
more convinced of his guilt. When Flavianus and the other officers tried to present a defense, 
their voices were drowned out by the legions’ shouts. Primus alone (uni Antonio, 3.10.3) 
managed to cut through the noise and quiet them, “for he possessed eloquence and the ability to 
soothe a mob, as well as authority” (namque et facundia aderat mulcendique volgum artes et 
auctoritas, 3.10.3). Primus may have quashed this particular mutiny (3.10.4), thereby proving for 
the first time that he was indeed “in control of riots and mutinies” (discordiis et seditionibus 
potens, 2.86.2).239 The legions’ mutinous spirit, however, had not been extinguished (3.11). 
Throughout the campaign to come, Primus would often face unruly and greedy soldiers, and 
would need to rely on more than charisma and eloquence to keep them under control.  
Within the character sketch (2.86.2), Tacitus previews Primus’ strategy for managing his 
acquisitive and occasionally mutinous civil-war army in a provocative two-word 
                                                      
better,” 3.3.1). For a discussion of the contents of Primus’ clever and successful speech at Poetovio (3.2.4), see Ash 
(1999) 152-57.  
237 According to Tacitus (3.4), Tampius Flavianus was in fact a relative of Vitellius’. Though he does not fare well 
here, he survives the wars of 69 and attains the office of suffect consul ca. 76; see Levick (1999) 177. 
238 We do not know much about this donative, or even whether it was Otho or Vitellius who promised it; see 
Wellesley (1972) 237. 
239 I adapt this translation from Manolaraki (2003) 166-69, who notes that the collocation seditionibus potens is quite 
rare, only appearing in fact outside Tacitus (cf. H. 1.10.2, 60, 73) in Vergil’s introduction of Drances (seditione 
potens, A. 11.340).  
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homoeoteleuton: raptor largitor (“plunderer and lavish giver [of bribes]”).240 The significance of 
these agent nouns is bound together. raptor, as Tacitus no doubt realized, is slightly inaccurate: 
Primus himself does not plunder anyone, nor is he particularly excited to see anyone plundered; 
rather, he allows and even encourages his soldiers to be plunderers. Nor, as largitor suggests, 
does Primus keep the profits. The two clearly-related meanings of largitor—“a person who gives 
liberally, a bestower, benefactor” (OLD s.v. 1), and “a person who gives money corruptly, a 
briber” (OLD s.v. 2)—both speak to Primus’ strategy:241 by granting his legions permission to 
plunder, he in effect both sets himself up as their benefactor and bribes them not to mutiny. This 
“one-two punch”—i.e., plundering innocent civilians while generously sharing the accrued 
wealth with his soldiers—flies in the face of Vespasian’s idea of how best to handle an army: in 
Chapter 2, we saw that Vespasian was “impressively and firmly opposed to bribing his soldiers, 
and therefore had a better army” (egregie firmus adversus militarem largitionem, eoque exercitu 
meliore, 2.82.2). It is somewhat ironic, then, that Primus’ particular, violent brand of bribery 
(raptor largitor) leads his army to victory in Vespasian’s name. We will see throughout this 
chapter that Primus, under Flavian banners, plunders his way toward Rome, and in the process 
supervises the shocking brutalization and destruction of Cremona, a friendly Italian city, and 
eventually of Rome itself. It is no wonder that Vespasian distances himself from the general after 
the war (4.80).242  
                                                      
240 The collocation is found only here. For a similar formulation, cf. praedae…largitor (“generous distributor of 
plunder,” Liv. 9.42.5). Sallust calls Catiline cuius rei lubet simulator ac dissimulator (“capable of pretending or 
concealing anything at all,” Cat. 5.4; trans. Ramsey (2007) 70). 
241 OLD s.v. 2 claims 2.86.2 as an example, however. 
242 Robbed of both influence and position in Vespasian’s administration (4.80), Primus apparently retires to Tolosa. 
He does not appear in the record again until the 90s, when Martial (10.23) writes an epigram on the occasion of his 
seventy-fifth birthday. Ash (1999) 148 notes that these verses may contain “a hidden defense of Primus’ 
contribution to the civil war. … This is hardly a forthright denunciation of Primus’ critics, but the fact that Martial 
felt the need for such a diplomatic tone so long after the civil war indicates that Flavian resentment toward the 
general to whom they owed so much had not decreased.” 
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Ultimately, however, Vespasian and Mucianus can only distance themselves from Primus 
the raptor largitor so far without opening themselves up to charges of hypocrisy. For, despite 
Vespasian’s exercitus melior and aversion to direct bribery (largitionem, 2.82.2), Tacitus does 
not allow Primus to be the repository of all Flavian shame. There was, in fact, a darker, grubbier 
side to the Flavian acclamation than we encountered in Chapter 2: many of Vespasian’s own 
supporters have a long-standing desire for plunder (multos dulcedo preadarum stimulabat, “a 
desire for plunder spurred on many,” 2.7.2).243 Josephus’ contention (BJ 4.585) that the Eastern 
legions rallied around Vespasian because they disliked the Vitellians’ depredations of Italy is a 
detail found nowhere else in the Histories.244 Even Vespasian himself, for all his virtues, 
possesses the vice of greed (prorsus, si avaritia abesset, antiquis ducibus par, “all in all, if it 
were not for his greed, he would have been the equal of the generals of old,” 2.5.1).245 Later, as 
waves of oaths to Vespasian sweep the Eastern provinces (2.79-81), Mucianus appeals to his 
legions’ higher earning potential under a Flavian regime, warning that Vitellius was planning to 
“transfer the German legions to Syria for a profitable and peaceful posting” (Germanicas 
legiones in Syriam ad militam opulentam quietamque transferret, 2.80.3), and to send the Syrian 
                                                      
243 On dulcedo praedarum, Ash (2007) 95: “T[acitus] elsewhere attributes this discreditable motivation to 
German tribes (praedae dulcidine, G. 33.1).” For the pejorative connotations of dulcedo in Livy, see 
Oakley (1997) 713. 
244 Nicols (1978) 95-96 identifies three aspects of Flavian propaganda present in Josephus’ account: “First, the 
acclamation of Vespasian was a spontaneous movement of angry and patriotic soldiers who had just learned of the 
Vitellian depredations of Italy and Rome [Jos. BJ 4.585ff]. Second, the reluctant Vespasian had the empire forced 
upon him by his soldiers (Jos. BJ 1.24; 4.601). And, third, Vespasian hoped to win a bloodless victory.”   
245 This passage caps a longer, largely flattering, character sketch of the soon-to-be emperor: Vespasianus, 
acer militiae anteire agmen, locum castris capere, noctu diuque consilio ac, si res posceret, manu hostibus 
obniti, cibo fortuito, veste habituque vix a gregario milite discrepans; prorsus, si avaritia abesset, antiquis 
ducibus par (“Vespasian, every inch the soldiers, marched at the front of the line, chose where to encamp, 
and, day and night, struggled against his enemies by holding council and—if the situation demanded—by 
entering combat. He ate when he could; his clothing and uniform scarcely differed from a common 
soldier’s. All in all, if it were not for his greed, he would have been the equal of the generals of old,” 2.5.1; 
translation adapted from Ash (2007) 86). 
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legions to Germany, where the weather was harsher and the work harder.246 opulentam (OLD s.v. 
1, “profitable”) successfully, if tactfully, hints at the money the legions stand to lose if Vitellius 
has his way.247—A better army, yes, but hardly a perfect one, as Tacitus makes clear. 
 
FLAVIAN SCALES 
 
 
Only two days after departing from his base at Verona,248 Primus arrives in the neighborhood of  
Bedriacum, where he wastes no time instilling in his army some unsavory patterns of behavior:  
postero die legionibus ad muniendum retentis, auxiliares cohortes in Cremonensem 
agrum missae, ut specie parandarum copiarum civili praeda miles imbueretur: ipse 
cum quattuor milibus equitum ad octavum a Bedriaco progressus, quo licentius 
popularentur. (3.15.2). 
 
On the following day, while keeping back the legions to fortify the camp, the 
auxiliary cohorts were sent into the country around Cremona, in order that the 
common soldiers might acquire an early taste of civilian plunder, though under the 
pretense of gathering supplies: Primus himself, along with 4,000 cavalry, advanced 
to within eight miles from Bedriacum in order to pillage undisturbed. 
 
This “siguläre Wendung” of praeda and imbuo suggests that a behavior is being learned; imbuo, 
beyond simply “to imbue,” connotes training and initiation (OLD s.v. 4).249 Later, in the midst of 
                                                      
246 Tacitus goes on to remark that the local provincials and the legions had grown fond of, and accustomed to one 
another, “many having formed ties of intimacy and kinship” (plerique necessitudinibus et propinquitatibus mixti, 
2.80.3; trans. Irvine). On these legions’ long tenure in Syria, see Levick (1999) 58 and Ash (2007) 314. 
247 Ash (2007) 313: “The combination militia + opulenta is unique, but T[acitus] plays with words, since opulentus 
can mean both ‘profitable’ (OLD s.v. 1), as here, and ‘well supplied with military resources’ (OLD s.v. 2).” 
248 From the beginning of Primus’ campaign, Tacitus emphasizes the tactically-advantageous speed and brutal 
efficiency. Cf. Ash (1999) 152: “In Tacitus’ eyes, Antonius Primus’ action [at 3.15.1] is justifiable, given the 
possibility of escalation: the phrase immensa belli lues graphically reflects the potentially massive destruction which 
could have resulted from delay.” 
249 See Heubner (1972) 60. Wellesley (2009) 133 translates “to acquire a taste for plundering Roman civilians.” Cf. 
Bassols de Clement (1951) 30: “para que los soldados se fuesen acostumbrando (empezaran a encontrar gusto) a 
saqueo de los ciudadanos.” Later, after the battle of Cremona, Primus allowed the legionaries to replace their own 
commanders “in order that the common soldiers acquire a taste for license” (ut…licentia militem imbueret, 3.49.1). 
In his commentary, Wellesley (1972) 99 takes issue with the historicity of 3.15.2: “The auxiliaries would normally 
get their booty from enemies outside the Roman empire. The remark is tendentious; Antonius’ purpose was 
obviously to lure the Vitellian troops well away from their camp.” This sort of craven behavior, following as it does 
immediately upon Tacitus’ descriptions of Primus’ exceptional charisma and eloquence, begins to confirm the apt 
assessment of Ash (1999) 148: “Tacitus offers us a disturbing portrait of a man who possesses the practical flair 
associated with the ideal general, but whose moral code allows him to use sinister methods for the sake of short term 
expediency.” 
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battle, Primus “spurred everyone on with hopes and promises” (omnes spe promissisque 
accendens, 3.24.1). As Ash rightly observes, “[w]e are not told what these hopes and promises 
are, but the implication is that plunder and money is involved.”250 Such incentivizing helps shape 
the desire for plunder that will determine the course of events. 
In the lead-up to the destruction first of the Vitellian legionary camp (3.27-29), then of 
Cremona (3.30-34), Tacitus provides a glimpse of how Primus’ men conceptualize the risks of 
war in relation to the rewards of victory: 
quae super cuncta terrebat ipsorum miles periculi quam morae patientior: quippe 
ingrati quae tuta, ex temeritate spes; [a] omnisque caedes et [b] vulnera et [c] 
sanguis aviditate praedae pensabantur. [27.1] huc inclinavit Antonius cingique 
vallum corona iussit. (3.26.3-27.1) 
 
[Antonius Primus and his fellow officers’] own army, more tolerant as it was of 
danger than of delay, was the thing that terrified them more than anything: the men 
scorned what was safe, their expectations were rash; [a] all slaughter, [b] wounds 
and [c] shedding of blood was compensated for by their greed for plunder. [27.1] 
Antonius was inclined to agree and ordered a ring of troops to surround the 
rampart.251 
 
The narrative perspective here is sophisticated: Tacitus does not simply record the feelings of the 
soldiers; rather, he records how Primus and the other officers perceive the soldiers’ feelings.252 
The literal meaning of penso is to weigh something out, such as gold or other valuables, for 
commercial purposes (OLD s.v. 1).253 The “scales” of Primus’ army, however, are metaphorical 
(OLD s.v. 4), and thus represent the “commodification” of violence. On one side of the scales lie 
death, injury, and bloodshed; on the other, plunder as reward for their suffering, and the greed 
                                                      
250 Ash (1999) 159n45 notes further that “[p]romises in the Histories are often financial in nature: see 1.25.1, 2.8.1, 
3.58.3, and 4.30.2.”  
251 The translation of 3.26.3 is my own; that of 3.27.1 is adapted from Wellesley (2009) 140. 
252 Wellesley (1972) 113 posits a likely setting: “T[acitus] seems to be recording the reflections of the [generals] at a 
hurried council of war on the field.” 
253 Sil. 1.624, 4.153; cf. 4.273, Liv. 48.8-9. These passages and their possible significances for the Histories will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
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which will motivate them to grab that reward.254 The implication is that without the opportunity 
to remain active and engaged in plunder, they will not tolerate hardship for long.255 Primus 
understands that the strength of the soldiers’ “greed for plunder” (aviditate praedae) is such that 
it can carry them through anything, which is why he opts for an immediate assault (huc 
inclinavit).256 He also understands that a delay would be dangerous to try to impose on this 
impatient lot. Given the premium the men place on action over safety, it is clear that praeda 
(“plunder”), in this instance, refers not merely to “booty (taken in war, robbery, or sim. 
circumstances), plunder, spoil, loot” (OLD s.v. 1a), but to “the act or practice of plundering, 
spoliation, pillage” (OLD s.v. 1c) as well.257 The soldiers need action; Primus knows that, and is 
willing to give it to them in the form of praeda (OLD s.v. 1c). Furthermore, by setting himself up 
as the dispenser (largitor) of praeda—in both senses of the word—Primus is in better position to 
lead his army toward his ultimate goal: the destruction of the Vitellian army.  
 The Vitellians have holed themselves up within the well-fortified legionary camp, which 
was constructed by the German legions during the conflict with Otho. Nearby lies the provincial 
city of Cremona (3.26.1).258 Though the city’s inhabitants are staunch supporters of Vitellius 
(3.30.1), the city itself has little or no strategic value for Primus as a military target. So the 
Flavians, sensibly, proceed to lay siege to the camp, rather than Cremona. The besieged 
Vitellians rain stones and spears down on their assailants: 
                                                      
254 For a similar commodification of sanguis identified throughout Lucanian and Flavian epic, see Coffee (2009), 
esp. 132-33, 148, 160, 196-97. 
255 Cf. Master (2016) 45-48, who has recently argued that “[f]or the Romans to persuade non-Romans to risk their 
lives for Rome…rewards, especially the rewards of citizenship, are necessary.” 
256 Pace Wellesley (1972) 113: “Antonius concurs, willy-nilly.” Heubner (1972) 77 translates huc inclinavit 
expansively: “hierfür (d. h. für unverzüglichen Angriff) entschied sich Antonius.”  
257 Underlining added for emphasis. 
258 Wellesley (1972) 112-13 translates moenibus Cremonensium castra sua, castris vallum circumiecerat (3.26.1) as 
“they had built their camp near the walls of Cremona, and constructed a rampart around the camp” [emphasis in the 
original]. For examples of circum in the sense of “near” (as opposed to “around”), he cites militari vallo Veronam 
circumdare (3.10.1) and circumiectas civitatis (43.1) in Histories 3 alone. 
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donec solute compage scutorum [c] exangues aut [b] laceros prosternerent [a] 
multa cum strage. incesserat cunctatio, ni duces militi et velut inritas exhortationes 
abnuenti Cremonam monstrassent. (3.27.3) 
 
until the compact structure of the shields fell apart and they could flatten [c] their 
bleeding or [b] maimed opponents [a] with deadly slaughter. Hesitation had set in, 
but their generals, finding the men worn out and deaf to exhortation which seemed 
pointless, pointed suggestively to Cremona.259  
 
The terms in Primus’ initial consideration of the injuries which the opportunity to plunder (OLD 
s.v. praeda 1c) was deemed to offset ([a] omnisque caedes … [b] vulnera … [c] sanguis, 3.26.3) 
correspond chiastically to the soldiers’ actual hardships suffered in this subsequent attack on the 
Vitellian camp ([c] exsangues … [b] laceros … [a] multa cum strage, 3.27.3).260 With this 
semantic mirroring, Tacitus artfully suggests a link between the two passages: the siege (3.27.3) 
puts Primus’ supposition about the soldiers’ motives (3.26.3) to the test. At this point, the 
soldiers, by suffering significant bodily harm and death, have satisfied the conditions of one side 
of the “scale.” But, as of yet, they have no plunder to show for it. So it comes as no surprise that 
their resolve begins to waver. incesserat cunctatio implies that the soldiers were, in the absence 
of plunder, prepared to stop the assault. But Primus and the other commanders intervene, 
“point[ing]” (monstrassent, 3.27.3) to Cremona. In this way, Primus and his fellow officers offer 
up Cremona as a sacrificial victim to the army’s greed: the promise of wealth that Cremona 
represents rebalances the “scales” with a massive amount of potential praeda and thereby 
incentivizes the miles to continue the fight. 
The tactic works extremely well; the Flavians now fight with reckless abandon: 
non iam [c] sanguis neque [b] volnera morabantur, quin subruerunt vallum 
quaterentque portas, innixi umeris et super iteratam testudinem scandentes 
prensarent hostium tela brachiaque. integri cum [b] sauciis, [a] semineces cum 
                                                      
259 Translation adapted in part from Wellesley (2009). On the exhortationes of Otho, see Keitel (1987).  
260 Woodman (2012) 257-90 has identified chiasmus in the preface of the Agricola. For chiasmus on a smaller scale, 
see Goodyear (1981) 186. 
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exspirantibus volvuntur, varia [a] pereuntium forma et omni imagine [a] mortium. 
(3.28) 
 
Now neither the [c] shedding of blood nor their [b] wounds stopped them from 
rushing upon the rampart and shaking the gates, standing on the shoulders of their 
comrades in testudo formation they grasped at the spears and limbs of the enemy. 
The unhurt and the [b] wounded, the [a] nearly-dead and the [a] dying were piled 
together in a heap; [a] death had many shapes and took on many forms. 
 
The second half (c-b-a) of the chiasmus is repeated, providing even stronger evidence that 
Tacitus has crafted a sustained relationship between reward and suffering in these chapters. 
Moreover, the crescendo of semantic repetitions (c-b-b-a-a-a) serves to darken the tone and drive 
home how far the soldiers were willing to go for the promise of monetary reward.  
 Kenneth Wellesley objects to Tacitus’ reportage of Primus’ actions on historical and 
logical grounds: “Considerable suspicion attaches to this sentence [i.e, cunctatio…monstrasset, 
3.27.3] as a statement of fact, for the troops were already well aware of the possibility of plunder 
at Cremona, and knew their own power.”261 It is indeed possible that, in the actual course of 
events, Primus and his lieutenants may have had little to no leverage to control the lusts of the 
common soldiers, and that the sack of Cremona was essentially a foregone conclusion. In other 
words, Wellesley is not wrong to question the historical accuracy of any account of the 
destruction of Cremona which imbues Primus with the potential authority to restrain his army. 
But that is largely beside the point. All the evidence on which one might construct an argument 
of plausibility such as Wellesley has, derives from Tacitus’ and others’ accounts—Tacitus’ being 
by far the fullest. In other words, to disprove Tacitus, Wellesley would need to rely either on 
Tacitus himself or mere appeals to probability. In short, rather than measure Tacitus’ account 
against what cannot be known (i.e., whether Primus actually pointed to Cremona), we ought to 
                                                      
261 Wellesley (1972) 115 also finds it less than credible that “a verbal promise [i.e., monstrasset, 3.27.3] of what they 
already regarded as theirs could have enabled the troops to pass over so suddenly to a successful offense [3.28].” 
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consider why Tacitus decided to include this detail and what its inclusion may signify. My 
analysis of chiastic repetition provides an answer: Primus’ decision to attack the camp (and as of 
yet not the city) contained within it an implicit promise to his soldiers that they could plunder the 
camp for valuables in order to satisfy the losses they would suffer in the hard siege. However, 
the camp would have contained only a modest amount of wealth, so the soldiers were not willing 
to commit to large losses to sack it. Primus understood this and therefore in the heat of battle 
offered Cremona as a fat reward, worthy of the intense challenge that the taking of the camp 
fortifications proved to be.262  
 
Before the siege of the legionary camp ever began, both Primus and the common soldiers 
realized that the city of Cremona represented a huge potential payday. Primus was in no position 
to deny the soldiers their desires for plunder, and he knew it. Even attempting to delay the 
opportunity to plunder nearly sparked a mutiny.  
 As the entire Flavian force finally convenes near Cremona on the night before the assault, 
the soldiers, many coming off a successful skirmish against the Vitellians outside the city (3.18), 
are eager to storm the gates as soon as possible and force a quick surrender—so, remarks 
Tacitus, was their “fine-spoken public stance” (haec in medio, pulchra dictu, 3.19.1). However, 
the soldiers’ privately held feelings and motivations to which Tacitus claims access (illa sibi 
quisque, “these things each man kept to himself,” 3.19.1) undercut the pure martial spirit of their 
official line and reveal an army deeply concerned with personal gain:263 
                                                      
262 My interpretation is close to that of Pomeroy (2012) 141: “In the third book of the Histories, Tacitus, in the midst 
of a vivid battle scene, has the Flavian commanders, desperate to encourage their soldiers into one final effort, 
pointing out the prize of victory in the nearby city of Cremona (Hist. 3.27.3). This strategy worked, although it 
involved a Roman army pillaging a Roman city and the civilians inside being brutally mistreated by those who were 
meant to be their protectors. This was the greatest outrage of the civil wars of 69 CE.” 
263 Ash (1999) 160 remarks that the Flavian soldiers’ decision to “veil their private craving for booty by pretending 
to want to press on towards Cremona and enforce the surrender of the enemy” reveals a “sensitiv[ity] about their 
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illa sibi quisque: posse coloniam plano sitam impetu capi. idem audaciae per 
tenebras inrupentibus et maiorem rapiendi licentiam. quod si lucem opperiantur, 
iam pacem, iam preces, et pro labore ac volneribus clementiam et gloriam, inania, 
laturos, sed opes Cremonensium in sinu praefectorum legatorumque fore. 
Expugnatae urbis praedam ad militem, deditae ad duces pertinere. (3.19.2) 
 
But on the other hand, each man privately thought that the colony, which lay on flat 
ground, could be seized in a direct assault, and that, if they attacked at night, they 
would have the same measure of courage and a greater license to plunder. But if 
they waited for daylight, there would be peace and supplication, and that, in 
exchange for their effort and their wounds, they would win glory and a reputation 
for clemency—pointless things!—but that the wealth of the Cremonese would fall 
into the lap of the prefects and legates: the booty of a sacked city belonged to the 
soldiery, that of a surrendered city to the commanders.  
 
The soldiers’ secret thoughts about Cremona in this passage anticipate the same sort of 
calculations—material gain as compensation for personal effort and loss (underlined above)—to 
which Primus accedes (huc inclinavit) in the nighttime scene before the attack (3.26.3-27.1). The 
soldiers’ cynicism and greed fit well their disdain for the traditionally positive Roman qualities 
clementia and gloria.264  
 When the soldiers finally give outward expression to these private passions, they do so 
non-verbally:  
spernuntur centuriones tribunique, ac ne vox cuiusquam audiatur, quatiunt arma, 
rupturi imperium, ni ducantur. (3.19.2) 
 
The centurions and tribunes were spurned, and lest anyone’s voice be heard, they 
clashed their weapons to indicate that they would break his power if they were not 
led onwards.265  
 
                                                      
image.” This sensitivity is visible in Primus as well, when he sends auxiliaries into the area around Cremona to 
acquire a taste for plunder, but does so under the pretext of foraging for supplies (3.15.2). Cf. Ash (1999) 65: 
“Tacitus exploits the contrast between appearance and reality, just as he did with his supposition about the Flavian 
auxiliaries apparently collecting supplies, but actually acquiring a taste for plundering fellow citizens (3.15.2). 
Antonius Primus’ gambit seems to have worked because when the troops finally reach Cremona, any fear of death is 
outweighed ‘by their eagerness for plunder’ (3.26.3. cf. Justin’s Epitome 11.5.9). Self-preservation now means little 
to the greedy Flavians.” 
264 Cf. 3.24.2, where Antonius urges Pannonian legions to “recover their glory” (reciperare gloriam). 
265 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009) 135.  
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rupturi imperium, a periphrasis for threatening mutiny, recalls the German legions’ decision to 
break their reverence for the oath of loyalty (rupta sacramenti reverentia, 1.12.1) at the start of 
the 69 CE narrative, the moment when the crises of the Histories began. Thus, the situation in 
northern Italy has been marked as serious. Among the generals, only the charismatic Primus 
demonstrates that he understands the plunder-obsessed mindset which lies behind this threat to 
mutiny—unvoiced though it is—when he “affirm[s] that he was not trying to rob such deserving 
men as they of either their glory or their reward” (non se decus neque pretium eripere tam bene 
meritis adfirmabat, 3.20.1).266 Then Primus, in order to reassert some control, articulates his own 
plan of attack, marked by close attention to detail and a brutal pragmatism: rather than object to 
taking Cremona by force on any moral grounds, the general argues that the darkness puts them at 
a disadvantage, and that the proper siege weapons required for success in an assault of this kind 
have not yet arrived (3.20.3). “Why not,” he implores, “wait for just one night…?” (quin potius 
mora noctis unius, 3.20.3). He defends his right to delay the assault by articulating a theory of 
the separate duties of soldiers and generals: the former, he concedes, ought to “love fighting” 
(cupidinem pugnandi, 3.20.1; cf. aviditate praedae, 3.26.3),267 while the latter are required 
occasionally to curb recklessness for the greater good (3.20.1). Clearly, Primus never intended to 
check to the soldiers’ violent and greedy impulses with regard to Cremona; he merely wanted to 
channel those impulses towards the best possible military outcome. Yet even that little bit of 
prudence nearly provoked a mutiny (prope seditionem ventum 3.21.1)!268 It was only the timely 
news of a Vitellian advance that reined in their seditious spirit and brought them back under 
                                                      
266 Otho exhibits a similar sensitivity to the realities of troop behavior during civil war: volgus et plures seditionibus 
et ambitioso imperio laeti per turbas et raptus facilius ad civile bellum impellerentur (“the majority of the common 
soldiers, delighting as they do in mutiny and imperial power that campaigned for their affection, could be compelled 
into civil war more easily through rioting and plunder,” 1.83.1). 
267 Heubner (1972) 66 notes of cupidinem pugnandi: “die Verbindung nur hier und Amm. 21.3.3.” 
268 For this phrase, cf. Liv. 26.48.8 and Curt. 4.10.4, with Heubner (1972) 68. 
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Primus’ control (3.21.1-2). This close call shows just how volatile these civil war soldiers are—
and how essential it was that Primus and his fellow generals point to Cremona.  
 
After the walls of Cremona are breached, and its inhabitants are left exposed to the whims and 
passions of the Flavian army, Tacitus presents a Primus and officer corps who do virtually 
nothing to prevent catastrophe. At first, when the soldiers begin to rough up the townspeople, the 
generals manage to calm them down enough to prevent full-scale slaughter (3.32.1). Thereupon 
Primus, true to form, steps forward and speaks.269 Tacitus summarizes Primus’ message (in 
indirect discourse) as follows:  
et vocatos ad contionem Antonius adloquitur, magnifice victores, victos clementer, 
de Cremona in neutrum. (3.32.1) 
 
Antonius also called a general assembly of the soldiers; he addressed the victors 
admiringly and the vanquished with mercy, but didn’t say anything one way or the 
other about Cremona.  
 
Given that the issue at hand is the safety of the city’s inhabitants, Primus has, in effect, said 
nothing at all. This de-facto silence echoes Primus’ non-verbal indicating (monstrasset, 3.27.3), 
and like that earlier episode ought to be construed as tacit consent to plunder.270  
 Primus at this point retires to the baths to wash off the blood from battle (3.32.3), thereby 
indicating his disinterest in participating in further violence, as well as his acceptance of the 
soldiers’ earlier contention that “the booty of a sacked city belonged to the soldiery, that of a 
surrendered city to the commanders” (3.19.2). As Tacitus makes clear with the following 
anecdote (and analysis), the general neither gives the final command to destroy Cremona nor 
                                                      
269 For Primus’ penchant to step forward and address the assembled soldiers, see the discussions of 3.10.3 and 3.20.1 
above. 
270 Pace Wellesley (1972): “that the Flavian commanders extended a direct invitation to plunder the city [at 3.27.3] 
seems to be excluded by the words of T[acitus] at 32.1.”  
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fears that he has lost control of them.271 Rather, he is content to observe from a distance what he 
has helped to set in motion:272 
excepta vox est, cum teporem incusaret, statim futurum ut in<c>alescerent: vernile 
dictum omnem invidiam in eum vertit, tamquam signum incendendae Cremonae 
dedisset, quae iam flagrabat. (3.32.3)273 
 
As he complained about the lukewarm water, he was overheard saying, “things will 
be heating up soon!”—a witticism worthy of a slave that turned everyone’s ire 
toward him, as if he had given the signal to set fire to Cremona, which was in fact 
already burning. 
 
Earlier in this same chapter, Tacitus was quick to remind us of the legionaries’ insitam praedandi 
cupidinem (“inborn desire to plunder,” 3.32.1).274 Thus, the historian implies that these 
legionaries were going to fulfill the promise of Primus’ and the other generals’ fateful point 
(monstrassent, 3.27.3) whether Primus ordered them to or not. 
 By now, it is evident that Primus (a) understands how to harness the natural impulses and 
pride of soldiers and to use them to further his cause (3.26.3-28.3), and (b) understands when it is 
best to sit back and let his soldiers do what they do best: plunder (3.32). But, effective though 
they are, such tactics come at the cost of many innocent lives. At the start of the campaign, when 
Primus sent his troops into the neighborhood of Cremona to start their career in plundering 
(3.15.1), they were willing to “drop their booty and fight” (omissa praeda proelio occureret, 
3.16.2) when the situation necessitated. Back then, Primus’ strategy of destructive plunder 
(raptor), followed by allowing the soldiers to enrich themselves (largitor), did not interfere with 
                                                      
271 Pace Wellesley (1972) 122, who hangs much on the speed of Primus’ departure to the baths (propere petit, 
3.32.3): “The need for haste is not obvious unless, as T[acitus] probably implies, Antonius [Primus] despaired of 
controlling his men.” 
272 Cf. Manolaraki (2003) 177: “[Primus’] effective control [over his army] is largely contingent upon his ability to 
relate to mutinies and quasi-mutinies. His secret is, to put it glibly, that, instead of swimming against the current, he 
goes with the flow.” 
273 For a lengthy discussion of how this passage has been variously construed, see Heubner (1972) 87-88. 
274 Cf. cupidine praedandi (Liv. 33.19.4), cited by Heubner (1972) 87. 
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discipline, and thus did not interfere with his authority. Now, as Primus bathes, the plunder and 
carnage rage on unchecked: 
non dignitas, non aetas protegebat, quo minus stupra caedibus, caedes stupris 
miscerentur. grandaevos senes, exacta aetate feminas, viles ad praedam, in 
ludibrium trahebant: ubi adulta virgo aut quis forma conspicuus incidisset, vi 
manibusque rapientium divolsus ipsos postremo direptores in mutuam perniciem 
agebat. dum pecuniam vel gravia auro templorum dona sibi quisque trahunt, 
maiore aliorum vi truncabantur. quidam obvia aspernati verberibus tormentisque 
dominorum abdita scrutari, defossa eruere. (3.33.1-2) 
 
Neither rank nor age protected rape from sex crimes and murder from 
intermingling. They dragged off for sport old men and elderly women, who had no 
value as plunder: wherever an adult virgin or anyone who stood out for his beauty 
came in the soldiers’ path, they were torn to pieces by the violent hands of rapists, 
ultimately driving the plunderers themselves to self-destruction. Whoever made off 
with their own sum of money or golden offerings taken from temples, was cut down 
violently at the hands of others. Some, spurning the more obvious loot, tried to find 
hidden treasures and dig up what was buried by beating and torturing the property 
owners.   
 
viles ad praedam, in ludibrium trahebant is a doubly disturbing phrase: on the one hand, it 
reveals that the soldiers have become so gripped with greed that they have begun to assess the 
value of even the defenseless elderly in monetary terms; on the other hand, the phrase reveals 
that not even “objects” deemed to be of low value are safe from violent treatment. Primus’ 
legions have no qualms about crossing the line from selfish greed to pure sadism, debauchery 
and chaos. The results are horrific: sexual misconduct (adulta virgo…forma conspicuus), 
sacrilege (templorum), and the unraveling of unit cohesion (in mutuam perniciem; aliorum vi 
truncabantur).275  
 The soldiers, it turns out, were motivated by “more than an inborn desire for plunder” 
(praeter insitam praedandi cupidinem, 3.32.1): Primus’ formerly Othonian legions were nursing 
a grudge against the townsfolk (a) for allegedly supporting Vitellius in the war against Otho; (b) 
                                                      
275 These are traditional motifs in descriptions of sacked cities: cf. Sal. Cat. 51, with Wellesley (1972) 123. For a 
discussion of wartime rape in H. 3.33 and elsewhere, see Williams (2010) 112-16. 
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for mocking the Thirteenth Legion when it was garrisoned there previously; and (c) for giving 
the Vitellians food and other support (3.32.2). Tacitus caps the list of motives with an element of 
the mundane:276 the residents of Cremona were at that moment hosting several wealthy 
merchants within their walls.277 The gathering of merchants on market days is a routine activity 
of normal civilian life.278 Its occurrence at this time suggests that the Cremonese thought that 
they were safe, thus further highlighting the transgressive nature of attacking this Italian city. 
Furthermore, a scene of banal normality casts into even sharper relief the far-from-routine 
“monetary” activities of the Flavian plunderers and rapists. Tacitus comments further on the 
perversion of wartime commercial values when “Primus, ashamed of their crimes [sc. of raping 
and pillaging Cremona] and because of growing resentment, decreed that no one was to keep any 
citizen of Cremona prisoner. Agreement among the Italians, who as a bloc vehemently opposed 
the buying and selling of slaves acquired in this way, had rendered the soldiers’ booty useless 
(inritamque praedam militibus, 3.34.4).” The Flavian soldiers, not to be deterred, simply began 
killing their captives until their families and neighbors “bought them back in secret” (occulte 
redemptabantur, 3.34.2)! No commercial norm, whether civilian or military, is respected by the 
Flavian soldiers once the walls of Cremona are breached. 
 
FLAVIANS AS BARBARIAN BOOGEYMEN 
 
 
Silius Italicus’ account of the capture of Syracuse furnishes perhaps the most dramatic and 
laudatory example of Roman restraint in the face of an opportunity to plunder. In a detailed 
                                                      
276 Cf. Ash (1999) 66: “This item [i.e. the mention of the market in progress] is placed emphatically last in the list of 
motivating influences and adds weight to the passing comment with which Tacitus opened the discussion (‘quite 
apart from their natural desire for plundering,’ 3.32.1).” 
277 tempus quoque mercatus ditem alioqui coloniam maiore opum specie complebat (“It was also market season and 
the colony, which was rich to begin with, was filled with the visible opulence” 3.32.2).  
278 See Frayn (1993). 
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ecphrasis (Sil. 14.641-66), the poet describes the unrivalled wealth suddenly at Rome’s 
disposal.279 Marcellus, hyper-aware of his own power to destroy (Sil 14.666-70), chooses rather 
to curb the soldiers’ violence: “thus mercy to the conquered took the place of plunder, and the 
goddess of Victory, asking no more than victory, waved her wings unspotted by blood, in 
approval of herself” (sic parcere victis / pro praeda fuit, et sese contenta nec ullo / sanguine 
pollutis plausit Victoria pennis, Sil. 14.673-74).  
 Primus’ allowance of, and even enticement towards, plunder clearly contradicts the sort 
of ideal Roman practice Marcellus represents.280 The tradition of Caesar at Pharsalus further 
demonstrates Primus’ alignment with the darker side of Roman generalship. In his own Bellum 
Civile, where he often seeks to justify his own actions, Caesar orders his men not to allow 
themselves to be distracted by plunder (BC 3.97.1).281 Similarly, in the Annals, Tacitus has 
Suetonius Paulinus exhort his legions before fighting Boudicca to “forget about plunder” 
(praedae immemores, A. 14.36.2).282 In the De bello civili Lucan’s Caesar offers up Pharsalus for 
plunder such that the poet’s sinister characterization of the Roman icon clearly informs Tacitus’ 
Primus:283 
   non magno hortamine miles 
in praedam ducendus erat: “victoria nobis 
plena, viri,” dixit, “superest pro sanguine merces, 
quam monstrare meum est: neque enim donare vocabo, 
quod sibi quisque dabit.” (7.736-39) 
 
The soldiers needed no great encouragement to be led toward plunder: “Complete 
victory is ours, men,” he said, “what remains is your reward for bloodshed, which 
falls to me to point out: for I will not call it “giving” what each man gives himself.”  
                                                      
279 For ecphrases in the Punica, see Manuwald (2009). 
280 Most of the examples cited in the paragraph are derived from Ash (1999) 37-38. Wellesley (1972) 121, citing 
Liv. 21.57.13-14 and 37.32.12-13: “Antonius [Primus] was seriously at fault in not talking stronger.” 
281 Ps.-Caesar also describes himself as forbidding plundering at Hadrumentum ([Caes.] BA 3.1; cf. 54); see Ash 
(1999) 38. 
282 Adler (2011) 129 points out that Paulinus’ instruction to refrain from violence is “essentially practical: the 
Roman troops can defeat the rebels more easily if they are not distracted by plunder.” 
283 This intertext has long been recognized; cf. Wellesley (1972) 115. 
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Primus also closely resembles Juba, the Numidian king who, according to pseudo-Caesar, “gave 
the town [of Vaga] over to his troops to be plundered and destroyed” (dedisse oppidum 
diripiendum delendumque militibus, [Caes.] BA 74.2).284  
 In this section, I will explore how Silius’ use of the verb penso expands our 
understanding of Primus’ dark and barbarous place in Tacitean historiography even further. It 
was noted above that the metaphorical language used by Tacitus for “weighing” (pensabantur, 
3.26.3) the soldiers’ profits against their toils derives from the literal vocabulary of scales. penso, 
an Imperial Latin by-form of pendo, is not particularly well-attested in Tacitus’ day or earlier.285 
So it is noteworthy that Silius Italicus, poet of the Punica and elder contemporary of Tacitus, 
uses penso several times—in both a literal and figurative sense—in reference to Hannibal, his 
Gallic allies in the Second Punic War, and their ancestors, the Senones Gauls, who sacked Rome 
in 390 BCE.286 This locus of intertextual engagement is not an idle one: in his “obituary” of 
Cremona, Tacitus notes that the city had been founded 286 years earlier, “at the time when 
Hannibal was menacing Italy, to serve as a fortification against the Gauls living north of the Po 
or any other violent invasion by way of the Alps. … [B]ut a city which had been unscathed by 
foreign invasion proved unlucky in civil wars”287 (ingruente in Italiam Annibale, propugnaculum 
adversus Gallos trans Padum agentes et si qua alia vis per Alpes rueret.…bellis externis 
intacta,288 civilibus infelix, 3.34.1). Primus and his Roman legions, in other words, destroyed a 
city which over the centuries had withstood Rome’s fiercest enemies.  
                                                      
284 Cited by Ash (1999) 159. 
285 TLL x/1.1108.28-1109.30 cites, other than Tacitus and Silius Italicus, only Liv. 22.51.3, 30.32.5; Curt. 3.6.5, 
7.8.2, 8.2.29; Pet. 132.6. The vast majority of cited passages postdate Tacitus. 
286 Little work has been done on the relationship between Silius Italicus and Tacitus. For resonances of the Silian 
Hannibal in the complex portrayal of Germanicus in the Annals, see Augoustakis and Manolaraki (2012). 
287 Translation by Wellesley (2009) 144. 
288 According to Wellesley (1972) 125, bellis externis intacta refers to “the unsuccessful attack of the Boii and their 
allies under a Carthaginian leader on Cremona in 200 BC (Liv. 31.10 and 21), the invasion of the Cimbri halted at 
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 It was Rhiannon Ash who first noticed the connection between the Flavians of Tacitus 
and the Carthaginians of Silius: the Hannibal of the Punica offers up the Roman-allied city of 
Saguntum as a sacrifice to his soldiers’ greed in much the same way Primus offers up 
Cremona:289 
perque ipsos caedis cumulos stragemque iacentum 
monstrabat furibundis iter cunctosque ciebat 
nomine et in praedas stantem dabat improbus urbem (Sil. 1.453-5) 
 
The raging Hannibal pointed the way over the actual piles of corpses and heaps of 
the dead, calling all his soldiers by name and boldly offering them the city as booty, 
though it still stood. (trans. Ash (1999)) 
 
Romanae utrimque artes: pondera saxorum Vitelliani provolvunt, disiectam 
fluitantemque testudinem lanceis contisque scrutantur, donec soluta compage 
scutorum exangues aut laceros prosternerent multa cum strage. incesserat 
cunctatio, ni duces fesso militi et velut inritas exhortationes abnuenti Cremonam 
monstrassent. (H. 3.27.3) 
 
Both sides employed Roman tactics: The Vitellians rolled heavy stones and then, 
when the Flavian testudo broke apart and wavered, they probed it with lances and 
pikes, until, now that the connections between the shields had been broken, they 
could lay the men flat, bloodied and wounded, with deadly slaughter. Hesitation 
would have set in, had not the generals pointed out Cremona to the soldiers, who 
were exhausted and refusing exhortations as if they were useless.  
 
In both passages, a general offers the booty of an entire city to renew the fighting spirit of a 
slackening offensive. Livy has a comparable scene, on which Sil. 1.453-455 is likely based.290  
                                                      
the Campi raudii…in 101 BC, and perhaps the occupation of the Alpine regions, Raetia and Noricum, in the period 
35 to 14 BC.” 
289 Ash (1999) 63.  
290 Interim animos eorum nunc ira in hostes stimulando, nunc spe praemiorum accendit; ut vero pro contione 
praedam captae urbis edixit militum fore, adeo accensi omnes sunt ut, si extemplo signum datum esset, nulla vi 
resisti videretur posse (“Meanwhile he kindled their spirits, now by inciting them to rage against their enemies, 
again by holding out hopes of rewards. But when he made a speech proclaiming that the spoils of the captured city 
should go to the soldiers, they were all so excited that if the signal had been given instantly, it seemed as if no force 
could have withstood them,” Liv. 21.11.3-4; trans. Foster (1929), adapted). See Ash (1999) 38. 
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But Tacitus’ use of the pivotal verb monstro shows that he had the poet in mind more than the 
historian. Tacitus’ passage, in fact, has an epic flavor overall: the phrase soluta compage, for 
instance, is an epic collocation.291  
 Ash’s larger argument is that Tacitus aligns the Vitellians and the Flavians with different 
barbarian boogeymen of Rome’s past: while the Flavians variously evoke the Hannibal of Livy 
and Silius, it is the barbarous ways of the Vitellians, not the Flavians, which evoke the Senones, 
the Gauls who sacked all of Rome except the Capitoline Hill in 390 BCE.292 The Vitellians’ 
arrival at Rome, for instance, follows the same pattern as Livy’s Senones—wide-eyed tourism 
(H. 2.88.3; cf. Liv 5.41.4), followed by aimless wandering (H. 2.93.1; cf. Liv. 5.44.5), and finally 
falling victim to southern heat and diseases (H. 2.93.1 and 2.99.1; cf. Liv. 5.48.3).293 Yet, when 
we explore how Tacitus and Silius employ the verb penso, we find that both Hannibal and the 
Senones lurk behind the Cremona episode of the Histories. Indeed, Tacitus places Primus within 
a lineage of barbarian enemies of Rome—stretching back, through Hannibal, to the original 
terror from the north, the Senones.  
 Silius first makes use of penso during the battle of Saguntum, thus strengthening the 
monstro intertext discussed above. After Hannibal has offered the city to his soldiers as booty to 
embolden them (Sil. 1.453-55), the Carthaginian general kills the Saguntine warrior Murrus in 
single combat (Sil. 1.515-17). Enraged, the young men of Saguntum gang up on Hannibal, 
bringing him close to the breaking point (Sil. 1.518-32). Hannibal of course survives, and the 
poet offers the following explanation for the general’s fortitude: 
mente adversa domat gaudetque nitescere duris 
                                                      
291 I owe this observation to Antony Augoustakis. Cf. Luc. BC 3.491, Sil. 17.606, and Stat. Theb. 8.31. On the 
metaphorical potential of compages in the Histories, cf. 4.74.3 with Master (2016) 139-40. Joseph (2012) 129-35 
identifies H. 3.27 as participating in a network of epic, and especially Lucanian, allusiveness. 
292 See Ash (1999) 37-72, esp. 45-49 and 63-69. 
293 Ash (1999) 45-48. 
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virtutem et decoris pretio discrimina pensat. (Sil. 1.533-534)  
 
He overcomes disaster through courage and is delighted that his virtue is made 
brighter by hardship; and he weighs dangers against the reward of glory. (trans. 
Duff (1934)) 
 
The echoes with the “scales of war” before (3.26.3) and during (3.27.3-28) the battle at Cremona 
are striking. Silius’ account of Hannibal at Saguntum was likely a model for Primus at Cremona, 
which, if true, casts doubt on Primus’ claim to Roman identity. Yet whereas both generals 
“weigh” cost against benefit, the sentiment expressed by Silius is considerably nobler: Hannibal 
views glory as a worthy prize (decoris pretio, Sil. 1.534); Primus’ soldiers write off the rewards 
of glory as “worthless” (inania, 3.19.2), and instead put everything on the line for plunder 
(aviditate praedae, 3.26.3). Primus hardly protests (3.20.1, 31.1). Thus, in the lead-up to 
Cremona, Primus and his legions as a collective entity fall short of Silius’ Hannibal at 
Saguntum.294  
 pensat (Sil. 1.534), like pensabantur (H. 3.26.3), refers to “weighing” in a metaphorical 
sense (OLD s.v. 4).295 But, in several other passages of the Punica, Silius uses penso in its literal 
meaning (OLD s.v. 1), usually in reference to the physical scales used to weigh the indemnity 
Rome paid to the Senones Gauls after the humiliating sack at their hands in 390 BCE. Livy 
records the best known version of the story:296  
pondera ab Gallis allata iniqua, et tribuno recusante additus ab insolente Gallo 
ponderi gladius, auditaque intoleranda Romanis vox, Vae victis. (Liv. 5.48.9) 
 
The weights brought by the Gauls were dishonest, and when the tribune objected, 
the insolent Gaul added his sword to the weight, and a saying intolerable to Roman 
ears was heard: “Woe to the conquered!” (trans. Foster (1924), adapted) 
                                                      
294 Cf. Manolaraki and Augoustakis (2012) 400: “To acknowledge that Tacitus’ Germanicus is informed by Silius’ 
Hannibal is to overcome the limitations of the simplified typology Roman vs. Foreign and the unravel the 
complexities of both characters.” But whereas Germanicus is quite like Silius’ Hannibal, Primus falls short of even 
that non-Roman hero. For a further connection between Tacitus’ Flavians and Hannibal in the realm of “linguistic 
heterogeneity,” see Ash (1999) 69-70.  
295 Cf. also adversa secundis pensando (“weighing adversity against success,” Liv. 27.40.2). 
296 For the other versions of the legend, cf. D.H. 13.13 and Plut. Cam. 28, with Ogilvie (1965) 738.   
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It will be noted that the verb in question does not appear in Livy’s account: Tacitus is not 
interested in alluding to the historical episode per se, but rather to the representation of the 
episode in the Punica.297 For instance, amid an ecphrasis of a Roman temple functioning as a 
Middle-Republican senate-house, we glimpse “the helmets of the Senones and the wicked sword 
which decided how much gold was weighed on the scale” (hic galeae Senonum pensatique 
improbus auri / arbiter ensis inest, Sil. 1.624). And again later in book 4, during the battle of the 
Ticinus, Crixus, a Gallic chieftain allied with Hannibal, boasted that he was descended from 
Brennus himself, and wishing to co-opt for himself the glory of his ancestors’ capture of the 
Capitol, “in his madness sported on his shield boss the Celts weighing out the gold on the sacred 
summit of the Tarpeian rock” (Tarpeioque iugo demens et vertice sacro / pensantes aurum 
Celtas umbone gerebat, Sil. 4.152-153). In both of these passages, the allusion to the humiliating 
Roman defeat of 390 BCE hinges on penso. 
 Consider also how Hannibal, addressing the Romans, describes the Carthaginians’ 
willingness to surpass their barbarian predecessors in cruelty:   
 “…Tarpeios iterum scopulos praeruptaque saxa 
 scandatis licet et celsam migretis in arcem, 
 nullo iam capti vitam pensabitis auro.” 
 incensi dictis animi, et furor additus armis. (Sil. 2.33-36) 
 
“…Though you climb a second time up the steep cliffs of the Tarpeian rock and 
take refuge in your lofty citadel, you shall not again, when made prisoner, ransom 
your lives for any weight of gold.” These words fired the courage of his troops and 
they fought with fresh fury. (trans. Duff (1934), adapted) 
 
It is important to note that, once again, penso appears in the context of motivating troops to press 
on with their attack. This is not the only time the poet frames the Carthaginians’ and Gauls’ 
present achievements in terms of the Senones’ ancient achievements. For instance, immediately 
                                                      
297 It is also possible that Tacitus wishes to allude to another non-extant account of the “vae victis” scene. 
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following the death of the Saguntine champion Murrus, Silius muses (in highly allusive 
language) that, if even one spear thrown at Hannibal had sunk in deeper, Rome’s defeat at the 
hands of the Senones at the Allia River would have remained the most serious defeat in their 
history; since Hannibal survived the duel, however, the coming slaughter at Lake Trasimene in 
the present war (Punica 5) will set a new precedent (Sil. 1.535-47). Later, when Scipio kills 
Crixus, the Gaul who literally wore the events of 390 BCE on his person, Scipio is delighted to 
point out how much closer to Rome his ancestor Brennus had come to total victory (Sil. 4.286-
88).  
 Tacitus, by using the verb penso in a pivotal way in his narration of Cremona’s 
destruction, has tapped into the same rhetorical stream—either directly or indirectly; it cannot be 
known which—Silius tapped into in order to construct and explore multiple layers of barbarian 
identity simultaneously. The Senones lie at the source of the tradition, followed by Hannibal and 
the Carthaginians, and now Roman general Primus and his Roman legions. The Flavians of 
Histories 3 not only follow upon Hannibal and the Gauls, as the “obituary” of Cremona suggests 
(3.34.1), but embody those archenemies of Rome as they symbolically reenact their conquests. 
That the Flavian army proceeds from Cremona to participate in the burning of the Capitol makes 
its status as successor to the Senones especially apt—and perverse. In fact, to drive the 
connection home, Tacitus twice compares the burning of the Capitol in 69 CE explicitly to the 
Gauls’ similar—but lesser—exploits of 390 BCE:  
id facinus post conditam urbem luctuosissimum foedissimumque rei publicae 
populi Romani accidit, nullo externo hoste, propitiis, si per mores nostros liceret, 
deis, sedem Iovis Optimi Maximi, auspicato a maioribus pignus imperii conditam, 
quam non Porsenna dedita urbe neque Galli capta temerare potuissent, furore 
principum exscindi. (3.72.1) 
 
This was the most lamentable and appalling disaster to befall the state to befall the 
state of the Roman people since the foundation of the city. Although no foreign 
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enemy threatened, although the gods favored us as far as our failings permitted, the 
sanctuary of Jupiter Best and Greatest, solemnly founded by our fathers as a symbol 
of our great destiny—a temple which neither Porsenna on the surrender of the city 
nor the Gauls on its capture had been able to desecrate. (trans. Wellesley (2009)) 
 
captam olim a Gallis urbem, sed integra Iovis sede mansisse imperium: fatali nunc 
igne signum caelestis irae datum et possessionem rerum humanarum Transalpinis 
gentibus portendi superstitione vana Druidae canebant. (4.54.2) 
 
[The Gallic rebels of 70 CE said that] the city was once captured by the Gauls, but 
Roman power had remained, since Jupiter’s seat had remained intact: now, the 
Druids prophesied in their vain superstition that the fateful fire [on the Capitol] was 
sign of divine wrath and that world empire for the peoples beyond the Alps was 
being foretold. 
 
Just as Hannibal’s victory at Lake Trasimene superseded the Senones’ victory generations before 
along the Allia river (Sil. 1.535-47), so do Tacitus’ Flavians (together with the Vitellians) 
manage to burn the “seat of Jupiter” when even the Senones could not. Thus, the civil war 
combatants of book 3 take their place alongside the greatest barbarian boogeymen in Roman 
history. 
 
 
PART 2: The Non-Violence of Fabius Valens 
 
Though often downplayed or overlooked by modern scholars,298 Fabius Valens, legionary legate 
in Lower Germany in 69 CE and loyal Vitellian partisan, plays an undeniably significant role in 
Tacitus’ larger narrative—even, in a sense, embodying the rise and fall of the Vitellian regime. 
The first character to speak (in indirect discourse) in the entire Vitellian narrative, Valens 
successfully convinces the complacent then-governor to want the throne for himself: quatiebatur 
his segne ingenium, ut concupisceret magis quam ut speraret, (“his lazy character was rocked by 
                                                      
298 In fact, Valens’ role in the Histories is almost never discussed at much length in Tacitean scholarship. Morgan 
(1994) and Ash (1999) are significant exceptions. Other studies which discuss discrete aspects of Tacitus’ 
characterization of Valens include Powell (1972), Morgan (1993), Manolaraki (2005). 
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these arguments, resulting in his desiring rather than hoping [to gain power],” 1.52.4).299 Then, 
after planting the seed of revolt, he nurtures it to fruition. When news reaches Vitellius in 
Cologne (in Lower Germany) that Caecina and the legions of Upper Germany have smashed 
Galba’s statues and sworn loyalty to the SPQR, it is Valens, “the biggest go-getter among the 
legates” (promptissimus e legatis, 1.57.1), who rides into Cologne from nearby Bonn and, with a 
retinue of legionary and auxiliary cavalry,300 “proclaims” (consalutavit) Vitellius emperor. Upper 
Germany follows suit the very next day, and thus the Vitellian challenge is born. As principle 
conceiver and creator of the Vitellian challenge, Valens fills much the same role for Vitellius that 
Mucianus fills for Vespasian. Much later in the Histories, when the Vitellian forces are on the 
ropes after having lost the Second Battle of Cremona, it is the capture of Valens which finally 
breaks the Vitellians’ backs: capto Valente cuncta ad victoris opes conversa (“with the capture 
of Valens, the entire Roman world turned to the victor’s position of strength,” 3.44). And when 
Valens is subsequently executed and his head put on public display, the Flavian army takes it as 
a sign that the end of the war is upon them (ut finem belli, 3.62.1).  
 At various points throughout this larger “Valens narrative,” the actions (and inactions) of 
Valens and his army add dimension to the role which plunder and bribery play in the 
relationships between commander and soldier. As such, Tacitus draws many implicit 
comparisons between Valens and the raptor largitor himself, Antonius Primus. These two 
military leaders find themselves in similar predicaments: both serve men who strive to become, 
and succeed in becoming, emperor; both march south through the Alps and into northern Italy; 
once in Italy, both engage their civil-war enemy in a battle outside the city of Cremona; and, 
                                                      
299 Segnitia (“laziness”) is one of Vitellius’ most prominent and consistent characteristics; cf. 1.62.2; 2.73, 90.1, 
94.2; 3.55.1, 56.2, 86.1.  
300 Morgan (1994) 104 points out that this combination of cavalry types represents both native and Rome support— 
a clever PR stunt to visually convey the depth and diversity of support for Vitellius. 
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most significantly, in order to accomplish their goals and achieve victory for themselves and 
their masters, both must contend with the outsized demands and cravings of the soldiers they 
command. Indeed, Valens’ army possesses all those qualities typical of Tacitus’ 69 CE narrative: 
they are simultaneously lazy and ambitious, obsessed with fairness (when it suits them), restless, 
fractious, prone to violence, and above all greedy.301 Yet there is a key difference in how the two 
commanders handle their soldiers’ impulses. Primus, as we have seen, uses the soldiers’ “desire 
for plunder” (aviditate praedae, 3.26.3) to his advantage, offering his men the opportunity to 
pillage an entire city as compensation for the losses sustained in taking the nearby Vitellian 
camp. Many innocents (the elderly, the young) are killed at Cremona to satisfy the soldiers’ 
immoderate urges, and Primus does nothing to stop it (3.32-33). Valens too commands an army 
bursting with violent and acquisitive energy; but, unlike his Flavian counterpart, he does not 
offer up cities to plunder. As we will see, the Vitellian commander, in order to limit the deaths of 
innocents, improvises a system whereby he extorts money from the Gallic cities which they meet 
on the march rather than seize those cities by force. Tacitus’ “message” about whose strategy is 
“correct” is far from clear-cut. On the one hand, Valens’ attempt during the march south through 
Gaul to steer his men away from their propensity to commit violence is largely successful: many 
innocent lives are saved as a result of his clever leadership.302 On the other hand, by taking 
bribes rather than destroying cities, Valens garners a reputation among his men for avarice, and 
suffers a near-fatal mutiny as a result.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
301 For the most important passages in the repetitious characterization of armies in the Histories as greedy, see pp. 
106-9 above. 
302 Caecina, Vitellius’ other legate and ally who marched south parallel with Valens, took far less concern with the 
lives of the innocent; cf. 1.67-70 and Morgan (1994). 
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VALENS’ IMPOSSIBLE CHALLENGE 
 
 
Gwyn Morgan, one of the very few scholars to pay the figure of Valens any considerable 
attention, argues that “[i]n his account of Valens’ march Tacitus describes a situation in which 
the commander loses control, first over his men, then over himself.”303 Rhiannon Ash agrees: 
“…the column which advances on Rome under Valens becomes progressively less disciplined as 
the march continues.”304 While it is true that Valens’ reputation is in some ways permanently 
tarnished by the time he reaches the Alps, I argue that Valens, rather than lose control, in fact 
gains a good deal of control over his men. Though this control is tenuous and his methods 
morally suspect, Valens largely manages to keep the violent plunder of Rome’s allies at bay. 
Thus, Tacitus depicts in the character of Valens an alternative strategy to the Flavian army of 
Antonius Primus, the most brutal raptor of the Histories. However, Tacitus is not in the business 
of constructing simple antitheses between moral heroes and immoral villains. Valens may 
eschew violence, but in the process he creates a military culture which condones—even 
promotes—other forms greed, luxury, and licentiousness. In other words, he is no less of a 
largitor. Furthermore, by protecting innocent civilians from slaughter, he sows the seeds of 
future internal conflict.  
 Any complexity of character in Tacitus’ Valens appears to be an innovation, for the 
Valens of the extant parallel tradition, when mentioned at all, is one-dimensional and lacking in 
detail. There is one brief mention in Plutarch’s Life of Otho, where he is described as an 
insatiable plunderer of the enemy who also stole and received gifts from allies: 
Φάβιον δὲ Οὐάλεντα τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν οὔτε ἁρπαγαὶ πολεμίων οὔτε κλοπαὶ 
καὶ δωροδοκίαι παρὰ συμμάχων ἐνεπίμπλασαν χρηματιζόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐδόκει 
διὰ τοῦτο βραδέως ὁδεύων ὑστερῆσαι τῆς προτέρας μάχης. (Plu. Otho 6.4) 
                                                      
303 Morgan (1994) 107-10. 
304 Ash (1999) 39. 
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Fabius Valens, the other general, was so rapacious that neither what he plundered 
from the enemy nor what he stole or received as gifts from the allies could satisfy 
him. In fact it is believed that this was why he arrived too late to the battle at 
Placentia. (trans. Rouse (1926), adapted) 
 
Cassius Dio’s assessment that Valens collected money “by every means” (ἐξ ἅπαντος τρόπου, 
Cass. Dio 63.10.1) supports Plutarch’s portrait. Tacitus’ Valens, on the other hand, proves to be 
considerably more complex: while certainly an eager fundraiser, he does not start out that way, 
and only becomes so out of necessity.  
 Tacitus’ exploration of the initia causaeque (“initial phases and causes”) of the Vitellian 
challenge contains a careful analysis of the soldiers’ thought-patterns:  
…ferox praeda gloriaque exercitus, ut cui sine labore ac periculo ditissimi belli 
victoria evenisset, expeditionem et aciem, praemia quam stipendia malebat. 
(1.51.1) 
 
…wild with plunder and glory, since victory in a highly profitable war [sc. against 
Julius Vindex] had been achieved, the army preferred the reward of campaigns and 
battles over regular payment.  
 
Their appetitive desire has two objects, praeda (“plunder”) and gloria (“glory”). Tacitus, 
moreover, defines precisely what he means by praeda: praemia, as well as the two nouns in 
apposition to it, expeditionem (“campaign”) and aciem (“battle”), all together constitute a nimble 
conflation of the two related senses of praeda discussed above: “booty (taken in war, robbery, or 
sim. circumstances), plunder, spoil, loot” (OLD s.v. 1a) and “the act or practice of plundering, 
spoliation, pillage” (OLD s.v. 1c).305 The precision of Tacitus’ language here leaves little doubt 
that a passion for violence per se lies at the core of their appetitive desires. These soldiers, like 
Primus’ Flavians, will not be content to collect their wealth passively; they want to earn it by 
fighting on campaign. The most dramatic example of the soldiers’ desire for praeda (OLD s.v. 
                                                      
305 See p. 103 above. 
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1c) comes when, amid various contributions to the nascent war effort, the rank-and-file donate 
even their modest travel stipends and adornments “due to external pressures, internal urges, and 
greed” (instinctu et impetu et avaritia, 1.57.2). The final ablative, avaritia, is charged with 
meaning:306 the soldiers craved wealth won through conquest so much that they were willing to 
part with what little wealth they had in order to make that happen. The message is clear: it is not 
wealth per se they want; they want to plunder. 
 Vitellius, however, in the lead-up to the march south from Lower Germany to Italy, 
issues orders to Valens at odds with the soldiers’ violent brand of avaritia:  
Fabius Valens adlicere vel, si abnuerent, vastare Gallias et Cottanis Alpibus 
Italiam inrumpere, Caecina propriore transitu Poeninis iugis degredi iussus. 
(1.61.1) 
 
Fabius Valens received orders to win over the Gauls to their side or, if they refused, 
to crush them, and to burst into Italy by way of the Cottian Alps; Caecina was 
ordered to descend through the Pennine pass by a shorter route. 
 
This passage is key to understanding Valens’ behavior on the march (1.63-67).307 In effect, 
Vitellius’ orders are to use violence against the native inhabitants only as necessary—orders 
which, as we will see, Valens does his best to follow. Valens’ obedience is not surprising; in 
spite of all his failings and flaws, Tacitus repeatedly emphasizes Valens’ loyalty to Vitellius. 
Whereas Caecina betrays Vitellius by an unsuccessful defection to the Flavian camp (3.13-14), 
Valens remains loyal to the end of his life. When another seemingly loyal Vitellian, Marius 
Maturus, jumps ship after the Second Battle of Cremona, Valens stays the course (3.42-43).308 In 
                                                      
306 Cf. Damon (2003) 219: “the vagueness of instinctu and impetu…sets avaritia, which is both precise and cynical, 
into relief.” 
307 To my knowledge, the importance of this passage has not been previously recognized. The commentaries of 
Chilver (1979) and Damon (2003) are silent on this passage.  
308 Tacitus expresses Marius Maturus’ betrayal in the language of oaths: [Maturus] fidus Vitellio, cuius 
sacramentum cunctis circa hostilibus nondum exuerat (“[Maturus] was loyal to Vitellius, whose oath of allegiance 
he had not yet cast off even with all the enemies around,” 3.42.2); Maturo ceterisque remanere et in verba 
Vespasiani adigi volentibus fuit (“Maturus and the others wanted to stay and be sworn into allegiance with 
Vespasian,” 3.43.2). Such oath language may allude to the beginning of Vitellius’ reign, when the sacramentum 
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an obituary otherwise full of salacious reproaches,309 Tacitus writes that the lieutenant was “loyal 
to Vitellius and respectable in light of others’ treachery” (Vitellio fidus et aliorum perfidia 
inlustratus, 3.62.2). 310 On the issue of loyalty, then, Valens stands diametrically opposed to 
Primus, who, when himself presented with orders from his soon-to-be emperor to pursue a 
bloodless strategy, selfishly pursues violence nonetheless (3.8). 
 Valens’ obedience and loyalty notwithstanding, several circumstances, enumerated by 
Tacitus, threaten to make a non-violent march difficult. First, while these German soldiers have 
traditionally been inured to strict commanders and few rewards, discipline has recently been 
relaxed (1.51.2). Second, because of their recent conflict with the pro-Galban Gauls, the men 
have grown to despise some of their neighbors to the west, even regarding them as hostes. Some 
anti-Galban Gallic tribesmen in the Rhineland cohorts stand ready to capitalize on this prejudice 
whenever possible (1.51.3-4). Third, though the legions of Upper and Lower Germany were 
historically separated from each other, the war against Vindex has brought them together into a 
single German force—a force which day by day becomes more aware of its own strength and 
shared identity (1.51.5). In short, Tacitus methodically shows that, in the early days of 69 CE, the 
                                                      
would would have been first taken. If so, Tacitus comments implicitly on the longevity of Valens’ loyalty, for it was 
Valens who first saluted Vitellius emperor (1.57.1). 
309 I reproduce the obituary here in full, with translation: natus erat Valens Anagniae equestri familia. procax 
moribus neque absurdus ingenio famam urbanitatis per lasciviam petere. ludicro Iuvenalium sub Nerone velut ex 
necessitate, mox sponte mimos actitavit, scite magis quam probe. legatus legionis et fovit Verginium et infamavit; 
Fonteium Capitonem corruptum, seu quia corrumpere nequiverat, interfecit: Galbae proditor, Vitellio fidus et 
aliorum perfidia inlustratus. (“Valens was born in Anagnia to an equestrian family. Wanton in his ways, but not 
lacking in talent, he sought a reputation for urbanity through lewd behavior. Under Nero he played a part in a mime-
play—at first as if under duress, but soon willingly—with more skill than decorum. As legionary legate he both 
supported Verginius and dragged his name through the gutter; he killed Fonteius Capito because he was corrupt, or 
perhaps because he couldn’t corrupt him. Galba’s betrayer, loyal to Vitellius and respectable in light of others’ 
treachery,” 3.62.2). Cf. Pomeroy (1991) 204: “it is Valens’ final, and fatal loyalty to Vitellius which makes up for 
the shadows in the rest of his career.” 
310 Tacitus had expressed the same sentiment on the heels of Caecina’s betrayal: et fidus Vitellio Fabius nec militiae 
ignarus (“and Fabius [Valens] was loyal to Vitellius and not ignorant of military matters,” 3.15). 
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region has become a powder keg, and that, should Vitellius’ armies go trekking through, they are 
sure to provide the perfect spark.  
 After so much talk about the soldiers’ greed in the explanation of causes (1.51), when the 
campaign finally begins, Tacitus surprisingly pushes not praeda and avaritia, but furor 
(“madness”) and rabies (“frenzy”) to the fore: 
Divoduri (Mediomatricorum id oppidum est) quamquam omni comitate exceptos 
subitus pavor terruit, raptis repente armis ad caedem innoxiae civitatis, non ob 
praedam aut spoliandi cupidine, sed furore et rabie et causis incertis eoque 
difficilioribus remediis, donec precibus ducis mitigati ab excidio civitatis 
temperavere; caesa tamen ad quattuor milia hominum. (1.63.1) 
 
At Divodurum (the town of the Mediomatrici),311 though welcomed with complete 
friendliness, the men, seized with a sudden terror, suddenly took up arms to 
slaughter innocent citizens, not for plunder or out of a desire for looting, but 
because of madness and frenzy and reasons uncertain and thus difficult to remedy, 
until, soothed by the entreaties of their general they left off destroying the town—
not before 4,000 people were killed, however.  
 
Eleni Manolaraki has observed that Tacitus generally seems to find it either insufficient or 
unsatisfying to rely too heavily on madness as a motive.312 On those few occasions where 
Tacitus does suggest furor as a motive, he tends also to qualify or contextualize it. In this 
passage, Tacitus’ alignment of madness with the unexplainable speaks to his distrust of those 
who would employ furor as a motive of convention and convenience. Hence, this invocation of 
furor must be seriously considered. A random spasm of mass slaughter at the very start of a 
campaign in which violence was to be eschewed if possible (1.61.1) shows, if nothing else, the 
difficulty of the task which lies ahead for Valens. It is important to note that Tacitus vests Valens 
with no role whatsoever in the violence. This suggests that the troops acted alone. Valens, as of 
                                                      
311 Modern Metz. 
312 See Manolaraki (2003) 68-93, esp. 74-75. On the furor at Divodurum as a prelude to the Flavian furor at the 
Capitolium (3.71.1), see Master (2016) 64. 
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yet, has only the most tenuous control over his army, and must rely on supplications (precibus) 
rather than issuing orders.313 
 Soon, however, Valens discovers an effective middle path to asserting control between 
pleading and commanding: bribery.314 Upon reaching Lugdunum (Lyons), the citizens appeal to 
Valens’ men to destroy their long-time rivals, the pro-Galban city of Vienna (Vienne), by 
invoking the riches to be gained there. This is surely the soldiers’ dream: plunder and a chance to 
kill Galban hostes at the same time! Valens and the people of Vienna happen to have the same 
objective: that no harm come to the city. The citizens of Vienna pacify the soldiers by offering 
supplicatory gifts such as velamenta (“olive branches wrapped in woolen fillets”) and infulae 
(“headbands”),315 and “by grasping soldiers’ weapons, knees and feet, they swayed the soldiers’ 
hearts” (arma genua vestigia prensando flexere militum animos, 1.66.1). Lastly, adds Tacitus, 
Valens “chipped in by giving 300 sesterces to each man” (addidit Valens trecenos singulis 
militibus sestertios, 1.66.1). Valens’ offered bribe, the last item on the list, strikes a monetary 
note. We may recall that a similar formulation was used when Tacitus describes why the 
common soldiers donated their own money and possession to the war effort: instinctu et impetu 
et avaritia (“due to external pressures, internal urges, and greed,” 1.57.2).316 By ending these 
“lists” at 1.66.1 and 1.57.2 on notes of bribery and greed, respectively, Tacitus engages is the 
subtle yet deliberate darkening of his narrative. For nearly a century, scholars have periodically 
                                                      
313 For a discussion of the role of supplication in Tacitus’ Histories, see Manolaraki (2003) 93-99. 
314 Even before the bribery of 1.66, Valens had shown signs of growing competence. He had settled a squabble 
between the Batavian auxiliaries and the legionaries by punishing a select few and reminding them of his own 
authority (1.64). Whereas Morgan (1994) 109 suggests that the punishment of “only a few” (paucorum) “may be 
another subtle hit at Valens,” punishing only a few ringleaders and thus setting an example for all has good Roman 
precedent among the most effective generals. For instance, after the mutiny at Sucro during the Second Punic War, 
which in many ways is the locus classicus of Roman mutinies, Livy 28.29 tells us that Scipio only punished the 
ringleaders; see Chrissanthos (1999).  
315 velamenta et infulae are the typical accoutrements of Roman suppliants. Damon (2003) 234 notes that the 
collocation is standard, particularly in Livy; cf. H. 3.31.2 and Liv. 25.25.6, 30.36.4, 37.28.1.  
316 See pp. 124-25 above. 
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taken up the question of how we ought to read Tacitus’ presentations of alternative explanations, 
and have repeatedly observed that in such passages the item listed last tends to be darker in 
tone.317 Damon, explicitly citing 1.66.1 and 1.57.2, observes that lists in Tacitus tend to 
“conclude on a pragmatic (and sometimes morally dubious) note.”318 We can take matters a step 
further by noting that in the Histories the pragmatism of the final item is often money related.319 
Tacitus, merely by repeating the same motif over and over again in the same rhetorical structure 
known as the “loaded alternative,” subtly implies that the desire for money is driving events. 
Once the tone of the scene has been darkened by Valens’ bribe, the ensuing platitudes and 
dignified language assume a bitter, sneering tone:  
tum vetustas dignitasque coloniae valuit et verba Fabi salutem incolumitatemque 
Viennensium commendantis aequis auribus accepta. (1.66.1) 
 
Then, the antiquity and dignity of the colony began to hold sway and the words of 
Fabius Valens recommending the safety and security fell on receptive ears. 
 
The 300 sesterces put the lie to these lofty sentiments; greed lies behind the army’s restraint.    
 Valens has managed, since that first ugly incident at Divodurum (1.63.1), to stay loyal to 
Vitellius’ directives (1.61.1). That is to say, he has succeeded in attracting the native Gallic 
population to his side without an outbreak of violence. The citizens of Vienna understood the 
danger they faced if they did not supplicate themselves to the soldiers (haud ignari discriminis 
sui Viennenses, 1.66.1), so they did. The soldiers, though deprived of the opportunity to plunder, 
still got paid, and Vienna was spared.   
                                                      
317 Ryberg (1942); Sullivan (1976) 319, 324; Whitehead (1979) 476. The usefulness of such studies have their 
limitations, since they tend to emphasize the codification of different types of alternatives, rather than seek to 
understand any literary or historical reasons motivating the patterns.  
318 Damon (2003) 219, 324. 
319 This pattern is evidenced again at 2.28.2-29.3 (see below). 
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 Yet Valens’ decision to sidestep plunder does considerable harm to his reputation among 
his own men. 300 sesterces, the amount Valens “chipped in” (addidit, 1.66.1) to each man to 
head off violence, was one-third of a soldier’s annual salary,320 a huge sum to stop the assault on 
only one of a dozen Gallic cities between Divodurum and Italy. Such lavishness breeds 
suspicion: next we learn of a rumor among the men that Valens had been bought off by the 
citizens of Vienna (fama constans fuit ipsum Valentem magna pecunia emptum, 1.66.1). How 
else, the text implies, could Valens have afforded the bribe? The soldiers are apparently unaware 
of their hypocrisy—or simply have no shame: Valens has bribed them to stay their hand, but they 
despise the thought of their commander having accepted the same arrangement!  
 Despite the hypocrisy, the end of the march narrative confirms for Tacitus’ audience that 
the soldiers’ suspicions of Valens having been “bought” were correct. When considered 
alongside the events at Vienna (1.66.1), the following passage gives the overall impression of a 
general who has set himself up as the conduit through which illicitly-gained monies flow from 
intimidated Gauls to greedy soldiers—but primarily, if not exclusively, concerned with enriching 
himself in the process: 
is sordidus, repente dives mutationem fortunae male tegebat, accensis egestate 
longa cupidinibus immoderatus et inopi iuventa senex prodigus. lento deinde 
agmine per fines Allobrogum ac Vocontiorum ductus exercitus, ipsa itinerum spatia 
et stativorum mutationes venditante duce, foedis pactionibus adversus possessores 
agrorum et magistratus civitatum, adeo miniciter, ut Luco (municipium id 
Vocontiorum est) faces admoverit, donec pecunia mitigaretur. quotiens pecuniae 
materia deesset, stupris et adulteriis exorabatur. sic ad Alpes perventum. (1.66.2) 
 
He, a lowly man suddenly rich, did a poor job disguising his change of fortune; he 
was immoderate in his passions, which had been inflamed by long poverty, and 
after a disadvantaged youth, a prodigal old age. He led his army to the borders of 
the Allobroges and Vocontii on a slow march, putting up for sale where and for 
how long they stopped, making treaties with the cities’ farm-holders and 
                                                      
320 This if the figure provided by Damon (2003) 219, who cites Alston (1994). Chilver (1979) 127 offers more 
detail: “300 HS a man, if the auxilia were included (but perhaps they got less), required at least 12 m[illion] HS. For 
the legionaries it would mean a third of their annual pay.” 
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magistrates, threatening to such a degree that he would put Lucum (the town of the 
Vocontii) to the torch, until they placate him with money. Whenever money was 
not available, he was placated by sexual favors and adultery. In this way they 
proceeded to the Alps. 
 
Despite the obviously deplorable moral character on display (e.g., stupris et adulteris), praeda in 
its violent sense—i.e., “the act or practice of plundering, spoliation, pillage.” (OLD s.v. 1c)—is 
in fact avoided until the Alps are reached. The combination of admoverit and donec suggest that 
the torches approached but never touched Lucus Augusti. Indeed, there is nothing in the literary 
or archaeological record to indicate that the town was destroyed or damaged at this time.321 
Valens’ soldiers only threaten destruction until (donec) they are paid off. Conversely, at 
Cremona, Primus’ legionaries throw torches into homes and temples purely “for the fun of it” 
(per lasciviam, 3.33.2)—a motivation which more closely resembles Valens’ soldiers’ violence 
furore et rabie et causis incertis before Valens had begun to assert any semblance of control 
(1.63.1).322 But now, at the end of the march, Valens has managed to stifle the more purely 
violent impulses of his soldiers, and thus has deviated from the sort of violence that Antonius 
Primus will embrace at Cremona. 
 Valens’ evasion of violence has mixed results. On the one hand, nothing more is 
mentioned of plunder, slaughter or the threat of slaughter. In other words, after Divodurum there 
is nothing like the sack of Cremona under Valens’ watch. Valens sets up a system wherein he 
and the army enrich themselves without the need to kill or plunder. The first sentence of 1.67, the 
beginning of the parallel narrative of Caecina’s march to the Alps along an alternate route 
through the northern provinces (1.67-70), drives this point home: “Caecina drank in more 
plunder and blood [sc. than Valens]” (plus praedae ac sanguinis Caecina hausit, 1.67.1). Though 
                                                      
321 Unfortunately, our knowledge of Lucus Augusti (Luc-en-Diois) is sparse overall. For the surviving record of 
Lucus Augusti, see Plin. HN 3.36. 
322 See p. 127 above. 
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Vitellius’ orders to Valens at 1.61.1 to “entice” the Gauls (adlicere) are, by the end of Valens’ 
march, carried out by means of intimidation (miniciter, 1.66.2), his further orders not to 
“destroy” (vastare) Gallic communities are followed with admirable strictness. On the other 
hand, Valens’ self-enrichment in the process provokes the enduring ire and suspicion of his men, 
which compromises his ability to prevent the violation of innocents later in the war: In the 
aftermath of victory in the First Battle of Cremona,323 Valens’ forces participate in the rape and 
pillage of the Italian countryside, as the commander “was infamous on account of his profits and 
acquisitions and therefore turned a blind eye to the transgressions of others” (Valens ob lucra et 
quaestus infamis eoque alienae etiam culpae dissimilator, 2.56.2). 
 
MUTINY AGAINST VALENS 
 
 
The common soldiers’ resentment of their commander’s personal wealth compromises his long-
term ability to maintain order in the ranks. On the eve of the First Battle of Cremona, Valens 
suffers a mutiny:  
quod ubi auditum volgatumque, maerere socii, fremere legiones. [28.2] orbari se 
fortissimorum virorum auxilio; veteres illos et tot bellorum victores, postquam in 
conspectu sit hostis, velut ex acie abducti. si provincia urbe et salute imperii potior 
sit, omnes illuc sequerentur; sin victoriae columen in Italia veteretur, non 
abrumpendos ut corpori validissimos artus.  
          [29.1] haec ferociter iactando, postquam immissis lictoribus Valens coercere 
seditionem coeptabat, ipsum invadunt, saxa iaciunt, fugientem sequuntur. spolia 
Galliarum et Viennensium aurum, pretia laborum suorum, occultare clamitantes, 
direptis sarcinis tabernacula ducis ipsamque humum pilis et lanceis rimabantur. 
nam Valens servili veste apud decurionem equitum tegebatur. … [29.3] ille utili 
moderatione non supplicium cuiusquam poposcit, ac ne dissimulans suspectior 
foret, paucos incusavit, gnarus civilibus bellis plus militibus quam ducibus licere. 
(2.28.1-29.3) 
 
When this was heard and was made common knowledge, the allies became morose 
and the legions complained. [28.2] They said that they had been deprived of the aid 
                                                      
323 Not to be confused with the Second Battle of Cremona, discussed earlier in this chapter, in which the victorious 
Flavians sack and plunder the Vitellians.  
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of the strongest men; those famed veterans who had won so many battles, after the 
enemy came into view, had virtually been sent away from the front lines. If a 
province is more important than the City and the empire’s safety, then let everyone 
follow them; but if the security of Italy hinges on victory, the most powerful limbs 
ought not to be rent from the body, so to speak. 
          [29.1] Having made these menacing statements, after Valens sent in his 
lictors to try to break up the mutiny, they attacked him, threw rocks at him and 
chased him as he fled. Claiming that he had hidden Gallic loot and Viennese gold, 
the rewards for their own labor, they ripped his luggage apart, ransacked the 
general’s tent, and poked at the very ground with spears and lances. For Valens, 
dressed in slave-clothes, was hiding in a cavalry decurion’s tent. … [29.3] Practical 
and moderate, he did not demand anyone’s execution, but lest he be suspected 
disingenuous, he chastised a few men, aware as he was that in civil wars soldiers 
have more leeway than generals. 
 
Tacitus, once again by naming economic dissatisfaction last and thereby highlighting it, puts the 
lie to all nobler motivations.324 A dissection of the soldiers’ own arguments and allegations will 
demonstrate this: before the mutiny begins (2.28), the legionaries allege anger (a) because the 
Batavians have been sent away; (b) because the loss of their best fighting men will downgrade 
their effectiveness as a fighting force; and (c) because Italy will be less safe as a result. In short, 
they take exception seemingly to everything not related to money. But when the munity begins 
(2.29), a totally unrelated—and much more plausible—motivation is alleged: that (d) Valens was 
hording and depriving the men of the just rewards for their labors (spolia Galliarum et 
Viennensium aurum, pretia laborum suorum). The contrast between the well-reasoned rhetorical 
argument made beforehand (a, b, c) and the money-grab made in the heat of the moment (d) 
comes across as a contrast between convenient pretext and true motive, respectively. The 
jealousy and greed of the army, it turns out, is at the core of Tacitus’ mutiny narrative.  
 The prodding and digging at the soil with the weapons of war (pilis et lanceis, 2.29.1) is 
evocative of battle and, I would argue, signifies an attempt by the soldiers to fulfill their desires 
                                                      
324 Cf. 1.57.2, 66.1. 
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for the sort of violent plunder (OLD s.v. praeda 1c) they have been denied.325 Ash astutely 
observes that laborum seems boastful, since the troops have not yet fought in a proper battle.326 
Yet the troops are in the mindset of a battle all the same, seemingly determined to play out the 
dramatic scenarios of Tacitean civil warfare regardless of observable reality. Indeed, in the 
absence of actual enemies, the soldiers have turned their pent-up aggression on the dirt, literally, 
and on Valens’ greed more figuratively. The sort of calculation implicit in pretia laborum 
suorum (“rewards for their efforts”) anticipates the calculation of Antonius Primus’ army as they 
engage in actual battle (3.26-28). Antonius Primus, as we saw in PART 1 above, recognizes the 
lengths to which his soldiers would go to fulfill their desire for plunder (aviditate praedae, 
3.26.3), and harnesses that desire in order to toward achieving victory over the Vitellians. 
Valens, on the other hand, fails to treat his soldiers’ desire to plunder with sufficient seriousness, 
instead acquiring the spolia Galliarum et Viennensium aurum in a series of suspect under-the-
table deals. and suffers a mutiny as a result. The violent side of greed, Tacitus suggests, is a 
strong motivator for the civil-war soldier; the commander who seeks to channel rather than stifle 
it puts himself in a better position for success. The successes and failures of Valens in books 1 
and 2 prime the reader to better understand—if not approve of—the “scales of war” which cause 
the Flavian commanders to sacrifice Cremona on the altar of their soldiers’ greed. 
 It is no coincidence that the digging language of this mutiny scene anticipates nearly 
verbatim the Vitellians’ defense of their camp outside Cremona. In both cases, it is the Vitellians 
who are doing the poking and prodding, though to very different effects: 
…ipsamque humum pilis et lanceis rimabantur… (2.29.1) 
 
                                                      
325 Ash (2007) 154 calls the soldiers’ actions a “vivid misappropriation of the weapons of war,” and notes that 
“[s]ince the camp was struck each day on the march, burying the gold under or near the commander’s tent would not 
have been especially practical.” 
326 Ash (2007) 154. 
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…They were probing the ground itself with lances and pikes… 
 
Romanae utrimque artes: pondera saxorum Vitelliani provolunt, disiectam 
fluitantemque testudinem lanceis contisque scrutantur… (3.27.3). 
 
Both sides were using Roman tactics: the Vitellians rolled down heavy rocks, and 
prodded at a scattered and wavering testudo with lances and pikes…327 
 
In the passage from book 2, the Vitellian soldiers are the acquisitive party, desperately searching 
for the wealth they believe is rightfully theirs. In the passage from book 3, the same Vitellians, 
now besieged, adapt their earlier wealth-seeking tactics in an effort to defend themselves against 
the greedy Flavians. Yet the Vitellians can no more vanquish the Flavians’ testudo than they 
could the dirt. It is significant that this intratextual reference in book 3 comes immediately before 
Primus and the other generals “point” (monstrassent, 3.27.3) to Cremona: at the very moment 
Tacitus reveals the ability and willingness of the Flavian commanders to exploit the avarice of its 
soldiers, he reminds us of the moment when Valens was nearly the victim of his own soldiers’ 
avarice. Greed, implies Tacitus, though an effective weapon when harnessed properly, 
nevertheless threatens the stability of military order and authority.  
 
A passage found in the epitome of Cassius Dio, which has evident resonances with Histories 
2.29, lends insight into Tacitus’ efforts to shape the character of Valens to serve his own 
narrative purpose: 
Ὅτι ὁ Οὐάλης οὕτω περὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐσπούδαζεν καὶ οὕτως ἐξ ἅπαντος τρόπου 
ἤθροιζεν ὥστε καὶ τὸν δέκαρχον τὸν κατακρύψαντά τε αὐτὸν καὶ 
διασώσαντα ἀποσφάξαι διὰ χιλίας δραχμάς, ἃς ἐκ τῶν σκευῶν αὐτοῦ ὑφῃρῆσθαι 
ἔδοξεν. (Cass. Dio 63.10) 
 
Valens was so eager for money and collected it so assiduously that he even put to 
death the decurion who had concealed him and had saved his life—all because of a 
thousand denarii which he thought had been stolen from his baggage. (trans. Cary 
(1925), adapted) 
                                                      
327 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009). 
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Many elements of Cassius Dio’s brief account find parallel in Tacitus’ account of the Valens 
mutiny—e.g., the involvement of a decurion, the presence of luggage, and the motif of 
concealment (underlined above). Thus, both Tacitus and Cassius Dio seem to have preserved 
several of the components which they likely inherited from a shared common source or 
sources.328 Yet the point of Tacitus’ scene differs from Cassius Dio’s considerably. Given 
Tacitus’ uniqueness among our sources in imbuing Valens with a consequential role in the 
narrative, I posit that Tacitus shifts the greed which he found in his original source material—and 
which Dio faithfully reproduced—from Valens to his army.329 In Tacitus’ version, Valens is the 
victim of others’ greed. But he is also a victim of his own making: it was Valens who had turned 
the campaign through Gaul into a cash-grab, so it makes sense that his men, now without any 
Gauls to extort, would set their sights on him. Though Valens manages to survive the mutiny and 
regain control of his army, the degree to which he must debase himself to do so—i.e. by putting 
on slave clothes and hiding (2.29.1)—underscores how precarious his position as a leader has 
become. 
 
 
Valens is a complex foil for Primus. His cleverness and determination to prevent violence and 
plunder amplifies Primus’ ruthlessness and willingness to commit violence by contrast. The fact 
that Valens ultimately fails to exert much influence either over his own soldiers or over the 
                                                      
328 Many have subscribed to the theory that the accounts of Tacitus, Suetonius, Dio and Plutarch all derive from the 
same “common source.” For a defense of the theory, see Martin (1981) 189-98. For a skeptical view: Syme (1958) 
272-74. Powell (1972) 834-36 and Chilver (1979) 26-30 provide good summaries. For Tacitus’ engagement with his 
sources in the Annals, see most recently Potter (2012) 125-40.  
329 It is also possible that Dio’s and Tacitus’ accounts both exist in some form in the common source(s). However, 
given the number of similarities in plot and theme, I believe that some form of adaptation is likely to have taken 
place. 
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course of the war suggests that his non-violent tactics, though effective to a point, were no match 
for the prevailing tone of violence and chaos in 69 CE. 
 
 
PART 3: To Horrific Victory 
  
 
In several ways, the sack of Cremona constitutes the turning point in the Flavian war effort.330 
First, and most obviously, it marks the decline of Vitellian power and, in retrospect, proves to be 
the decisive battle of the Vitellio-Flavian War (though loyalty to Vitellius persists even after the 
emperor’s death, as discussed in Chapter 4). Second, the battle’s immediate aftermath brings into 
question the morality and sustainability of Primus’ raptor largitor approach. As discussed above, 
Tacitus’ charged rhetoric of urban destruction rendered the Flavian legions grotesque, little 
different from—and certainly no better than—Rome’s most storied enemies of yore (e.g., 
Hannibal and Gallic Senones). Even Primus himself, who bathed while Cremona burned, when 
confronted with city’s ground still putrid with gore (3.35.1), was “ashamed of their own 
criminality, even as resentment against [the Flavians] began to mount” (pudore flagitii, 
crebrescente invidia, 3.34.2).331 Now, in a post-Cremona atmosphere of exceptional brutality, 
Primus must reassert some control over his army, if he has any hope of reversing the invidia 
which they well deserve, and which he helped foster. 
 This task proves difficult, however, as the greed which determined the calculus of 
Cremona does not loosen its grip in the immediate aftermath. And in fact, after a narrative panel 
                                                      
330 Cf. Morgan (2006) 190: “The campaign conducted by the legions under Antonius Primus’ legions falls naturally 
into two parts. Their initial moves…established them firmly in northern Italy with the sack of Cremona, still the 
enemy’s base in the area. Then came their more dilatory advance south toward Rome, culminating in the killing of 
Vitellius in late December.” 
331 It is Primus’ concern regarding growing resentment which prompts him to ban the imprisonment of those left 
alive, which in turn, coupled with the other Italians’ refusal to ransom men taken as slaves, led to the execution of 
several prisoners. Cf. 3.34.2.  
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on the struggles facing the Vitellians post-Cremona (3.36-48), the Flavian narrative resumes with 
a notice of the recent moral decline of Primus, whose “greed, pride, and other hidden vices” 
(avaritiam superbiam ceteraque occulta mala, 3.49.1) have now emerged as the result of his 
success.332 In his thirst for power (potentiam), he now begins actively corrupting his men as a 
matter of policy: 
utque licentia militem imbueret, interfectorum centurionum ordines legionibus 
offerebat. eo suffragio turbidissimus quisque delecti; nec miles in arbitrio ducum, 
sed duces militari violentia trahebantur. quae seditiosa et corrumpendae 
disciplinae mox in praedam vertebat… (3.49.2) 
 
In order that he might steep the soldiery in license, he offered his legions [the 
privilege of filling] the ranks of dead centurions. In that election all the wildest men 
were chosen; soldiers were not subject to the judgement of their commanders, but 
the commanders to the violence of soldiers. Antonius soon turned these seditious 
activities into his own profit (praeda), indeed for the purpose of corroding 
discipline. 
 
In this passage, Primus, rather than extol and enforce the proper roles of general and common 
solder—a shocking development, given his long-winded thoughts on the matter before Cremona 
(3.19)—gladly blurs the lines for his own enrichment. The use of praeda suggests especially that 
he is violating the calculus of 3.26.3: now, rather than weighting the scales with plunder to 
motivate his soldiers, he himself takes part in the greed.333 Furthermore, though the army’s thirst 
for plunder has been slaked for a time, the common soldiers make seditious noise over the lack 
of a donative (3.50.3).334 Tacitus’ decision to include a complaint of this nature immediately 
                                                      
332 See Damon (2006) 271. Wellesley (1972) 145: “T[acitus] inclines toward a static view of human personality, 
whereby evil characteristics, revealed however late in life, are regarded as previously latent or repressed;” he cites 
the “famous character sketch of Tiberius at A. 4.51” as evidence. Woodman (1998) 68-69, less inclined to demonize 
Tiberius, offers a dissenting “portrait of a man whose sense of responsibility was in perpetual conflict with his desire 
for withdrawal, of a man who was truly ambiguus imperandi.” Martin and Woodman (1989) 31 insightfully express 
the complexity of Tacitus’ portrayal of Tiberius as “consist[ing] of a whole series of modifications or adjustments, 
as if he were photographing his subject from a series of different angles and in different lights: none of the frames, 
whether in close-up or not, is contradicted by another, but each produces a different effect.”  
333 Cf. Wellesley (1972) 145 on in praedam: “that is, he sold the appointments to the highest bidders.” 
334 More precisely, their lack of a clavarium (“shoe-nail money”), which Tacitus defines parenthetically as donativi 
nomen est. Wellesley (1972) 147 explains: “The troops were charged for their food, clothing, boots, etc. by 
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after the large financial gains at Cremona does not reflect well on the soldiers, and effectively 
conveys the idea that their greed will never cease to be a problem for Primus: even sated with 
plunder, they expect handouts!  
 Primus, however, quickly reasserts relative control over the avaritia that has overrun him 
and his army. When the Flavian advance troops want to hasten against Vitellius’ men at Carsulae 
before reinforcements arrive, lest they be forced to share the plunder (praedae, 3.60.1), Primus 
attempts to reverse the trend toward greed by appealing to their shared Roman identity: 
vocatos ad contionem Antonius docuit … satis gloriae proelio Cremonensi partum 
et exitio Cremonae nimium invidiae: ne concupiscerent Romam capere potius quam 
servare. maiora illis praemia et multo maximum decus, si incolumitatem senatui 
populoque Romano sine sanguine quaesissent. his ac talibus mitigati animi. 
(3.60.2) 
 
Antonius Primus pointed out his men convened in assembly … that they had earned 
enough glory at the battle of Cremona and too much ill-will upon its destruction. 
He bade that they yearn to preserve rather than to seize Rome. They would have, 
he said, greater rewards and by far the greatest honor, if they sought the security 
for the Senate and the People of Rome without bloodshed. By these and such words, 
the soldiers’ spirits were tamed.  
 
In no uncertain terms, Primus here argues that Rome must not be another Cremona. sanguine 
recalls the calculations at Cremona, though now, pointedly, it is not their own blood but the 
bloodshed of their fellow Romans which Primus insists is of primary importance. Primus, rather 
than give in to the praedae avaritia (cf. aviditate praedae, 3.26.3), attempts to sell the 
attractiveness of glory (decus) as reward for preserving Rome—the very thing which his army 
had once rejected as “pointless” (inania, 3.19.2). maiora…praemia is uncomfortably vague, and 
probably intentionally so: does praemia generically anticipate the more precise decus (OLD s.v. 
2), or is it a virtual euphemism for the material spoils of war (OLD s.v. 3)? In other words, does 
                                                      
stoppages debited to their pay accounts and this demand must have been for extra pay to offset the cost of boot 
repairs.” 
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Primus suggest that the prize awaiting them is glory, or that there will be other “greater prizes” in 
addition to glory such as plunder? Perhaps against the sinister interpretation is that praemia is 
listed first and in a syntactically normal position. Yet the possibilities inherent in the word are 
likely meant to resonate with soldier and reader alike. Ambiguity aside, Primus’ plea for 
“security…without bloodshed” (incolumitatem…sine sanguine) is proved feasible in the 
subsequent Vitellian panel, where merely the fear of the Flavian army’s size foments chaos and 
disloyalty (3.61-63), suggesting that no further bloodshed will be needed to effect a Flavian 
victory at this point. Tacitus (via Primus) is confronting a very serious problem in civil warfare: 
how does a victorious challenger transition from treasonous rebel to legitimate new regime, 
while simultaneously fulfilling victorious soldiers’ expectations of material reward? Primus’ 
answer: attempt to adjust those expectations. 
 After the armies of Vespasian bear down on Rome, Vitellius sends delegations to each 
army to sue for peace. Primus’ army, Tacitus tells us, was the most receptive, “not because the 
troops were more restrained (modestior) but because their general had more of a hold on them 
(duci plus auctoritatis, 3.80.2).”335 As a “last effort to prevent a head-on collision,”336 Vitellius 
entrusts delivery of a letter to the Vestal Virgins in the delegation, in which the sitting emperor 
asks for a delay of one day so that “everything can come together more easily” (facilius omnia 
conventura, 3.81.2)—an apparent euphemism for surrender.337 Primus—the man who, on the eve 
of his own army’s assault on the Vitellians at Cremona, risked sparking a mutiny to ask his 
troops for a delay of one day (3.19-21)338—refuses, arguing that “because of the murder of 
                                                      
335 Trans. Wellesley (2009) 175. It is only for the delegation sent to Primus that Tacitus slows down his narrative. 
336 Wellesley (1972) 183. 
337 Cf. Sal. Hist. 2.74: interim legatis ostentans et deditionem cunctis praesentibus facilius conventuram 
(“meanwhile he held out to the envoys lenient terms and that surrender would be more easily worked out when 
everyone was present,” trans. Ramsey (2015)), cited by Heubner (1972) 192. 
338 See pp. 106-9 above. 
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Sabinus and the burning of the Capitol, the normal commerce of war had been dissolved” (Sabini 
caede et incendio Capitolii dire<m>pta belli commercia, 3.81.2). The economic tinge provided 
by the primary sense of commercium (OLD s.v. 1) alludes to plunder.339 Ironically, however, 
Primus does end up asking his men to wait a day until attacking the city (3.82.1). Tacitus 
explains:  
ratio cunctandi, ne asperatus proelio miles non populo, non senatui, ne templis 
quidem ac delubris deorum consuleret. sed omnem prolationem ut inimicam 
victoriae suspectabant. (3.82.1) 
 
His reason for waiting was his fear that the troops, once stirred up after a battle, 
would have no regard for the people and senators or even for the temples and 
shrines of the gods. However, the men suspected any postponement as being 
detrimental to their victory. (trans. Wellesley) 
 
Primus fears the possibility of a repeat performance of the outrages committed against Cremona 
(3.33). His fear proves justified. The civilians and enemy combatants in Rome and its vicinity are 
no more spared the greed and violent impulses of the Flavian army than were the citizens of 
Cremona. But this time, Primus’ role in the matter fades from view, along with all other 
individual identities.  
When the battle for Rome is joined at last, Tacitus relates that Flavians and Vitellians 
were so busy killing themselves that the booty fell to the crowd of civilians (…parte maiore 
praedae potiebantur: nam milite ad sanguinem et caedes obverso spolia in volgus cedebant 
(“[the people watching the fighting] got the majority of the plunder: for, with the soldiers turned 
towards on blood and slaughter, the spoils fell to the mob,” 3.83.1). This detail is consistent with 
Tacitus’ generally pessimistic opinion of the vulgus—a far cry from the virtuous Cremonese 
                                                      
339 Cf. Verg. A. 10.532-3 and Tac. A. 14.33.2. Wellesley (1972) 183 translates “negotiations normal in war,” yet the 
primary sense of actual commercial exchange ought not to be overlooked. 
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victims.340 Yet Cremona still looms: sanguinem et caedes, coupled with praedae and spolia, 
evoke the same “scales of war” (3.26.3). 
Tacitus’ decision to infect all sides with blame—both the civil warriors who wreak havoc 
and the vulgus which looks on and reaps the reward—is consistent with a larger trend, found 
elsewhere in the Histories in times of great duress, to spread blame all around. Dylan Sailor 
observes that, in assessing blame for the destruction of the Capitol, Tacitus condemns no one 
individual, or even seeks to blame either the Flavians or Vitellians more harshly than the other, 
but rather indicts the whole imperial system.341 Similarly, when, on the morning of 21 December 
under Primus’ command, the Flavian forces terrorize and ransack the city, committing every 
atrocity along the way (3.83-84; 4.1.1), no Flavian avoids implication in the violence. Tacitus 
simply defines all the Flavian perpetrators as “the victors” (victores, 3.84.1, victoribus, 3.84.3, 
victores, 4.1.1).342 Primus and the other commanders, along with most distinctions of rank, have 
by this point largely fallen out of the narrative. Such tendency toward generalization, I would 
argue, hints to the reader that the wickedness of the past three books has piled up to such a 
degree that it is beginning to infect everything and everyone—whole groups and institutions, 
rather than mere individuals. Commander and soldier alike have been subsumed into an 
anonymous force of violent, greedy, and vengeful men. This shift toward faceless evil takes on 
even darker dimensions when we consider the highly Tacitean sententia with which the fourth 
book begins: interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat quam pax coeperat (“After Vitellius was 
executed war had died down more than peace began,” 4.1.1).  The institutionalized violence of 
the Vitellio-Flavian conflict, Tacitus suggests, will transcend the war itself. 
                                                      
340 For Tacitus’ complex, but ultimately low opinion of the vulgus, see Newbold (1976).   
341 Sailor (2008) 205-18. 
342 By 4.1.1, the Vitellians, conversely, are simply “the conquered” (victos) as well. 
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As the faceless Flavian horde achieves its ghastly victory at Rome, Tacitus repeatedly 
reenacts and recalls the events at Cremona.343 During the Flavian assault on the praetorian camp, 
Tacitus relates their brutal, financially-driven calculations: “…the victors…were all the more 
intent to simultaneously move in everything ever invented to destroy powerful cities (the testudo, 
missiles, earthworks, torches), proclaiming that that endeavor would be the culmination of all the 
toil and danger they had swallowed in so many battles” (eo intentius victores, praecipuo veterum 
cohortium studio, cuncta validissimarum urbium excidiis reperta simul admovent, testudinem 
tormenta aggerem facesque, quidquid tot proeliis laboris ac periculi hausissent, opere illo 
consummari clamitantes, 3.84.1). The “honorable death” (decori exitus, 3.84.3) earned by the 
brave Vitellians in the camp further casts the acquisitive and self-centered Flavians in a negative 
light.344  
Furthermore, as the Flavian legions brutalize and plunder Vitellian and non-Vitellian 
alike in what is now a “captured city” (captae urbis, 4.1.3), the imagery and language of digging 
recurs for a third time:345 
ac mox augescente licentia scrutari ac protrahere abditos…. quae saevitia 
recentibus odiis sanguine explebatur, dein verterat in avaritiam. nihil usquam 
secretum aut clausum sinebant, Vitellianos occultari simulantes. (4.1.1-2) 
 
And soon, once the licentiousness had increased, they began searching around for 
people who were hiding and dragged them out…. While their hatred was still fresh, 
they satisfied such savagery with bloodshed, which then had turned into greed. 
They allowed nothing to remain either hidden or closed, pretending as though 
Vitellians were hiding everywhere. 
 
                                                      
343 On the Second Battle of Cremona as a reenactment of the First, see Joseph (2012) 115-20. 
344 Ash (1999) 51 convincingly argues that “the collective identity of Tacitus’ Vitellian troops is not static. Although 
initially these soldiers crave violent destruction, nevertheless they gradually develop unexpected moral fiber and 
show increasing sophistication in their capacity to make judgments for themselves. In Histories 3 a pattern begins to 
emerge whereby Tacitus commends the common Vitellian soldiers, but cases their officers in a much more flattering 
light….”  
345 For the urbs capta motif and Rome in the Histories, see also 1.50.1, 1.82.2, 2.89.1, 4.54.2. On the motif 
generally, see Paul (1982). On the motif in Tacitus, see Keitel (1984) 307-12 and Joseph (2012) 137-39. 
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The resurgence of the digging motif recalls the Vitellians’ efforts to pierce through the Flavian 
testudo as Primus pointed to Cremona (3.27). Even more significantly, the Flavians’ search 
recalls the legions of Valens who, angry at their commander’s perceived avarice, mutinied 
against him and dug in his camp for the gold and plunder they believed he had withheld (2.29). 
Valens had tried to contain his legions’ appetite for/to plunder. Instead, he found himself the 
target of that appetite, and barely escaped with his life. Primus, on the other hand, allowed his 
own legions to direct their excessive greedy energy outward. Innocents suffered and died—at 
Cremona, at Rome. Yet Primus never lost that all-important bond with his soldiers: he gave them 
plenty of opportunities to enrich themselves; and in return, though it was not easy, loyalty to 
Primus and to the Flavian cause was maintained. And, most importantly, victory was achieved. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an interpretive framework for viewing the campaign 
of Antonius Primus within the larger framework of oath-gift relations in the Histories. In Chapter 
2, we saw Tacitus praise Vespasian and Mucianus for restoring the donative to a more 
reasonable, even pre-Claudian size. The Flavians’ administrative abilities and sensitivities to 
how best to restore Roman fides appeared virtually unassailable. The work was not finished; the 
Principate still needed to be won. But they were off to an impressive and measured start. In the 
present chapter, we have seen that the reasonable and promising balance between oaths and 
donatives achieved in the East has little relevance in the actual business of war, however, as 
legions recklessly plunder and murder their way to Rome. In fact, readers of this chapter will 
have noticed that oaths do no factor into my discussion; that is because they do not factor into 
Tacitus’. 
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Primus not only highjacks Flavian military strategy, he highjacks Roman military culture. 
The grand bargain struck between Primus and his legions—offering the plunder of innocents as 
incentives toward violence in exchange for some bare minimum of discipline and loyalty—is the 
dark underbelly of that other, more entrenched first-century bargain I have argued for so far, cash 
gifts in exchange for formal pledges of fealty. Immediately after Vespasian and Mucianus re-
forge the consensus between soldiers’ and commanders’ expectations lost earlier that year, 
Primus adopts a darker version of it to suit his seedier purposes: engineered oaths give way to 
mutinies narrowly avoided; funds drawn from coffers and doled out in an orderly, official 
fashion give way to sanctioned rape, arson, murder, and of course plunder.  
Valens, Primus’ embattled Vitellian foil, is Tacitus’ way of saying that Primus essentially 
had two choices: embrace the twisted calculation or lose the war. But Tacitus is crueler still: to 
win is to become no different than Rome’s worst enemies of legend. Given these two choices—
die in a mutiny or lose your Romanitas—it seems especially appealing to interpret suicide in 
civil war as a positive good. 
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Chapter 4  
 
The Chaotic Oaths of a bellum permixtum: Histories 4 and the 
Batavian Revolt346 
 
 
…trina bella civilia, plura externa ac plerumque permixta…(H. 1.2.1) 
 
…three civil wars, several foreign wars, and a great many wars a combination of 
the two… 
 
So reads Tacitus’ initial breakdown of the many armed conflicts contained within the (originally) 
12 or 14 books of the Histories.347 Its first three books are filled with accounts of those trina 
bella civilia: the war between the Galbans and the Othonians, which ends in the gruesome 
beheading of Galba (1.41); the war between the Othonians and Vitellians, which ends with the 
suicide of Otho (2.49); and the war between the Vitellians and Flavians, which officially ends 
with the subdued execution of Vitellius (3.85). Book 4 primarily concerns itself with what has 
come to be known as the “Batavian Revolt.”348 Julius Civilis, prominent leader of the Batavian 
people and ally of Rome, kindled a rebellion against the Vitellian regime, and later against the 
                                                      
346 Front. Strat. 4.3.14 refers to it as a bellum Germanicum. “Batavian Revolt” and its variations—e.g., Merkel’s 
(1966) equivalent German “der Bataveraufstand,” Haynes’ (2003) plural “the Batavian Revolts,” and Wellesley’s 
(2009) “the revolt of Civilis”—designate the uprising of Batavians, then other German tribes, then some Gauls, 
against the Roman Empire in 69-70(?) CE. The term itself implies a bellum externum, which it no doubt was at least 
in part. The term is a good one, and I will use it throughout the present chapter. For summaries of the Batavian 
Revolt generally, see esp. Brunt (1960), Merkel (1966), Chilver (1985) 6-19 and Levick (1999) 107-10. On the 
Batavian Revolt as a bellum permixtum, see most recently Haynes (2003) 155-63, Edwards (2012) 255 and Master 
(2016) 142-57.  
347 See, e.g., Martin (1981) 67 for this standard view. Cf. McCulloch (1984) 173-75, who suggests that the Annals 
and Histories may have been “intended to be one long work.”  
348 Book 5 contains an incomplete section of the Batavian Revolt (5.14-26) after the Jewish excursus not discussed 
in this chapter. Without Histories 4-5, we would know next to nothing about the Batavian revolt. Among the other 
surviving accounts and references, Jos. BJ 1.5, 7.75-88, which Chilver (1985) 9 says “demonstrate ignorance of 
western affairs,” is the fullest. Cass. Dio 66.3 is entirely unhelpful. On the meagerness of these sources, see Murison 
(1991) 1707. Suetonius and Plutarch are silent. In the absence of nearly all possibility for corroboration, Münzer 
(1899) and Walser (1951) 86-128 express doubt that Tacitus’ account of the Batavian revolt can be trusted. Brunt 
(1960) 494, while acknowledging that next to nothing Tacitus writes can be corroborated, believes that the account 
ought to be taken seriously, adducing as evidence his having been a contemporary of 69-70 and how often Tacitus 
has been proven right. Murison (1991) 1709 agrees. 
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Flavians when they assumed power.349 The latter rebellion, which would grow to include several 
other German and Gallic peoples, was finally put down in the lost portion of the Histories.350 As 
a prominent Batavian leader seeking to galvanize a proto-nationalist Germanic movement, 
Civilis represents an external threat to Roman rule. Yet his former status as a loyal Roman 
auxiliary commander trained in Roman fighting tactics (as well as his curiously evocative name) 
points to an element of internal danger as well.351 As we shall see below, Civilis aligns himself 
with his Flavian allies-turned-enemies through imitation and adoption of their strategies for 
controlling and leading armies: a master orchestrator of oaths, he successfully gets his German 
followers to swear a number of oaths, while offering plenty of chances for self-enrichment. 
At a time when Rome needed to heal from the physical and metaphysical wounds caused 
by the outrageous transgressions of the trina bella civilia and move toward bella externa, Civilis, 
                                                      
349 Walser (1951) 103-9 denies “that either Gauls or Germans could have aimed at independence or at establishing a 
powerful Gallic or German empire.” Brunt (1960) passim, whose summary of Walser I quote (p. 497), offers several 
compelling arguments that there were indeed authentic (proto-)nationalistic feelings driving the Germans and Gauls 
to rebel—most of these arguments deriving from Tacitus’ own account. Urban (1985), following Walser, criticizes 
Tacitus’ ability to sort fact from pro-Flavian bias. Murison (1991) 1709 responds that Urban “goes too far, for it is 
precisely in individual points of detail that Tacitus can be shown to be highly accurate.” Levick (1999) 107-8, who 
agrees with Brunt’s position, adds: “The Flavians had reason to adjust their account of their dealings with the 
Batavian Julius Civilis and represent the revolt as a nationalistic uprising…fortunately Tacitus was not committed to 
a Flavian account”—implying that we can trust him when he characterizes the revolt as external. Haynes (2003) 148 
approaches the question from the perspective of Civilis’ own identity: “Civilis’ barbarism, a surface characteristic 
unlike his inner (civilized) intelligence, consists of ‘passing himself off’ as one or other of Rome’s famous former 
enemy [i.e. Sertorius or Hannibal: 4.13.2]. …Civilis appears to play rather than be the barbarian; on the other hand, 
he also plays Vespasian’s ally. From all angles, Civilis both is and is not assimilable as one of us.” For those who 
largely accept the thrust of Tacitus’ account, see also Syme (1958) 172-75, Nicolas (1979) 1268-70, Willems (1984) 
226-31. For those who believe Tacitus to have distorted the truth by either regurgitating or adhering to a pro-Flavian 
bias, see also Münzer (1899), Bessone (1972) and Wiedemann (1996). In recent years, Keitel (1992a), Haynes 
(2003), Timpe (2005), Ash (2009) and Master (2016) have to varying degrees turned away from (unknowable) 
questions of historical accuracy, and have each in their own way attempted to understand the Batavian Revolt 
historiographically and in the context of the Histories. 
350 The extant work ends abruptly at 5.25, in midst of a duel of words between Civilis and Cerialis. There is no 
closure on either a micro or macro level. 
351 In Tacitus’ brief excursus on the Batavian people (4.12-13), it is noted that their cohorts were “still commanded, 
according the the ancient custom, by the noblest men among them” (vetere instituto nobilissimi popularium 
regebant, 4.12.3). Brunt (1960) 507 astutely observes the likely reasons Tacitus provides this information: the 
details of the far-flung Batavians may not have been known to Tacitus’ audience; and, more importantly, the fact 
that the Batavians were somewhat self-ruled explains to Tacitus’ audience why it was so easy for them to separate 
from Rome. For Civilis’ relationship with Rome, see also Ash (2009) 96-97.  
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who was neither fully Roman nor fully barbarian—instigated instead a new “mixed” (permixta, 
1.2.1) phase of fighting marked by both domestic and foreign elements.352 Expressions of this 
duality abound: as early as book 2, Tacitus relates that some rowdy and truculent auxiliaries in 
Vitellius’ army are sent back to Germany, thus signifying “the beginning of a war 
simultaneously internal and external” (principium interno simul externoque bello, 2.69.1). Then, 
around the time Cremona was destroyed, we are told that “Germany…was thrown into chaos, 
and due to the complacency of the generals and the mutiny of the legions, due to violence from 
without and the treachery of our allies, Rome was nearly dashed” (turbata…Germania, et 
socordia ducum, seditione legionum, externa vi, perfidia sociali prope adflicta Romana res, 
3.46.1). And finally in book 4, Tacitus paints the following picture of the coalition of German 
forces laying siege to the Roman legionary camp at Vetera:353  
hinc veteranarum cohortium signa, inde depromptae silvis lucisque ferarum 
imagines, ut cuique genti inire proelium mos est, mixta belli civilis externique facie 
obstupefecerant obsessos. (4.22.2) 
 
The besieged were dumbfounded to see, on one side [of the Rhine], the standards 
of veteran cohorts, and on the other, the images of wild beasts which had been 
brought forth from forests and groves, according to each tribe’s customary way of 
entering battle—a mixture in appearance of civil and foreign war.  
 
Civilis’ and his army’s mixed identity is not the only force opposing Rome’s total 
transition to bella externa. Throughout book 4, Tacitus repeatedly demonstrates that the 
factionalism of books 1-3 along Vitellian and Flavian lines persists even long after Vitellius’ 
death. According to the book’s ominous first words, “after Vitellius had been killed, war stopped 
more than peace began” (interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat quam pax coeperat, 4.1.1). 
                                                      
352 For Tacitus’ notion that Civilis represents a “transitional” enemy for Vespasian and for Rome itself, see Haynes 
(2003) 148-49 and esp. Ash (2009) passim, who analyzes the civil wars of books 1-3 as a period of “fission,” and 
the Batavian Revolt of books 4 and 5 as inaugurating a fraught period of “fusion.” 
353 See Levene (2009a) 226. 
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The Flavian victors, not prepared to make peace with the surviving Vitellians, seek revenge by 
turning the city of Rome into a virtual warzone, full of violence and plunder (4.1.1-3). In turn, as 
we shall see in great detail below, many of the Vitellians are unwilling to sacrifice their loyalties 
to a dead man. Many oaths are made which purport to end factional conflict. But Tacitus 
repeatedly denies the sacramentum sole power to create and enforce new loyalties. The people 
themselves must be willing to undergo a change of heart. Otherwise, bellum civile will, on some 
level, never end. 
 
 
PART 1: The First Phase of Revolt 
 
 
INTRODUCING CIVILIS 
 
 
Neither Civilis nor the Batavian people possess any history or identity free of civil strife. In fact, 
Batavia’s very existence on the map is owed to a German domestic dispute: in a brief 
ethnography (4.12-13), Tacitus relates that the island nation was once part of the Chatti tribe, but 
was “driven out by domestic unrest” (seditione domestica pulsi, 4.12.2) and forced to settle on an 
island near the mouth of the Rhine, where they presently reside.354 The tribe’s intimate 
connection to internal strife persists to the narrative present: Julius Civilis, the leading citizen of 
the Batavian people during the Year of Four Emperors, is both physical embodiment and logical 
result of Rome’s civil wars: 
iniectae Civili catenae, missusque ad Neronem et a Galba absolutus sub Vitellio 
rursus discrimen adiit, flagitante supplicium eius exercitu: inde causae irarum 
spesque ex malis nostris. (4.13.1) 
                                                      
354 Cf. G. 29.1: Chattorum quondam populus et seditione domestica in eas sedes transgressus (“a people once of the 
Chatti who, due to domestic strife, crossed over to that seat”). Caesar, by calling their home island the “island of the 
Batavians” (insulam…Batavorum, BG 4.10), provides a terminus ante quem for this migration; see Chilver (1985) 
32. According to Tacitus, Agricola received in friendship an Irish king who was similarly “expelled by domestic 
unrest” (expulsum seditione domestica, Agr. 24.3).  
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Civilis was put in chains and sent to Nero. And, though freed by Galba, he ran into 
trouble again under Vitellius when the army demanded his execution. This is the 
reason for his anger and why our faults gave him hope. 
 
Interpretation of Civilis’ motivations rests in part on how one interprets the antecedent of inde. 
On one level, it certainly refers to the imprisonment under Nero and the near execution under 
Vitellius (catenae…discrimen…supplicium),355 experiences liable to be the causes of anyone’s 
anger. Yet, in a broader sense, we might better understand that Civilis, after being passed from 
one fate to another as the imperial throne rapidly changed occupant (Nerone…Galba…Vitellio), 
is enraged at the perpetual instability and helplessness to which he is constantly subjected—
enraged, in other words, at Rome’s unpredictability no less than his own mistreatment.356 And 
Civilis realizes that it is this very instability of the Roman world which gives him a hope of 
challenging it (spes ex malis nostris). 
When Civilis finally begins to assert his agency in book 4, he does so in the same way the 
Roman civil war factions had done in books 1-3, namely through the orchestration of mutinies 
and oaths, and the enticement toward plunder. It is important to realize that, during the early 
stages of the Batavian revolt, the war between Vitellius and Vespasian is not yet concluded. 
Thus, the Civilis narrative of book 4 does not so much continue the Vitellio-Flavian narrative of 
books 2-3, as add another dimension and perspective to it. Civilis’ treatment of his army 
                                                      
355 Tacitus first mentions Vitellius pardoning Civilis at 1.59.1. 
356 Tacitus’ decision to introduce the Batavian challenge as he does—i.e., by backtracking in time and sketching a 
summary of what happened to Civilis during the reigns of Nero, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius—follows the same 
pattern as Tacitus’ introduction of Vespasian and the eastern legions months before the Flavian acclamation: 
…auditique saepius in Syria Iudaeaque Caesares quam inspecti. nulla seditio legionum, tantum adversus Parthos 
minae, vario eventu; et proximo civili bello turbatis aliis inconcussa ibi pax, dein fides erga Galba. mox, ut 
Othonem ac Vitellium, scelestis armis res Romanas raptum ire volgatum est… (“…and, in Syria and Judaea, the 
Julio-Claudians had been heard about more often than seen. There were no mutinies among the legions, only threats 
against the Parthians, with mixed results; and in the most recent civil war [Ash (2007) 92: “i.e., the conflicts leading 
to Nero’s suicide and Galba’s accession”], when others were thrown into tumult, there peace was undisturbed; 
thereupon loyalty towards Galba. Later, when it became common knowledge that Otho and Vitellius had taken up 
wicked arms and were going about seizing Roman power…,” 2.6.1-2). 
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resembles and reenacts, in many cases, the deeds of the Flavian leaders Antonius Primus and 
Flavian Mucianus, while the nascent Batavian challenge as a whole mirrors several aspects of the 
Flavian experiment. In that respect, the Batavians and Flavians are, disturbingly, even more 
similar to one another than the Flavians are similar to the Galbans, Othonians, or Vitellians. Yet 
it is also undeniable that, especially in the first phase of the Batavian Revolt—i.e., before the 
Gauls join forces with the Germans—Civilis and his allies repeatedly mark themselves as 
barbarians, totally separate from the Roman experience. As such, the Romans, though still 
fractured into hostile Vitellian and Flavian factions, do have some success reorienting their 
aggression toward the “foreign” enemy and away from one another.357 
 
CIVILIS AND OATHS 
 
 
The narrative of the “Batavian Revolt” begins when the “authors of an engineered mutiny get 
[the common soldiers] to refuse enlistment [in auxiliary cohorts]” (compositae seditionis 
auctores perpulere, ut dilectum abnuerent, 4.14.2). Mutiny, as we have seen repeatedly, means 
the realignment of loyalty and the swearing of new oaths. And indeed, immediately upon 
delivery of a stirring speech to his fellow disaffected Batavians enumerating the outrages 
committed against him and his countrymen by Vitellius’ legionaries (4.14.1-2),358 Civilis secures 
the loyalty of his followers by leading them in an oath: 
magno cum adsensu auditus, barbaro ritu et patriis exsecrationibus universos 
adigit. missi ad Canninefates qui consilia sociarent. ea gens partem insulae colit, 
origine lingua virtute par Batavis; numero superantur. mox occultis nuntiis pellexit 
Britannica auxilia, Batavorum cohortes missas in Germaniam. (4.15.1) 
 
Having been heard with great approval, [Civilis] compels everyone to swear an oath 
marked with barbarian ritual and the traditional curses for breaking it. Envoys were 
sent to the Canninefates to join the conspiracy. That tribe inhabits a part of the 
                                                      
357 On various points of successful and unsuccessful reorientation in Histories 4, see Ash (2009) passim. 
358 Hence “engineered” (compositae). 
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island; they are similar to the Batavians in history, language and bravery, though 
smaller in population. Soon, Civilis used secret messages to entice the British 
auxiliaries—that is, the Batavian cohorts that had been sent to Germany. 
 
This oath passage contains a unique combination of the familiar (i.e., Roman) and the 
strange (i.e., barbarian). On the face of it, the oath-scene shows a German playing to a German 
crowd, yet intratextual correspondences with Vespasian’s acclamation (book 2) hint that there is 
something else at play as well. Let us first examine the oath’s strangeness, then its familiarity. 
 Though Tacitus relates little of the oath’s actual content—save that it seems to have 
contained a curse for those who break it—the chosen vocabulary marks the scene as certainly 
less than fully Roman. Tacitus nowhere in the Histories uses ritus to describe a Roman ritual, 
much less a Roman sacramentum; he reserves the word for describing the exotic.359 exsecratio, 
in the sense of “a curse invoked in the event of failure to keep a promise” (OLD s.v. 2), occurs 
only here in the Histories.360 The single occurrence of exsecratio (OLD s.v. 2) in the Annals 
appears in a passage about Parthians rather than Romans (A. 6.41.2), which perhaps suggests that 
Tacitus viewed the word as containing connotations of foreignness. In any case, the modifiers 
barbaro and patriis double up to mark the procedure as certainly foreign. Additionally, the one-
sentence ethnography of the Canninefates (ea gens…superantur) may seem merely a colorful 
footnote at first glance, yet the emphasis on this tribe’s similarity to the Batavians suggests the 
need for an oath which is Germanic in orientation.361 Civilis is attempting to construct a coalition 
of German tribes, and understands that appeals to common cultural heritage and custom help 
                                                      
359 Including 4.15.1, there are five occurrences of ritus in the Histories: the phrase templi ritum describes the unique 
and exotic representation of Venus at the the temple of Paphos (2.2.2); the term is especially favored in the Jewish 
ethnography, appearing three times in two chapters. (5.4.1, 5.5.1, 5.5.5). In the Germania, Tacitus relates that the 
Suevi “celebrate the horrors of their barbarian rite (barbari ritus horrenda) by publicly killing a person” (G. 39.2). 
Chilver (1985) 35 is skeptical, probably rightly, that something so dark is meant at H. 4.15.1 as at G. 39.2.  
360 exsecratio appears at 3.25.3 and A. 6.41.3 to mean simply “the act of cursing, imprecation” (OLD s.v. 1). For 
further examples of the meaning listed under OLD s.v. 2, cf. Cic. Verr. 2.5.104, Sest. 15, and Liv. 10.38.10, with 
Heubner (1976) 45. 
361 Cf. Heubner (1976) 45: “die civitas Canninefatium lag im westlichen Teil der insula Batavorum.”  
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reinforce common ethnic identities which he can exploit for his own purposes. A sacramentum—
that is, a specifically Roman loyalty oath—would certainly not have had special appeal to any 
shared sense of Germanic culture or ancestry.362 
 Though the content and style of the oath administered by Civilis (4.15.1) is portrayed by 
Tacitus as uniquely Germanic, the tactics Civilis uses to ensure the acceptance and spread of that 
oath resonate with the successful oaths of Vespasian’s acclamation (2.73-81) in several ways 
argued for in Chapter 2:363  
(a) Like Mucianus, Civilis immediately capitalizes on the positive mood which has been 
engendered among the soldiers (id ipsum opperiens, 2.80.2 ~ magno cum adsensu auditus, 
4.15.1). Thus, both leaders exhibit a canny ability to “take the temperature” of the oath’s 
audience. 
(b) Like Mucianus, Civilis leaves nothing to chance, opting instead to force the issue (adigit, 
2.80.2 ~ adigit, 4.15.1). The use of adigit, we will recall, marks an oath as compelled or 
orchestrated to some degree, as opposed to voluntary and spontaneous. Moreover, the curses 
uttered against oath-breakers implicit in exsecrationibus, though lexically marked as barbarian 
in orientation, intensify the impression of Civilis’ forcefulness: he wants to ensure there will 
be no turning back.  
(c) Like Mucianus, Civilis extends an invitation to participate in political revolution to the 
“common man” (militem, 2.80.2; Antiochensium theatrum ingressus…, 2.80.2 ~ primores 
                                                      
362 Despite the occasional lip-service paid in Histories 4 to Gallo-Germanic unity, these sorts of exsecrationes 
patriae seem not to have been shared between Germans and Gauls: when some Gallic tribes later join the rebellion, 
it appears, given the familiar formulaic language, to be a Roman-style sacramentum which Civilis withholds: “neque 
se neque quamquam Batavum in verba Galliarum adegit, fisus Germanorum opibus… (“Civilis compelled neither 
himself nor any of the Batavians to swear an oath of allegiance to the Gauls, relying as he did on the resources of the 
Germans…,” 4.61.1). 
363 For Mucianus’ role in Vespasian’s acclamation, see Ch. 2, pp. 68-78. 
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gentis et promptissimos volgi, 4.14.2; universos, 4.15.1). He avoids the fatal mistake Caecina 
made in excluding the average soldier from the process of sedition (3.13).364  
(d) Like Mucianus, Civilis, after having secured the loyalty of the men with whom he is 
physically present, sets about expanding the scope of the oath to neighboring groups with 
similar sympathies (Syria omnis in eodem sacramento fuit, 2.81.1; quidquid 
provinciarum…iuravere, 2.81.2 ~ missi ad Canninefates…pellexit Britannica auxilia, 
Batavorum cohortes…, 4.15.1). 
By virtue of these many similarities to Mucianus’ successful orchestration of oaths during 
Vespasian’s imperial bid, Civilis demonstrates that he and his revolution are a force to be 
reckoned with. In the Batavians, Tacitus slyly suggests, the Flavians may have met their most 
daunting enemy yet, namely a version of themselves.  
Four chapters after indicating that Civilis had extended the offer of allegiance in his 
rebellion to the Canninefates (4.15.1 and (d) above), Tacitus refocalizes the events through the 
Canninefates and Batavian cohorts themselves.365 Once again, Tacitus presents a sophisticated 
conflation of Roman mimicry and frightening barbarity: 
isdem diebus Batavorum et Canninefatium cohortes, cum iussu Vitellii in urbem 
pergerent, missus a Civile nuntius adsequitur. intumuere statim superbia 
ferociaque et pretium itineris donativum, duplex stipendium, augeri equitum 
numerum, promissa sane a Vitellio, postulabant, non ut adsequerentur, sed causam 
seditioni. (4.19.1) 
 
At that same time, the messenger sent by Civilis caught up with the cohorts of 
Batavians and Canninefates, as they were setting off for Rome under the order of 
Vitellius. They immediately swelled up in arrogance and anger and demanded, as 
price for making the journey, a donative, double pay, and an increase in the number 
                                                      
364 See Ch. 2, pp. 78-84. 
365 The Batavian auxiliaries mentioned here are the same eight Batavian cohorts whom Valens acquired in the 
territory of the Lingones before he marched south (1.59.1) and then after the march sent away from the main force 
(orbari…fortissimorum virorum auxilio, 2.28.2), thereby sparking a mutiny (2.28-29). See Ch. 2, pp. 132-33 and 
Brunt (1960) 501.  
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of cavalry—things which Vitellius had no doubt promised. But they demanded 
them not in order to get them, but rather to give a pretext for mutiny.366 
 
The Canninefates are apparently astute observers of the Roman sacramentum-donativum 
contract: in order to break their loyalty to Vitellius, they call in the donatives and the doubled 
salary they had been promised.367 But there is an important difference: whereas Roman armies in 
the Histories genuinely want their commanders’ promises fulfilled and tend to remain loyal if 
their demands are met, the Canninefates cry poverty in order to scheme their way into 
disloyalty.368 In other words, whereas the end goal of many Roman armies has been to get paid—
by no means an exceptionally noble goal, from an elite perpective—the end goal of the 
Canninefates’ mutiny is even worse—to be disloyal! Tacitus is careful to spell out in explicit 
terms how the actual motive of the Canninefates (causam seditioni) differs from the typical 
motive for soldiers demanding money (ut adsequerentur). This clarification is necessary, since, 
in the Histories, Roman armies’ desire for money is not typically accompanied by an ulterior 
motive. If anything the desire for money is the ulterior motive. As we saw in Chapter 1, the 
legions and praetorians under Galba, were not looking to turn against him; they really just 
wanted to get paid. The praetorians’ eagerness to accept Otho was rooted in a desire to restore 
loyalty on their own terms. Self-enrichment is visible as an end goal in Valens’ (1.51.1; 2.28-29), 
Primus’ (3.19.2, 26.3), and even Mucianus’ (2.80.3) armies as well. The cynical Canninefates 
reverse this process: they want to achieve mutiny (causam seditioni), and attempt to use their 
failure to obtain (ut adsequerentur) donatives and other forms of remuneration in order to reach 
                                                      
366 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009) 193. 
367 Chilver (1985) 40, citing Speidel (1973) 141-47: “the ordinary soldier in an auxiliary cohort received either two-
thirds or five-sixths of the legionary’s pay.” He continues, however: “The Batavians’ demand for doubling their 
existing pay…cannot be taken seriously, even if…duplex is not to be taken precisely. The only safe conclusion 
seems to be that the status and pay of the Batavian cohorts was significantly lower than that of the normal auxilia, 
presumably on account of their special position as tribal units…” Alföldy (1968) 91 disagrees. 
368 Cf. Brunt (1960) 501-2. 
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their goal. It is as if Tacitus has put a funhouse mirror up to the social and financial interactions 
that have underpinned soldier-commander relations since the beginning of the work.  
 As Civilis continues to recruit more disaffected cohorts into his army, the Batavian-led 
coalition wins a series of battles against loyal Vitellians (4.18-20). At which point, Civilis, as any 
good Roman general would, ponders his best course of action. Recognizing that there is strength 
in Roman identity (vim Romanam, 4.21.1), he outwardly aligns his pan-German and anti-Roman 
ambitions with the up-and-comer Vespasian, by administering a Flavian oath to his own soldiers: 
Civilis, adventu veteranorum cohortium iusti iam exercitus ductor, sed consilii 
ambiguus et vim Romanam reputans, cunctos qui aderant in verba Vespasiani 
adigit… (4.21.1) 
 
With the arrival of the veteran cohorts, Civilis was now the leader of a real army. 
But, since he was uncertain of his plan and mulling over the strength of Rome, he 
compelled everyone present to swear an oath of allegiance to Vespasian… 
 
Part of Civilis’ danger lies in his willingness and ability to employ oaths—even contradictory 
ones—whenever it suits his purposes. (Before this Flavian oath, Civilis had already secured the 
same soldiers’ loyalty to his proto-nationalist cause.) To Civilis, an oath is little more than a 
means of herding together large groups of soldiers to achieve a desired political outcome. And 
this time, the emulation of Mucianus is even more overt: not only do both men administer oaths 
to the same recipient (Vespasian), but Tacitus even repurposes his phrase from Mucianus’ earlier 
effort in Antioch: Mucianus alacrem militem in verba Vespasiani adegit (2.80.2). Once again, 
Civilis—like Mucianus, who secured the loyalties of both the officers (2.76) and the common 
soldiers (2.80.2)—sees the importance in focusing on everyone (cunctos, 4.21.1; cf. universos, 
4.15.1). 
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 The similarities to Mucianus’ triumphs grind to a halt, however, when the Vitellian 
legions—unlike the Syrians and other Easterners (2.80), and unlike the Canninefates (4.19)—
refuse to alter their allegiances: 
… mittitque legatos ad duas legiones, quae priore acie pulsae in Vetera castra 
concesserant, ut idem sacramentum acciperent. [2] redditur responsum: neque 
proditoris neque hostium se consiliis uti; esse sibi Vitellium principem, pro quo 
fidem et arma usque ad supremum spiritum retenturos: proinde perfuga Batavus 
arbitrium rerum Romanarum ne ageret, sed meritas sceleris poenas exspectaret. 
quae ubi relata Civili, incensus ira universam Batavorum gentem in arma rapit; 
iunguntur Bructeri Tenecteri et excita nuntiis Germania ad praedam famamque. 
(4.21.1-2) 
 
… and [Civilis] sent envoys to the two legions369—which had returned to the Vetera 
camp after being beaten in the previous battle—to collect the same oath. [2] An 
answer came back: they did not have any use for the advice of a traitor and enemy; 
Vitellius was their emperor and they would keep their weapons and loyalty to him 
till their final breath. So a Batavian deserter ought not to sit in judgement of Roman 
affairs,370 but wait for the punishments his crime deserves. When these things were 
related to Civilis, he was kindled with rage, and led the entire Batavian nation into 
war. The Bructeri and Tenecteri joined them, and this news roused Germany to seek 
plunder and fame. 
 
This refusal conforms to a pattern throughout the Histories, whereby Vitellians are portrayed as 
particularly stubborn and loyal to their emperor regardless of circumstance or reality.371 Yet, on 
another level, this refusal suggests that the Roman soldiers of the Year of Four Emperors, for all 
their crimes and betrayals, are unwilling to swear allegiance to a group of foreigner cohorts with 
dreams of German unity. In other words, Tacitus demonstrates that, despite Civilis’ successful 
mimicry of Flavian oath tactics, the definitional and literal boundaries between Romans and 
barbarians have, at this early stage of the Batavian revolt, not yet collapsed.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
369 Legions V (Alaudae) and XV (Primigenia); cf. 4.18.  
370 Phrase borrowed from Wellesley (2009) 195. 
371 See Ch. 3, p. 143n341. 
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CIVILIS AND GREED 
 
 
Much like Antonius Primus, Civilis understands how to exploit the soldiers’ acquisitive 
tendencies to his own advantage. As mentioned briefly above, in order to convince his fellow 
Batavians to revolt (4.14), Civilis delivers a speech invoking the outrages caused by Roman 
greed, while stoking the Batavians’ own impulses (4.14).372 The Batavians apparently had a lot 
to be angry about: the Roman levy which Vitellius had imposed was oppressive and 
economically damaging;373 the recruiting officers were lining their pockets, holding the old and 
infirm for ransom, and raping young Batavian boys (4.14.1-3).374 After invoking these outrages, 
Civilis turns suggestively to thoughts of revenge: “Never before have Roman affairs been in 
worse shape; their winter quarters are full of nothing but loot and old men” (numquam magis 
adflictam rem Romanam nec aliud in hibernis quam praedam et senes, 4.14.4). By coupling an 
appeal to greed with appeals to nascent German (proto-)nationalism and pronouncements of 
Rome’s degraded martial prowess (4.14.1-5), Civilis succeeds in using the promise of plunder to 
mobilize an offensive against Rome. That Civilis invokes the promise of material gain in order to 
spur on an army to attack a (technically) friendly force recalls the tactics of Antonius Primus, 
who offered up the riches of Cremona in order to sustain the momentum of his assault on the 
                                                      
372 Tacitus also blames Rome’s greed on the Frisian revolt of 28 CE: Frisii… pacem exuere nostra magis avaritia 
quam obsequii impatientes (“the Frisians cast aside peace more due to our greed than because they were unable to 
suffer obedience,” A. 4.72.1). See Master (2016) 35-51, who cites Boudicca’s revolt of 61 CE (A. 14.31.2) as being 
attributed to similar causes, and ultimately concludes: “Civilis’ angry complaints about the expectation of provincial 
sacrifice are given significant persuasive force by the way in which Tacitus grounds them in a long tradition of 
discussions of the proper rewards for military service at Rome” (51). 
373 In January, Germany had supplied auxiliary units to Valens’ and Caecina’s expeditions into Italy (1.61.2); see 
Chilver (1985) 34-35. 
374 Roman law prohibited this sort of extortion: lege Iulia repetundarum cavetur ne quis ob militem legendum 
mittendumve aes accipiat (“in accordance with the Julian law on extortion, one cannot accept money on account of 
the enlistment or dispatching or soldiers,” Paul. dig. 48.11.6.2); see Brunt (1960) 502. On similar barbarian charges 
of Roman soldiers’ sexual misconduct, cf. Agr. 31.1 (Calgacus), A. 14.35.1 (Boudicca). Cf. Adler (2011) 131: 
“Tacitus has a penchant…for viewing the excesses of the Roman provincial administration through the lens of 
sexual misconduct.”  
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nearby Vitellian camp (3.27).375 Not incidentally, this is the same speech which preceded Civilis’ 
initial solicitation of oaths discussed in the previous section. Thus, Civilis’ imitations of 
Antonius Primus’ tactics concerning greed and plunder run concurrent with his imitations of 
Mucianus’ tactics concerning oaths. And, just as we saw with Civilis’ imitations of Mucianus, 
his similarity to Primus is tempered by an occasional tendency to act the barbarian, thus serving 
to restore Roman identity in the face of a foreign enemy. 
Tacitus highlights the acquisitiveness and virtual barbarity of Antonius Primus’ army by 
noting that the peaceful city of Cremona was in the midst of a market day when the Roman 
legions sacked and plundered it (3.32.2).376 Now, in these early days of the Batavian revolt, 
Tacitus employs similar rhetorical coloring in order to heighten the distinction between the 
grasping Batavians and the victimized Romans. After the Canninefates and the Frisians attack 
and plunder the winter camp of two Roman cohorts (direpta castra, 4.15.2), they proceed to hunt 
down and kill even the surrounding merchants, who were “spread out as one does in a time of 
peace” (vagos et pacis modo effusos, 4.15.2-3). By mentioning the disruption and suffering of the 
local merchants—especially in an episode almost completely devoid of detail otherwise—
Tacitus amplifies the victimhood and unpreparedness of a largely peaceful place (the Roman 
territory), while simultaneously stressing the barbarism of the aggressor (the Germans).  
 
 CIVILIS AND THE SIEGE AT VETERA 
 
When the Vitellians at the legionary camp Vetera refuse to join the (nominally) Flavian cohorts 
led by Civilis (4.21.1-2), the Germans dig in for a protracted siege. The siege occurs in three 
stages throughout the book (4.21-23, 29-30, 59-60). This section is concerned with the first two 
                                                      
375 See Ch. 3, p. 101-6. 
376 See Ch. 3, p. 112. 
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stages only; the third stage will be discussed in Part 2 below. The rebels’ actions and motivations 
during the siege’s first stage (4.21-23) echo those of Antonius Primus and his army at Cremona, 
and thereby continue to reinforce the idea that the Batavian Revolt is in some sense a 
reenactment of the Flavian Challenge. But, by the second stage (4.29-30), Tacitus once again 
begins to reinforce the distinct Roman identity of the besieged and the markedly barbarian 
identity of the besiegers. Thus, though the siege of the Vetera camp makes it clearer than ever 
that Civilis’ successes reflect on the Flavians’ in disturbing and dangerous ways, it is 
concurrently made clear that Roman identity is, at this point, yet something distinct. 
 Even before the siege begins, the stage is set much as it had been at the Second Battle of 
Cremona. Not only are the opposing sides of both conflicts playing comparable parts—in both 
battles, a force deputized to fight for Vespasian assaults legions loyal to Vitellius—but both 
conflicts are roughly contemporaneous. What most meaningfully cements the comparison, 
however, is the close attention to detail paid in the Vetera narrative to replicating the motivations 
of Antonius Primus’ army. From the outset, we are told that the coalition of German forces is 
compelled to attack for two reasons: “plunder and glory” (ad praedam famamque, 4.21.2). This 
coupled motivation, though exhibited in Primus’ men (3.60.2), is too typical of Tacitus’ civil war 
armies generally to evoke any specific intratextual correspondences: the Vitellian army of 
Valens, for instance, is said to possess the same desires (ferox praeda gloriaque exercitus, 
1.51.1).377 However, once battle is joined at Vetera, Tacitus evokes the motivations of the 
Second Battle of Cremona in great detail: 
Batavi Transrhenanique, quo discreta virtus manifestius spectaretur, sibi quaeque 
gens consistent, eminus lacessentes. post ubi pleraque telorum turribus pinnisque 
moenium inrita haerebant et desuper saxis volnerabantur, clamore atque impetu 
invasere vallum, adpositis plerique scalis, alii per testudinem suorum; 
scandebantque iam quidam, cum gladiis et armorum incussu praecipitati sudibus 
                                                      
377 See Ch. 3, pp. 124-25.  
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et pilis obruuntur, praeferoces initio et rebus secundis nimii. [3] sed tum praedae 
cupidine adversa quoque tolerabant, machinas etiam, insolitum sibi, ausi. (4.23.2-
3) 
 
The Batavians and Germans from across the Rhine, so that their distinct virtues 
could be seen more clearly, drew themselves up into formation by tribe, and 
assailed Vetera from a distance. After that, when most of their spears hung uselessly 
from the turrets and wings of the walls and they themselves were being wounded 
by rocks from above, they stormed the rampart in a noisy onrush. Most put up 
ladders, while others climbed up on a testudo formation of their own men. Some 
were already climbing when they were hurled back down by swords and the 
clashing of arms, and then smothered by pikes and javelins. In the beginnings of 
battles, they were impetuous and immoderate due to their successes. [3] But, in this 
instance, they were also able to handle adversity by means of their desire for 
plunder, even daring to use machines of war with which they were 
unaccustomed.378  
 
Many elements of this scene recall details from the attack on the legionary camp near 
Cremona: a concern among the soldiers to distinguish themselves from the pack (quo discreta 
virtus manifestius spectaretur, 4.23.2 ~ ut descretus labor fortesque distingueret atque ipsa 
contentione decoris accenderentur, 3.27.1); rolling rocks from above onto the besiegers (desuper 
saxis volnerabantur, 4.23.2 ~ pondera saxorum Vitelliani provolvunt, 3.27.3); forming tortoise-
formations (per testudinem, 4.23.2 ~ fluitantemque testudinem, 3.27.3), and so on. That many of 
these similarities speak as much to a shared historiographical language of sieges as to deliberate 
intratextual engagement is probable.379 But Tacitus does not rely wholly on formula in order to 
explain the soldiers’ fervor. In fact, the historian’s assessment of the motivations of the German 
soldiers—sed tum praedae cupidine adversa quoque tolerabant (4.23.3)—contains a firm, 
intratextual resonance with the calculus of Antonius Primus’ legions: omnisque caedes et vulnera 
et sanguis aviditate praedae pensabantur (“all slaughter, wounds and shedding of blood was 
                                                      
378 Chilver (1985) 43: “[I]t is likely that the auxilia in the attack were less used to siege-work that the legions, and 
many of the force were Transrhenan Germans. Whether or not they had ever seen siege-engines at work, they had 
probably never constructed or employed them.” 
379 On stock scenes in Roman historiography, see Woodman (1988). On intratextuality and self-referentiality in 
Tacitus, see Woodman (1979) and Joseph (2012), esp. 6, 115-20, 169-79. 
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compensated for by their greed for plunder,” 3.26.3).380 adversa (4.23.3) recalls in compressed 
form the caedes et vulnera et sanguis of the earlier episode. sed and quoque signal that 
stereotypes about German ferocity (praeferoces), lack of endurance (initio), and inability to self-
regulate (rebus secundis nimii) do not alone provide the full picture; similarly, tum signals a shift 
from the realm of stereotype to immediate, specific causation. Thus, Tacitus’ effort to highlight 
the Batavians’ willingness to suffer for their greed is unmistakable. 
Though Tacitus’ employment of the book 3 motif of praedae cupido frames these 
German rebels in Flavian terms, Civilis’ forces, unlike Primus’, fail to breach the rampart and 
win a swift victory (4.23.4). They decide to rely instead on their ability to create a food shortage, 
which would shatter the loyalties (fides) of the besieged (4.23.4). In other words, the Germans 
hope that, in lieu of military victory and conversion at sword-point, they could exert enough 
stress on the Vitellians that they, holed up and starving, would abandon their allegiance to Rome. 
We will recall that, despite Civilis’ professions of loyalty to Vespasian (4.21.1), the Vitellians 
see through the ruse, recognize Civilis as a non-Roman “traitor” (proditoris) and “enemy” 
(hostium), and pledge to “keep their weapons and loyalty (fides) till their final breath” (4.21.2). 
Given the Vitellians’ strong sense of identity as Romans and loyalty to their emperor, Civilis has 
his work cut out for him. 
 As the siege moves into its second stage (4.29-30), Tacitus seems to validate the 
Vitellians’ stubborn defiance and steadfast loyalty to Rome by bringing Civilis’ barbarian and 
German identity to the fore. This is an identity which Civilis himself fiercely cultivated. For he 
ordered punitive plundering against two tribes, the Ubii and Treviri, for the crime of “renouncing 
                                                      
380 Cf. insitam praedandi cupidinem (“inborn desire to plunder,” 3.32.1). The precise phrase praedae cupidine 
appears also (in inverted order) in Tacitus’ digressive account of the Rhoxolani’s failed incursion into Moesia 
(1.79.2). Cf. also praedae magis quam pugnae intenta (“more intent on plunder than on fighting,” 1.79.1). 
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their homeland” (eiurata patria, 4.28.1) and, in the case of the Ubii, for preferring to be called by 
their Roman name.381 The Ubii, Tacitus tells us, were subdued (4.28.3). Now, “fiercer owing to 
his successes in these affairs” (successu rerum ferocior, 4.28.3), Civilis renews his offensive 
against the legionary camp. In Tacitus’ description of this bellum externum, stereotypical 
descriptions of German behavior abound—almost to the point of absurdity. Tacitus paints a 
grotesque image which collapses together several common barbarian tropes—love of feasting, 
drunkenness, rashness in battle, and excessive conspicuousness in appearance: 
congestis circum lignis accensisque, simul epulantes, ut quisque vino incaluerat, 
ad pugnam temeritate inani ferebantur. quippe ipsorum tela per tenebras vana: 
Romani conspicuam barbarorum aciem, et si quis audacia aut insignibus effulgens, 
ad ictum destinabant. (4.29.1) 
 
They piled up logs all around and set them on fire. Simultaneous with their feast 
and while each man was warm with wine, they were moved to attack out of inane 
recklessness. Indeed, their spears were pointless in the shadows. The Romans fixed 
on the barbarians’ conspicuous battle-line, and struck a blow against anyone whose 
boldness or insignia glinted. 
 
simul provides vivid color, for it suggests, somewhat comically, that the fighting and feasting 
somehow melded into a single activity.382 Later in the battle, the Roman-style levelheadedness 
and experience of the Vitellians is mentioned admiringly and in direct contrast to the Germans’ 
“incoherent fury” (inconsulta ira, 4.29.3). Going up against such an unruly barbarian foe, these 
Vitellians achieve the simple, laudatory designation of miles Romanus (4.29.3); in this moment, 
Tacitus implies, these Vitellians are engaged in an actual bellum externum. Crucially, however, 
even when the assault is beaten back, Civilis still “tries to undermine the loyalty of the legions 
with messages and promises” (nuntiis et promissis fidem legionum convellens, 4.30.2). Thus, as 
                                                      
381 The Ubii had a long tradition of loyalty to Rome dating back to the time of Caesar’s Gallic campaigns. For a 
concise summary of the relationship, see Chilver (1985) 45. 
382 Cf. Heubner (1976) 71: “die Partizipialkonjunktion…betont die Gleichzeitigkeit des allegemeinen Zechgelages 
und des jähen Losstürmens einzelner oder einzelner Gruppen in den Kampf…” 
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the second panel of the siege at Vetera comes to a close, the effort to undermine Roman loyalty 
continues to lurk. 
 
We have seen in PART 1 of this chapter that Civilis is a dangerous, transgressive, and 
inconsistent figure: he is capable of acting like a threatening external enemy, while 
simultaneously imitating Roman ways and even claiming to fight alongside Romans. 
Nevertheless, when push comes to shove, Civilis will often act the barbarian, thus partially 
alleviating the anxieties of this inherently “mixed war” (bellum permixtum, 1.1.2) and allowing 
aspects of legitimate bellum externum to shine through. Furthermore, the Vitellians, in the midst 
of a bitter civil war against the Flavian challengers, prove themselves unwilling to allow Civilis’ 
boundary-blurring ways erode their own sense of Roman identity. However, in PART 2, we will 
see Roman identity tested and violated in outrageous ways, as the sacramentum experiences its 
worst degradation yet. 
 
 
PART 2: The Second Phase of Revolt 
 
 
In order to define when the second phase of the Batavian Revolt begins, it will be useful first to 
say a few words about the complex chronology of the Vetera siege narrative. The relationship 
between the German rebels of book 4 and the Flavians of books 2-3 operates on two different 
levels. On the level of narrative chronology, the actions of the Batavian rebels at the siege of 
Vetera postdate and continue the phenomenon discussed in PART 1, wherein a non-Roman force 
reenacts, imitates, and mirrors Roman tactics and attitudes which have already been narrated in 
previous books. Yet, on the level of historical chronology, Tacitus makes clear that the two 
factions’ narratives overlap considerably. When Civilis begins his revolt against Rome, 
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Vespasian is still waging war against Vitellius.383 And, when the growing anti-Vitellian (read: 
anti-Roman) coalition of Germans first lay siege to the legionary camp at Vetera (4.21), 
Antonius Primus’ army has not yet sacked Cremona: according to Tacitus, once Civilis gives up 
trying to take Vetera by force and digs back in for a protracted blockade (4.30.2), word spreads 
throughout the northern provinces that Cremona has fallen at the hands of the Flavian Antonius 
Primus (4.31.1).384  
The Second Battle of Cremona is just as much a watershed in book 4 as it was in book 3. 
For it is upon receipt of the news of its destruction in northern Europe that the aims and loyalties 
of the ongoing Batavian Revolt begin to shift radically. These shifts happen on several fronts: 
The Vitellian legions, who have repeatedly expressed a stubborn desire to stay loyal to their 
feckless leader, still find it difficult to accept swearing allegiance to the new regime, even after 
Vitellius dies. With the Flavians soon to become the sole imperial claimant, Civilis realizes it is 
no longer possible to pretend to serve them to advance his separatist cause, and thus declares 
open war against the Roman state in the person of Vespasian. By doing so, he inaugurates the 
closest thing to a pure bellum externum in the Histories thus far. Meanwhile, Civilis expands his 
base of support into Gaul, where ambitious men have their own agenda; Civilis’ and his new 
Gallic allies’ visions for a future without Roman rule do not perfectly align. Such dense, 
complex historiographical narratives are woven together and told from many perspectives, 
occasionally with great attention to detail. But they are neither aimless nor unfocused. I argue 
                                                      
383 Civilis starts his movement probably in September; cf. Brunt (1960) 513. Vitellius died on 20 December; cf. 
Chilver (1985) 62.  
384 Brunt (1960) 515 places the start of the siege in late September, and lasting into the middle of October. Tacitus’ 
decision to explicitly align the re-entrenchment of Civilis’ besiegers with news of Cremona’s fall is further evidence 
that the narrative of the former was intended to invoke the latter. Wellesley (1957) 244-45 dates Flavian victory at 
Cremona to 24/25 October. So, according to Brunt (1960) 514, “[t]he news could well have reached Hordeonius at 
Neuss…very early in November…. The events described in 4.13-30 may then be placed between early September 
and early November.” 
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that Tacitus marshals these events in order to tell one devastating, overriding story: that in the 
darkest moments of the bellum permixtum, which itself is the dark (presumable) conclusion of 
three civil wars (trina bella civilia, 1.2.1), many Roman soldiers forsake their Roman loyalties 
and swear their allegiance to a foreign enemy (4.57.3), thereby triggering an identity crisis 
unequalled even in the bloodiest confusion of books 1-3.  
 
HAVING A HARD TIME LETTING GO 
 
 
In order to place this most shameful of oaths in the Histories in its proper context, it will be 
necessary to trace the story of the Vitellian legions who swore it. During the Vitellio-Flavian 
war, Hordeonius Flaccus, the legate of Upper Germany appointed by Galba to replace Verginius 
Rufus (1.9), clashed repeatedly with his legions because, as Tacitus sums up, “[t]he common 
soldiers were without doubt loyal to Vitellius, while the senior officers favored Vespasian” (haud 
dubie gregarious miles Vitellio fidus, splendidissimus quisque in Vespasium proni, 4.27.3).385 So, 
when word of Antonius Primus’ victory at Cremona reached Germany, Flaccus seized upon the 
opportunity to “compel” (adigente, 4.31.2) his men to swear allegiance to Vespasian. In the 
Histories, Tacitus consistently demonstrates that one cannot force an army to hold to an 
allegiance without their willing consent. sacramenta are successful because they give official 
sanction to genuinely felt loyalties (fides). In the case of Flaccus’ army, the sullen soldiers do not 
mutiny; instead, they merely go through the motions of oath practice half-heartedly—a clear and 
ominous sign that Vitellius is still in their hearts:386 
                                                      
385 See Damon (2003) 118 for a concise summary of Hordeonius Flaccus’ career and characterization in the 
Histories. 
386 Stäcker (2003) 304 (rightly) looks to this scene as a prime example of the personal orientation of the 
sacramentum during the principate: an oath of loyalty is sworn to an individual man, and so their ongoing affection 
for Vitellius makes it hard for them to say the name “Vespasian.”  
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vetus miles cunctabatur. sed adigente Hordeonio Flacco, instantibus tribunis, dixit 
sacramentum, non voltu neque animo satis adfirmans, et cum cetera iuris iurandi 
verba conciperent, Vespasiani nomen haesitantes aut levi murmure et plerumque 
silentio transmittebant. (4.31.2)387 
 
The veteran soldiers hesitated [to switch their loyalty from Vitellius to Vespasian]. 
But at Hordeonius Flaccus’ pressing and the tribunes’ insisting, they spoke the oath 
of allegiance, though giving no confirmation with their expressions or dispositions. 
And though they repeated all the rest of the oaths’ words, they hesitated at 
Vespasian’s name: some murmured it softly while most passed it over in silence.  
 
With this insincere oath, a rift has been created between the soldiers’ actions and their feelings—
between their official allegiance and their actual allegiance, we might say. Though these soldiers 
have not lost their fondness for Vitellius, they are now officially waging war against the 
Batavians under a Flavian banner. I would suggest that this internal rebellion in the hearts of the 
soldiers is a further manifestation of the bellum permixtum: outwardly, these Roman legions are 
tasked with fighting a foreign enemy; inwardly, the Vitellio-Flavian civil war rages on. The 
Roman civil war cannot truly come to an end until the loyalties of these Vitellian legions are 
won, outwardly and inwardly. 
 It does not take long for this inner civil war to resurface. After a series of battles (some 
won, some lost) against Civilis (4.33-35), Flaccus and one Dillius Vocula, legate of the Twenty-
Second Legion,388 suffer a mutiny at the hands of these discontented legions at Novaesium 
(4.36).389 Though the legions had been reluctant to swear allegiance to Vespasian (4.31.2), it 
                                                      
387 Cf. Tacitus’ description of a legislative dispute in the senate earlier in book 4: eam sententiam modestissimus 
quisque silentio, deinde oblivio transmisit (“all the most moderate men passed over this proposal in silence; then it 
was forgotten,” 4.9.2). 
388 What we know about his career comes from a tomb set up by his widow; see MacCrumb and Woodhead (1961) 
38 (=ILS 983). On the Spanish (Corduba) origins of the Dillii, see Syme (1958) 785. 
389 There is some uncertainly regarding where the mutiny took place. At the beginning of the paragraph, we learn 
that Vocula “came to Gelduba and from there to Novaesium” (Geldubam atque inde Novaesium, 4.36.1); but then he 
“captured Gelduba” (Civilis capit Geldubam, 4.36.1) and fought a cavalry battle “away from” (procul) Novaesium 
(4.36.1). Chilver (1985) 48-49 points out that Civilis capit Geldubam must be a gloss, and that Flaccus “seems” to 
be in Novaesium at 31.2 and is “certainly murdered” there (4.36.2). 
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takes a problem with the donative to spark an outright mutiny. The scene unfolds as follows: 390 
the legions discover that Vitellius had earlier sent funds to cover a donative, and, of course, upon 
learning this, demand to be paid (donativum exposcunt, 4.36.1). Flaccus forks over the money 
immediately—perhaps having learned from recent events not to trifle with angry soldiers 
demanding a “gift.” But in so doing, he makes a costly error: “…Hordeonius Flaccus gave [the 
donative] in Vespasian’s name, and this in particular was what incubated a mutiny” (Hordeonius 
nomine Vespasiani dedit, idque praecipuum fuit seditionis alimentum, 4.36.2). The legionaries, 
reveling in their outrage, drag Flaccus from his bedroom tent and kill him (4.36.2). Vocula 
escapes death by hiding in slave clothes (4.36.2)—an act of survival which stands in stark 
contrast to his later willingness to die.391  
The details of this mutiny reveal a serious problem for Vespasian.  The legions have 
refused to accept fully the sacramentum imposed on them by Flavian partisans, since the 
attendant donativum does not reflect their inner (i.e., Vitellian) fides. In other words, these 
legionaries care more that their fondness for Vitellius be reflected in the nature of their 
remuneration than that they get paid at all. They never considered their sacramentum to 
Vespasian legitimate, and, presumably because of these feelings, bristled when their 
commanders tried to pass off a donativum of Vitellius’ money as emanating from Vespasian. 
Thus, the Flavian commanders may at this point have nominal power over Vitellius’ old legions, 
but they utterly fail to reach a new Flavian sacramentum-donativum contract with them. Galba’s 
failure was one of stinginess in the eyes of the soldiery; Flaccus’ is one of imposture and 
illegitimacy.  
                                                      
390 Levick (1999) 109: “Hordeonius administered the oath of loyalty, but misjudged his troops’ fidelity. While the 
struggle for Vetera went on, a donative offered in Vespasian’s name merely provoked the troops at Novaesium…to 
a mutiny in which Hordeonius fell.” 
391 The same tactic which the Vitellian general Valens had used to escape mutiny; cf. 2.29.3. 
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 The mutiny ends quietly and without much gain. As Civilis bears down on them 
(adventante Civile, 4.37.1), some of the mutineers take flight (in fugam vertuntur, 4.37.1), while 
some others try to “dissociate themselves from their own cause” (erant causam suam 
dissociantibus, 4.37.2).392 Yet love of Vitellius had by no means abated: his statuary was re-
erected, even though, as Tacitus points out, at this point he was already dead (4.37.2)! 
Nevertheless, the mutiny draws to an official close when the mutineers abruptly re-swear 
allegiance to Vespasian: 
dein mutati in paenitentiam primani quartanique et duoetvicensimani Voculam 
sequuntur, apud quem resumpto Vespasiani sacramento ad liberandum Mogontiaci 
obsidium ducebantur. … [3] quin et loricam vallumque per fines suos Treveri 
struxere, magnisque in vicem cladibus cum Germanis certabant, donec egregia 
erga populum Romanum merita mox rebelles foedarent. (4.37.2-3) 
  
Then, the first, fourth, and twenty-second legions, in an about-face, repented and 
followed Vocula, in whose presence they swore their allegiance to Vespasian once 
again. They were led off to try to lift the siege of Mogontiacum. … [3] Moreover, 
the Treviri built a parapet and rampart along their own border, and fought the 
Germans with heavy losses on both sides—that is, until their rebellion befouled 
their outstanding service to the Roman people. 
 
Given the drawn-out and dramatic account of the mutiny, Tacitus’ unadorned and unexplained 
mutati and his matter-of-fact reporting of this second Vespasianic sacramentum are jarring. 
These legions’ difficult history with Vespasian—the very thing which sparked the mutiny in the 
first place—would seem to preclude such a simple resolution. Indeed, they have already resisted 
internalizing their compulsory oaths to Vespasian; they have shown themselves dissatisfied with 
donatives given in Vespasian’s name; they have mutinied from Vespasian, in the process killing 
high-ranking men loyal to him. Given all this recent (and ongoing) tension, I argue that the quick 
                                                      
392 This part of the narrative is quite condensed, and in the absence of another source to corroborate, it must remain 
unclear what adventante Civile and in fugam vertuntur mean precisely. Chilver (1985) 49 is condemnatory: “The 
whole of this chapter…seems hurried and ill composed.” 
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and undramatic resumption of the Flavian oath rings hollow, and was likely meant to do so.393 
The grammatical subordination of the resumed oath (resumpto Vespasiani sacramento, 4.37.2) to 
the coming showdown at Mogontiacum further eclipses the importance of alleged reconciliation 
and oath-bound unity. Tacitus has constructed the end of this scene in such a way that any true or 
meaningful resolution of the mutiny feels unachieved, and therefore that the legions’ loyalty to 
Vespasian rests on shaky ground. The externalized and distant perspective of the brief phrase 
mutati in paenitentiam (4.37.2) elides any mention of internal loyalties, such that we can only 
guess at the sincerity of the change. The historian, much like the Vitellians who skip over 
Vespasian’s name as they recite their oath (4.31.2), conveys meaning from silence. 
 
IN EXTERNA VERBA IURARENT 
 
 
As news of Vitellius’ death continues to spread, Tacitus warns that Vespasian would now face a 
new set of challenges. These challenges would arise on both foreign and domestic fronts—a sign 
that the bellum permixtum would continue to persist: 
audita interim per Gallias [et] Germaniasque mors Vitelli duplicaverat bellum. 
nam Civilis omissa dissimilatione in populum Romanum ruere, Vitellianae legiones 
vel externum servitium quam imperatorem Vespasianum malle. Galli sustulerant 
animos, eandem ubique exercituum nostrorum fortunam rati… (4.54.1) 
 
Meanwhile, news of the death of Vitellius spreading through Gaul and Germany 
expanded the war. For Civilis dropped all pretense and attacked the Roman people 
head on; the Vitellian legions preferred even foreign slavery over having Vespasian 
as emperor. The Gauls had lifted their spirits, believing that the same misfortune 
extended to our entire army… 
 
As the passage continues to unfold, we are told that the burning of the Capitol had stoked 
Druidic prophecies of Rome’s demise (5.54.2-3).394 But Tacitus has framed his discussion such 
                                                      
393 Commentators seem not to be particularly troubled by the abrupt resolution of this mutiny. See, e.g., Levick 
(1999) 109: “Vocula succeeded in obtaining the allegiance of I, IV Macedonica, and XXII” [emphasis added]. 
394 See Ch. 3, p. 120 for a discussion of this passage’s role in portraying the destroyers of Cremona as barbaric. 
 171 
that the “expansion of the war” (duplicaverat bellum, 4.54.1) does not merely refer to the Gauls’ 
defection, but indeed also to the fact that Civilis had become openly inimical to Rome, and that 
some Vitellianae legiones (4.54.1), a reference to Dillius Vocula’s army, were willing to join 
him.395 It is remarkable, and of obvious morbid interest to Tacitus, that all three parties in 
question—Civilis and his German allies, the newly rebellious Gauls, and Vitellius’ former 
legions under Vocula’s command—pose a threat to Flavian hegemony. 
Tacitus couches the initial conspiratorial measures taken by these “rebellious” (rebelles, 
4.37.3) Treviri in terms of oaths. A small cadre of Gallic nobles—namely, the Treviran Julius 
Classicus and Julius Tutor, and the Lingonian Julius Sabinus—meet secretly in Cologne to 
strategize. There, they agree that, since every aspect of Roman society is in a state of disrepair, a 
Gaul united both with itself and with Civilis’ existing rebellion could decide its own fate 
(4.55.4). Tacitus refers to this consensus agreement as a coniuratio (4.55.1). The term coniuratio 
is used only four other times in the extant Histories, all in book 1 in reference to the Othonian 
conspiracy against Galba (1.27, 32, 33, 42). Even though the sense here, and in the passages of 
book 1, is “conspiracy” (OLD s.v. 2), we must recognize that its primary meaning, “a swearing 
together” (OLD s.v. 1) may be active as well.396 While perhaps not terribly meaningful in its own 
right, the element of oath-taking in the language of the Gauls’ conspiracy foreshadows the 
central role oaths will play in the following chapters. 
 Once the conspirators have decided to get out from under the Roman yoke, they debate 
how to handle Vocula’s legions. Some believe they ought to be wiped out, seeing as they are 
                                                      
395 This “doubling” can hardly be literal. Heubner’s (1976) 129 translation seems to capture the sense well: “hatte 
die Wucht des Krieges verdoppelt.” 
396 Linderski (1984) 76-77 argues that, in the Republic, a coniuratio was simply a temporary oath sworn to unite 
soldiers in a common purpose, whereas a sacramentum was an oath sworn by levied soldiers to an imperium-holder. 
On the distinction between coniuratio as oath and coniuratio as conspiracy, see Pagán (2004) 10-14. 
 172 
“misbehaved, disloyal, and stained with the blood of their generals” (turbidos infidos sanguine 
ducum pollutos, 4.56.1)—a fairly accurate and concise summary of their role in book 4 thus far, 
so long as we understand infidos Vespasiano.397 Others think it would be better to “entice” 
(adlicendos, 4.56.1) the milites into the Gallic ranks while simultaneously killing their unloved 
commanders. The legions’ mutinous history suggests that such a measure may well succeed, and 
so the strategy of enticement carries. It is as if the Gallic rebels, weighing Tacitus’ book 4 
account of these legions’ unstable loyalty (fides), saw that their sacramentum to Vespasian 
would be easy to break. Significantly, when introducing the topic of debate, the Gauls refer to 
the legions not as “Flavian” or “Vespasianic” but as “the remnants of the Vitellian army” (de 
reliqui<i>s Vitelliani exercitus, 4.56.1). The Gauls, ironically, have more insight into the true 
allegiances of Vocula’s army than does Vocula, who earlier (apparently) accepted their abrupt 
and unexplained re-swearing of loyalty as sincere (4.37.2). 
 Despite his ignorance, Vocula alone stands between the Gauls and his discontented 
legions. He understands, moreover, that his own legions’ “inconsistency and disloyalty” 
(infrequentibus infidisque, 4.56.2) preclude confronting the rebels directly and with force. Thus, 
he decides to launch a campaign of intrigue of his own (4.56.2-57.2). But, as Vocula quickly 
finds out, no amount of intrigue or persuasion can sway the Gauls to cease their perfidia (4.57.3). 
When Vocula retreats in failure to Novaesium, the Gallic rebels, whose position is even more 
secure after having made a “firm agreement” (pacta firmavere, 4.57.1) with the Germans,398 set 
up their own camp two miles from the Roman one (4.57.3). Yet the spatial difference between 
                                                      
397 Though plural, the primarily referent of ducum is certainly Hordeonius Flaccus, who was murdered in a mutiny 
(4.36.2); see Heubner (1976) 132. turbidos and infidos certainly describe their behavior otherwise at 4.36-37. 
398 Similar language reappears later when Civilis negotiates a treaty with Colonia Agrippinensium: arbitrium 
habebimus Civilem et Veledam, apud quos pacta sancientur (“Civilis and Veleda will be the arbiters of our 
proposals, and they shall negotiate and witness the agreement,” 4.65.3); cf. per nuntios pacta perfidiae firmaret 
(“[Caecina] secured his pact of treachery through emissaries,” 3.9.2). 
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the two camps proves ineffective in preventing defection—not only from the Roman camp, but 
from Roman identity itself: 
illuc commeantium centurionum militumque emebantur animi, ut (flagitium 
incognitum) Romanus exercitus in externa verba iurarent pignusque tanti sceleris 
nece aut vinculis legatorum daretur. (4.57.3) 
 
The minds and hearts of the centurions and soldiers who went over there were 
bought, with the result that the Roman army—an unheard-of outrage!—swore a 
foreign oath of allegiance and that, as a pledge of such a wicked act, the legates 
would be killed or handed over in chains. 
 
The Gallic strategy of enticement works. In four books full of broken oaths, mutinies, and 
general civil strife, a Roman army who would willingly swear an oath of allegiance to a non-
Roman power is a new level of obscenity. The narrator’s parenthetical comment—flagitium 
incognitum—forcefully endorses this sad fact.399 emebantur is a loaded term, for it appears 
throughout the Histories in reference to monetary bribes which compromise one’s integrity and 
proper (sense of) loyalty: Galba, in an attempt to explain why he would not be paying a donative, 
proudly proclaimed that “his soldiers would be selected, not bought” (legi a se militem, non emi, 
1.5.2).400 Later, Otho is said to have bought (emptum) property, which he in turn gifted to a 
member of Galba’s bodyguard as a bid to break his loyalty to the emperor (1.24.2).401 Valens 
was believed by his soldiers to have been improperly “bought off” (emptum) by the Gallic cities 
which escaped destruction at his hands (1.66.2). Vitellius’ did not attend Nero’s music recitals 
out of compulsion, as the best men did, but because he was “bought by, and delivered up as the 
possession of Nero’s extravagant appetites” (luxu et saginae mancipatus emptusque, 2.71.1). 
Here, in the case of the defection of Vocula’s legions, emo not only signifies that the legions 
                                                      
399 incognitus (“unknown”) is sometimes equated to nefarius, dirus, perversus (TLL vii/963.83-88); cf. Stat. Theb. 
11.125 and Tac. A. 11.26.1. 
400 See Suet. G. 16.1 for the phrasing; see Plut. G. 18.2 and Cass. Dio 64.3.3 for the sentiment. 
401 For a similar usage of emo in Otho’s scheming, cf. 1.46.3. 
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accepted illicit bribes in their defection, but, given the immediate vicinity of the words in externa 
verba iurarent, suggests that they have accepted what they refused to accept from Vocula and 
Vespasian (4.37): donatives in exchange for oaths. The defectors’ new loyalty to the Gallic 
rebels rests on firmer ground than it ever did with the Flavians. 
 
VOCULA’S LAST STAND 
 
 
Tacitus channels his evident outrage at the legions’ unprecedented betrayal of Roman identity 
through Vocula, who, in a long speech addressed to an assembly of all the soldiers (vocata 
contione, 4.57.3), warns that the very fabric of Roman order threatens to be subverted. For 
Vocula—and for Tacitus as well—the proper and effective functioning of the sacramentum 
process represents the health of Roman military society. This speech, which seeks to dissuade 
what would be the most egregious violation of the sacramentum to this point in the Histories, is a 
critical and dramatic moment in the longstanding conflict between loyalty and disloyalty, 
between mutiny and obedience, and between the common soldiers’ desire for monetary 
compensation and the ruling classes’ desire to formalize their dominant position with oaths. Yet, 
it is also the case, as we shall see, that Vocula’s ethical blind-spots preclude identifying him as a 
simple mouthpiece for authorial frustration. In order to discuss this speech in the detail it 
deserves, I reproduce it here in full:402 
“numquam apud vos verba feci aut pro vobis sollicitior aut pro me securior. nam 
mihi exitium parari libens audio mortemque in tot malis [hostium] ut finem 
miseriarum exspecto: vestri me pudet miseretque, adversus quos non proelium et 
acies parantur; id enim fas armorum et ius hostium est: bellum cum populo Romano 
vestris se manibus gesturum Classicus sperat imperiumque et sacramentum 
Galliarum ostentat. [2] adeo nos, si fortuna in praesens virtusque deseruit, etiam 
vetera exempla deficiunt, quotiens Romanae legiones perire praeoptaverint, ne 
loco pellerentur? socii saepe nostri exscindi urbes suas seque cum coniugibus ac 
liberis cremari pertulerunt, neque aliud pretium exitus quam fides famamque. [3] 
                                                      
402 On Vocula’s speech, see Haynes (2003) 159-61. 
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tolerant cum maxime inopiam obsidiumque apud Vetera legiones nec terrore aut 
promissis demoventur: nobis super arma et viros et egregia castrorum munimenta 
frumentum et commeatus quamvis longo bello pares. pecunia nuper etiam donativo 
suffecit, quod sive a Vespasiano sive a Vitellio datum interpretari mavoltis, ab 
imperatore certe Romano accepitstis. [4] tot bellorum victores, apud Geldubam, 
apud Vetera, fuso totiens hoste si pavetis aciem, indignum id quidem, sed est vallum 
murique et trahendi artes, donec e proximis provinciis auxilia exercitusque 
concurrant. Sane ego displiceam: sunt alii legati, tribuni, centurio denique aut 
miles. [5] ne hoc prodigium toto terrarum orbe volgetur, vobis satellitibus Civilem 
et Classicum Italiam invasuros. an, si ad moenia urbis Germani Gallique duxerint, 
arma patriae inferetis? horret animus tanti flagitii imagine. Tutorine Treviro 
agentur excubiae? Signum belli Batavus dabit? et Germanorum catervas 
supplebitis? quis deinde sceleris exitus, cum Romanae legiones contra derexerint? 
Transfugae e transfugis et proditores e proditoribus inter recens et vetus 
sacramentum invisi deis errabitis? [6] te, Iuppiter optime maxime, quem per 
octigentos viginti annos tot triumphis coluimus, te, Quirine, Romanae parens urbis, 
precor venerorque ut, si vobis non fuit cordi me duce haec castra incorrupta et 
intemerata servari, at certe pollui foedarique a Tutore et Classico ne sinatis, 
militibus Romanis aut innocentiam detis aut maturam et sine noxa paenitentiam.” 
(4.58.1-6) 
 
“Never have I spoken to you feeling more nervous for you or more sure of myself. 
For I am glad to hear that you are plotting to kill me; amid such evils, I long for 
death as an end to my miseries: I am ashamed of you and feel sorry for you—you 
who face no military engagement or line of battle. That is to say, the fas armorum 
and the ius hostium. Classicus hopes that he can wage a war against the Roman 
people by means of your hands, and presents you with the imperium and 
sacramentum of the Gauls. [2] Even if luck and courage have deserted us for the 
moment, have the examples of antiquity so fallen away from us that we have 
forgotten how many Roman legions have chosen to die rather than be made to 
abandon their post? Even allies of ours403 have often endured the destruction of 
their cities and their own incineration alongside their wives and children, nor was 
there any reward for their death other than fides and fama. [3] The legions at Vetera 
are enduring the greatest scarcity of resources possible, and are not being swayed 
by fear or promises. In addition to arms, men, and outstanding camp-defenses, we 
have enough provisions for however long the war drags on. Recently, there was 
even enough money for a donative. Whether you prefer to see this donative as 
coming from Vespasian or Vitellius, you certainly got it from a Roman emperor. 
[4] It is quite disgraceful if you—as victors of so many campaigns, after so many 
of the enemy have been brought down at Gelduba, at Vetera—are afraid to fight. 
You have a rampart, and walls, and the ability to drag out the fighting until 
auxiliaries and legions arrive from nearby provinces. You might not like me, but 
                                                      
403 If socii means “allies,” as Wellesley (2009) 221 suggests, then its primary position makes it quite emphatic 
(“even allies of ours,” vel sim.). Which socii might he have in mind? Heubner (1976) 136 suggests the Saguntines, 
who “honored their loyalty as allies unto their own demise” (fidem socialem usque ad perniciem suam coluerunt, 
Liv. 21.7.3). 
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there are other legates, tribunes, and then even centurions and common soldiers (sc. 
ready to take my place). [5] Do not let your monstrous crime become known the 
world over, that Civilis and Classicus were going to invade Italy with you in tow. 
If the Germans and Gauls lead you to the walls of the City, will you bear arms 
against your fatherland? I shudder at the thought of such wickedness. Will the 
Treviran Tutor make you stand guard for him? Will a Batavian give you the signal 
for battle? Will you fill in the German ranks? When the Roman legions draw up 
against you, what end will there be the outcome of your criminality? Deserters of 
deserters and traitors of traitors, will you wander between your new and your 
ancient oath of allegiance, hated by the gods? [6] I call upon you and worship you, 
Jupiter the Best and the Greatest, whom we have honored in triumphs for 820 years, 
and you, Quirinus, the father of the City of Rome, that, if it is not in your heart that 
this camp be preserved uncorrupted and inviolate, you still at least do not allow it 
to be polluted and befouled by Tutor and Classicus. To the soldiers of Rome, grant 
either innocence or a timely repentance to avoid punishment. 
 
In large part, this speech is a discourse on the proper role—as Vocula sees it—of loyalty 
(fides), oaths (sacramenta), and gifts (donativa) in Roman military life. When referring to the 
donative which the legions recently received (4.58.3), Vocula conveniently neglects to mention 
Flaccus’ dishonesty (the mutiny when Hordeonius Flaccus had given them a donative from 
Vitellius’ coffers in Vespasian’s name). Thus, Vocula’s argument—that, when it comes to 
emperors, the office trumps the man—falls flat. For if the office truly mattered more than the 
man, as Vocula implies, why then did Flaccus feel the need to misrepresent the source of the 
money or to give it in anyone’s name at all (4.36.2)? Given the logic and custom of the Roman 
system of sacramenta and donativa, dating back as least as far as the reign of Claudius, the 
legions had every right to expect that their donative would come from the same man to whom 
they had been forced to swear allegiance: Vespasian (4.31.2). It is no wonder, then, that Vocula 
shifts emphasis away from personal loyalties and towards respect for official power above all 
else. We might expand Vocula’s argument as follows: the donative may have come from 
Vitellius’ purse, but since Vespasian is emperor now, you should be content to view the money 
as having ultimately emanated from him, and thus you should honor him and keep your 
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allegiance to him. Vocula attempts to shame his men into accepting his argument, pointing out 
that even Rome’s allies (socii…nostri) have been willing to give their lives when the only 
“reward” (pretium) was “loyalty and glory” (fides famamque, 4.58.2), thereby implying that his 
legions place too much value on material rewards in the first place. By downplaying his own 
survival (nam mihi exitium parari libens audio mortemque in tot malis [hostium] ut finem 
miseriarum exspecto, 4.58.1), Vocula participates in the common Roman motif of subordinating 
oneself to the national interest: “You might not like me,” he concedes, “but there are other 
legates, tribunes, and then even centurions and common soldiers ready to take my place” 
(4.58.4).404 But ultimately, all of Vocula’s melodramatic hand-wringing does not change the fact 
that, in the eyes of the soldiers, Vespasian never compensated them properly for their loyalty.405 
The central purpose of Vocula’s speech is not to defend how the donative was 
dispensed—important as the matter is to the soldiers themselves—but rather to prevent his army 
from defecting to the foreign enemy. In order to accomplish this, Vocula’s strategy is essentially 
twofold: first, to point out the horror and degradation which awaits those who accept non-
Romans as masters; and second, to suggest that defection would be accompanied by a loss in the 
status and value of the defectors. These two arguments are not distinguished from one another by 
the speaker in form or content, and I will discuss them together. First, Vocula asserts that, by 
accepting a Gallic sacramentum, the legions would in effect become the tools of a war waged 
against the Roman people (4.58.1). Then, near the middle of the speech, he equates defection to 
the enemy with fear of the enemy—“a disgraceful thing indeed” (4.58.4). Yet it is in the final 
section of the speech that Vocula makes his grandest and most dramatic arguments. In the last 
                                                      
404 On interpreting Vocula’s self-sacrificial rhetoric through the lens of the Roman idea of devotio, see Aubrion 
(1985) 632, Keitel (1993), Edwards (2012) 255-56. 
405 Cf. Master (2016) 154-55, who attributes Vocula’s failure to convince his men to stay loyal to his “limited” 
understanding of the “evolving identity of the Romans and their subjects.” 
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several months, Vitellius’ and Vespasian’s Roman armies had already invaded Rome—an 
undeniable fact on which Vocula needs offer no comment. But the notion of Roman soldiers 
invading Italy as inferior subjects (satellitibus) to a foreign force—fighting for a German and 
Gallic rather than a Roman agenda—would indeed be a “monstrous crime” (prodigium, 4.58.5). 
No such war (bellum) could ever be classified as foreign (externum). 
 As the speech swells to a finish, Vocula turns to the divine and cosmic consequences 
which await defectors and oath-breakers (4.58.5-6). The imagery of wandering somewhere 
between two conditions of allegiance—i.e., “between your new and your ancient oath of 
allegiance” (inter recens et vetus sacramentum, 4.58.5)—suggests that, should the soldiers go 
through with their defection, the very idea of loyalty and oaths will become alien to them. Such 
rhetoric recalls the beginning of the first book and the crisis of Galba’s emperorship (1.5.1, 12.1), 
where Tacitus had slyly suggested that it was not merely oaths which were being broken but that 
the institution itself lost its traditional credibility (reverentia). invisi deis errabitis is significant, 
since it marks the first time in the Histories when Tacitus explicitly highlights the divine 
component of the sacramentum evidenced in our surviving Julio-Claudian inscription.406 This 
rhetoric is consistent with Tacitus’ tendency in the Histories to invoke the (absence of the) gods 
in moments of high narrative drama and existential crisis.407  
                                                      
406 See Ch. 1, pp. 12-13. Stäcker (2003) 302 cites transfugae e transfugis et proditores e proditoribus inter recens et 
vetus sacramentum invisi deis errabitis? (4.58.5) in his discussion of the religious significance of the sacramentum 
in the Imperial period: “Desertion und damit der Bruch des sacramentum ein nefas bedeutete, also ein frevelhaftes 
Vergehen gegen die Götter.” He cites in evidence a passage from Seneca: primum militiae vinculum est religio et 
signorum amor et deserendi nefas, tunc deinde facile cetera exiguntur mandanturque iusiurandum adactis (“the 
military’s primary bond is religion and the love of the standards and the unspeakable evil of desertion, then the rest 
is easily required and demanded of those who have been administered the oath,” Ep. 95.35). 
407 The most notable example is when Tacitus relates that Jupiter has left his seat during the destruction of the 
Capitolium (3.72). For recent commentary on the role of the gods in the Histories, see Davies (2004) 193-211, 
Griffin (2009), esp. 169-70. 
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 The connection between the sacramentum and the favor of the divinity becomes even 
more overt as the speech comes to an end. And the forecast is bleak. Though Vocula directly 
beseeches the gods to prevent the total moral and spiritual debasement of Rome’s forces (4.58.6), 
he also recognizes that the gods never intended to prevent fractious infighting entirely (si vobis 
non fuit cordi…, 4.58.6)408—a grim acknowledgement that the situation is already unavoidably 
dire. Furthermore, though Vocula warns his army that an alliance with the Gallic rebel leaders 
would “pollute and befoul” (4.58.6) them, Tacitus suggests that they have already polluted 
themselves through constant disobedience and violence against their own commanders (sanguine 
ducum pollutos), a fact which the Gauls recognized as sufficient reason to put them to death 
(4.56.1). These two passages (4.56.1, 58.6) reveal that Roman soldiers can incur pollution either 
from betraying their commanders through mutiny and violence (4.56.1) or from following a man 
undeserving of loyalty (4.58.6). In the end, Vocula’s army will incur both types. 
As Vocula casts defection in terms of oath-breaking at the beginning of the speech 
(Classicus … imperiumque et sacramentum Galliarum ostentat, 4.58.1), we may safely posit a 
connection between bad/broken oaths and pollution. We will recall that, in his programmatic 
listing of “coming attractions” in book 1, Tacitus includes the phrase pollutae caerimoniae 
(1.2.2). Since Tacitus pairs the phrase with magna adulteria, it is has been assumed that pollutae 
caerimoniae refers to the adultery and execution of Vestal Virgins under Domitian.409 As likely 
as the reference may be, we need not restrict such a vague and programmatic phrase to one 
particular type of event. There is no reason to doubt that the sacramentum would have been 
among the many Roman religious and civic activities which one might categorize as caerimoniae 
                                                      
408 A common phrase for beseeching the gods: cf., e.g., Cat. Orig. 12 and Liv. 9.8.8-9, with Heubner (1976) 139. 
409 See Chilver (1979) 43 on 1.1.2: “In 83 three Vestals were found guilty of adultery and were allowed to choose 
the manner of their deaths, their lovers being relegated; in 90 the Chief Vestal, for the same reason, was buried alive, 
her lover being beaten to death.” 
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(OLD s.v. 3). Beyond 1.2.2, polluo occurs infrequently in the Histories; and, when it does, it is 
never in reference to anything one might reasonably describe as a caerimonia.410 Thus, it is 
plausible that pollutae caerimoniae (1.2.2) specifically forecasts the failings of Vocula’s army 
with respect to loyalty and oaths. In addition, the speech as a whole is an undeniably important 
moment in the work-long sacramentum motif. Vocula’s ability to appeal to his legions’ sense of 
duty, honor, tradition, and loyalty—as he seeks to define them—is the only thing that might 
prevent the ultimate degradation of one of Rome’s most ancient and sacralized military rituals. 
In the end, however, Vocula’s speech does not work. The legions defect en masse. 
Vocula contemplates killing himself, but is convinced not to do so by his freedmen. He dies 
anyway when Classicus sends a man to kill him (4.59.1). 
It is Classicus who, upon a dramatic and strange entrance into the Roman camp, makes 
the late Vocula’s worst fear a reality: 
dein sumptis Romani imperii insignibus in castra venit. nec illi, quamquam ad omne 
facinus durato, verba ultra suppeditavere, quam ut sacramentum recitaret: 
iuravere qui aderant pro imperio Galliarum. interfectorem Voculae altis ordinibus, 
ceteros, ut quisque flagitium navaverat, praemiis attollit. (4.59.2) 
 
Thereupon he entered the camp dressed in the garb of a Roman general. Though 
hardened to every type of crime, he could manage no words, except to recite the 
sacramentum. Those present swore to the empire of Gaul. He promoted Vocula’s 
assassin with high honors, everyone else with rewards commensurate with their 
crimes. 
 
Classicus’ inability to articulate anything other than the words of a successfully-administered 
oath stands in contrast to Vocula’s long-winded failure to prevent that oath from ever taking 
place. In Classicus’ terseness, Tacitus alludes to tales of Rome’s past in which Roman generals 
                                                      
410 In addition to 1.2.2, 4.56.1, and 4.58.6, polluo appears five times in the Histories: 2.37.2 (referring to the personal 
foibles of emperors), 2.56.1 (referring to pollution incurred by rape and violence), 2.62.2 (referring to the pollution 
equestrians incur by performing in the gladiatorial arena), 2.76.2 (referring to the pollution Rome has suffered under 
Vitellius), and 3.41.1 (referring to the belief that Valens had polluted himself with his sexual misconduct).  
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were able to restore good faith and discipline among a mutinous army largely as a result of their 
high reputation and charisma. For instance, Caesar is said to have quelled a mutiny in 47 BCE 
simply by addressing his men as Quirites.411 Similarly, according to Polybius, Scipio, before 
acquiring the cognomen Africanus, was able to stop a mutiny through sheer force of reputation: 
“since in everything the example of his own life supported his advice, they did not require many 
words from him” (παράδειγμα γὰρ ἐν πᾶσι τὸν ἴδιον βίον εἰσφερόμενος οὐ πολλῶν ἐποίει 
προσδεῖσθαι λόγων τοὺς ἀκούοντας, Plb. 11.10.5).412 The fact that Classicus impersonates a 
Roman imperium-holder (sumptis Romani imperii insignibus, 4.59.2) makes the nod to such 
great figures more likely—and more ironic.413 As a foreigner with a history in the auxiliaries, 
Classicus is not a known quantity to the legionaries; thus, he cannot, like Scipio or Caesar, 
merely rest on reputation. Yet Classicus’ obvious inability to fill the same role as a Caesar or a 
Scipio does nothing to detract from the legions’ willingness to entrust themselves to him—a 
Gallic traitor—at the drop of a hat, simply because he looks the part. Such blind eagerness makes 
the legions appear foolish in their treason.  
                                                      
411 Suet. Caes. 70, Plut. Caes. 51, Cass. Dio 42.52-53, and App. BC 2.92-93 all record versions of this story. Lucan 
transposes Quirites to the mutiny at Placentia two years earlier in 49 BCE (5.358). Fantham (1985) 120 and 126, 
who argues that the book 5 mutiny episode “serve[s] [Lucan’s] portrayal of Caesar as the embodiment of 
scelus,” believes that Lucan transposed the Quirites “because he did not intend to treat the second mutiny [in 47 
BCE].” Chrissanthos (1999) 126-36 argues convincingly that, in reality, Caesar’s legions were well aware of the 
leverage they possessed and did have many of their demands met. 
412 Cf. Marincola (1997) 131: “We can see the importance of character in persuasion by a glance at some of the 
remarks made by the historians themselves which are not methodological or self-conscious, and thus reflect the 
preconceptions inherent in Greek and Roman society.” Marincola also cites two examples from Livy where the 
opposite is true, the Roman people not listening to someone because the speaker is held in low esteem.   
413 There has been some dispute what Romani imperii insignibus precisely means. Walser (1951) argues, he was 
seen not as a Gallic imperator but as a Roman princeps. Chilver (1985) 69 is less certain: “[insignibus presumably 
denotes] the purple cloak, lictors, and fasces. Yet an ordinary provincial legatus had lictors and fasces (A. 2.69.2, 
77.1), and Classicus may simply have appeared in the guise of an ordinary military commander. … In any case, we 
can infer little of the nature of the revolt.” There is no reason to assume that Classicus positions himself as an 
emperor, as opposed to simply a man of imperium-holding rank (see, e.g., Sal. Cat. 36.1). Linderski (1984) 77 points 
out that, under the Republic, it was prerogative of those with imperium to hold levies and administer the 
sacramentum. 
 182 
Leaving aside the legions’ stupidity for entrusting themselves to an obvious fraud, events 
proceed in a fashion typical of successful oaths in the Histories. iuro (as opposed to adigo) 
indicates that the agency rests with the oath-takers and implies a level of willingness on the part 
of the legions. Yet recitaret (~ praeiret; cf. 2.74.1) clearly shows Classicus in control. 
Immediately following upon the oath, Classicus honors custom by doling out various rewards 
(altis ordinibus…praemiis, 4.59.2). Finally, Tutor capitalizes on Classicus’ success by spreading 
the new oath through Upper Germany (in eadem verba adigit, 4.59.3).414 Thus, Classicus and 
Tutor, just like Mucianus and Civilis before them, demonstrate an ability to create and expand 
loyalties through coordination of oaths and bribes. 
Tacitus, apparently wishing to wallow in the shameful after-effects of the foreign oath, 
describes the defectors’ role in the rebel army. And it is even worse than Vocula feared: far from 
being incorporated into, or even subordinated to the rebel army (4.58.5), the legions are treated 
as disgraced prisoners and set on a forced march nearly a hundred miles due south to Augusta 
Trevirorum (Trier).415 Throughout the Histories, Tacitus occasionally devotes space to exploring 
the diversity of opinions and perspectives among various classes and individuals.416 This forced 
march is one such occasion. Though varied, Tacitus’ assessment of the Roman legions—as 
opposed to the foreign-born cohorts—is quite damning as a whole.417 Many (though not all) of 
the legionaries are ashamed (rubore) of their reduced status; these Tacitus calls the melior pars 
(4.62.1). Many others, however, are dominated by cowardice (ignavissimus), fear (paventes), 
lack of honor (nulla dedecoris cura), greed (pecuniam), and self-interest (carissima sibimet, 
                                                      
414 Specifically Colonia Agrippinensis and Mogontiacum. 
415 There appears to be an inconsistency in the identity of who precisely was marched from Novaesium to Augusta 
Trevirorum. In the section which narrates the march, Tacitus singles out the sixteenth legion and its auxiliary units 
(4.62.1), but then later refers to “legions” (plural).  
416 See Ash (1999), esp. 21-22. 
417 It has long been recognized that Livy’s account of the surrender at the Caudine Forks furnishes Tacitus with his 
literary model; see Andresen (1916) 402, Syme (1958) 685-86, Keitel (1992b) 327-37, Ash (1998). 
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4.62.1). Among the imprisoned units, only the Picentian cavalry regiment, an auxiliary unit, 
resists their captors in any way, hurling weapons at Vocula’s murderer when they meet him on 
the march.418 This act of defiance, Tacitus remarks, “was the beginning of the expiation of their 
guilt moving forward” (initium exsolvendae in posterum culpae, 4.62.4). The legions, 
conversely, do nothing to resist imprisonment or restore their reputation (nihil mutato itinere, 
4.62.4). The Picentian cavalry’s courage makes the legions look all the more cowardly by 
contrast. Thus, Tacitus heaps further doubt on their status as Romans. 
 Also indirectly damaging to Rome’s reputation is the peaceful cooperation achieved 
among the Germans at this time. Though greed has been a powerful force among Civilis and the 
Germans no less than it has been among the Romans, the Germans are able to rise above it. 
Whereas Antonius Primus had allowed—even stoked—his soldiers’ greed and leveraged it into a 
victory over his fellow Romans, Civilis and his rivals among the German tribes negotiate a 
bloodless and mutually-agreed-upon peace (4.66.1).419 
 
THE END OF THE SIEGE AT VETERA 
 
 
It is also at this time that Tacitus narrates the end of the siege at Vetera (4.56-60), another dark 
episode in the Flavians’ failing struggle to establish a successful post-civil-war identity. 
Julius Classicus endeavors to build upon the sacramentum won from Vocula’s men. To 
that end, he targets for conversion the legionary camp at Vetera, the site of the long-term siege 
                                                      
418 Cf. Ash (1998) 33, who also notes the distinct characterization of each group: “Some of these soldiers deserve 
our sympathy more than others, thus complicating our reaction to the group as a whole. Besides, Tacitus informs us 
that one segment, the ala Picentina, cannot bear the gaudium insultantis volgi ('glee of the insolent populace') and 
abandons the column. Thus it seems likely that we will find compassion for at least some of the soldiers at Histories 
4.62.28” 
419 Wellesley (2009) 303n108: “This civilized vignette [4.63.1-66.1] of the Tenecteri and the people of Colonia 
Agrippinensium resolving their internal differences by speech rather than by resorting to warfare offers a pointed 
contrast to the conduct of the Romans during the recent sequence of civil wars.” 
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which began at 4.21.420 He enlists “all the most corrupt men” (corruptissimum quemque, 4.59.3) 
from among the defectors at Novaesium to offer the men holed up near Vetera a pardon if they 
surrender, and to serve as an example of obedience to Gaul. Classicus’ new strategy works 
remarkably well. The besieged, to their credit, hold out to the brink of starvation (4.60.1); but, 
rather than accept death, “they befouled their remarkable honor with a disgraceful finale, by 
sending envoys to Civilis to beg for their lives” (donec egregiam laudem fine turpi macularent, 
missis ad Civilem legatis vitam orantes. 4.60.1). Civilis then sets as precondition for accepting 
their surrender that they “swear allegiance to the Gauls” (in verba Galliarum iurarent, 4.60.2). 
This demonstrates once again the value Civilis places on the sacramentum. He is trying not 
merely to win a war, but to legitimize Gallo-Germanic rule.  
 
 
We have hitherto examined many points of intratextual contact between the Flavians and the 
German rebels—more precisely, between (1) their respective attitudes towards, and usage of, 
oaths, and (2) their responses to the bloodlust and greed of their armies. Such intratexts, I have 
argued in PART 1 of this chapter, present Civilis as a threatening replay—or, more precisely, 
expansion—of the civil wars of books 1-3. Civilis’ ability, for instance, to use oaths to 
manipulate events and amass political power (4.21) recalls Mucianus’ orchestration of the 
Flavian challenge (2.73-81). Furthermore, the motivations and tactics of the Batavians at Vetera 
evoke the motivations and tactics of Antonius Primus’ Flavians at Cremona. But while Civilis 
collapses distinctions between his own barbarian forces and the Romans that created him, he 
simultaneously reinforces his otherness via unfamiliar oath rituals, barbaric battle tactics, and 
proto-nationalist pan-Germanic rhetoric. As we saw in PART 2 of this chapter, Roman identity is 
                                                      
420 See p. 156-57 above. 
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seriously threatened when the Gauls enter the rebellion (4.54) and entice Roman legionaries to 
swear allegiance to a foreign power (4.59.2, 4.60.2). These treasonous oaths, the disgraceful 
passivity of the imprisoned legionaries (4.62), and the relative civility and harmony of the 
Germans (4.63-66) all combine to mark a low point for Rome’s morale and self-definition in the 
extant Histories. 
By this point in book 4, Tacitus has driven Rome’s stock even lower than it was at the 
eruptions of violence in the City throughout book 3. In the remainder of the present chapter, we 
will examine Tacitus’ apparent decision to inaugurate a new phase of the narrative in which 
Roman rituals and institutions under the Flavians begin a process of rehabilitation.  
 
 
PART 3: Petilius Cerialis 
 
 
As book 4 draws to a close, Tacitus continues to dwell on the motifs and settings that have 
recurred throughout the Histories up until this point: oath-scenes, sieges, greedy soldiers, and 
donatives. While there are certainly gestures toward stability and reconciliation, the abrupt 
breaking-off of the text near the beginning of book 5 renders impossible any verdict on how 
Tacitus ultimately resolves the crisis that began in book 1 when Galba refused to pay a donative 
for the oaths of allegiance he had received. Nevertheless, I will endeavor (a) to consider how the 
motifs of oaths and greed do (and do not) change upon the entrance of Petilius Cerialis into the 
narrative, and (b) to speculate briefly on the future role of oaths in post-war Rome.  
 When Petilius Cerialis arrives in Germany, Roman pride and identity are already 
ascendant. The Sequani, a Gallic tribe who had remained loyal to Rome, had turned back the 
army of the Gallic rebels. This victory, says Tacitus, checks the “war’s momentum” (belli 
impetus, 4.67.2). At this time, infighting, complacency, and self-serving leadership all begin to 
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plague the rebellious Gallic communities (4.69). A major development on the Roman side soon 
follows. When a Treviran contingent, led by Julius Tutor, suffers a humiliating defeat at the 
hands of a loyal Flavian force, led by Civilis’ nephew, Julius Briganticus, the legions at Augusta 
Trevirorum—who once preferred a dead Vitellius to Vespasian, willingly swore allegiance to the 
Gallic rebels, and have since been living as disgraced prisoners of war—“voluntarily take the 
oath of allegiance to Vespasian” (legiones…se ipsae in verba Vespasiani adigunt, 4.70.5). This 
reflexive usage of adigo means that the administrators of the oath are the same as the recipients; 
in other words, the legions have taken the oath in to their own hands.421 Thus, for the first time, 
the formerly-Vitellian northern legions appear willing to accept Vespasian as their commander. 
The old rifts caused by the civil wars of 69, Tacitus suggests, are finally beginning to close.  
Cerialis is the first important agent in the Histories to act on behalf of a Roman state not 
at war with itself. Tacitus refers to him, significantly, not as a Flavian general, but as a “Roman 
general” (Romanum ducem, 4.71.5). In a confident display of chauvinism, Cerialis dismisses 
loyal Gallic auxiliaries from his army, boasting that the “legions were enough for imperial rule: 
let the allies return to their peacetime duties, confident in the fact that a war, once Rome get a 
hold of it, was as good as over” (sufficere imperio legiones: socii ad munia pacis redirent secure 
velut confecto bello, quod Romanae manus excepissent, 4.71.2).422 With this lean, ultra-Roman 
force, Cerialis soundly defeats the Treviri in a pitched battle at Rigodulum (4.71).423 Though a 
great victory for Cerialis and for Rome, Tacitus is less concerned with the battle itself than with 
complex shifting of values which follows. The next day, he enters neighboring Augusta 
                                                      
421 The reflexive of adigo also occurs in an oath context when Civilis “compelled neither himself nor any of the 
Batavians to swear an oath to the Gauls, relying instead on German resources…” (neque se neque quemquam 
Batavum in verba Galliarum adegit, fisus Germanorum opibus…, 4.61.1). Cf. also Germanicus…seque et proximos 
et Belgarum civitatis in verba eius adigit (“Germanicus administered the oath to himself, to those nearby, and to the 
cities of the Belgae,” A. 1.34.1), with Goodyear (1972) 254. 
422 Translation adapted from Wellesley (2009) 231; italics added for emphasis. 
423 For a discussion of this battle, see Wightman (1970) 45-46. 
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Trevirorum (4.72.1),424 where two acts of healing ensue—one on matters of greed, the other on 
matters of oaths. These episodes are discussed in the two following sections, respectively. 
 
A REPLAYING OF CREMONA AVERTED 
 
 
Though the Treviran army is broken, that tribe’s capital, Augusta Trevirorum (Trier), stands in 
Cerialis’ path. As they enter the city, Cerialis’ legions are aware of the violent precedent set at 
Cremona (3.26-31), and some express willingness to repeat it. In fact, their argument in favor of 
Trier’s destruction rests (ironically) on the relative injustice of Cremona’s destruction: 
hanc esse Classici, hanc Tutoris patriam; horum scelere clausas caesasque 
legiones. quid tantum Cremona meruisse? quam e gremio Italiae raptam, quia 
unius noctis moram victoribus attulerit. stare in confinio Germaniae integram 
sedem spoliis exercituum et <du>cum caedibus ovantem. redigeretur praeda in 
fiscum: ipsis sufficere ignes et rebellis coloniae ruinas, quibus tot castrorum 
excidia pensarentur. (4.72.1) 
 
This is the homeland of Classicus and Tutor; their crimes are responsible for the 
encirclement and murder of the legions. What similar crime did Cremona commit 
to deserve its destruction? It was snatched from Italy’s bosom because it delayed 
the victors for one night. On Germany’s border stands Trier, an untouched abode 
which exults in the spoils of our armies and the slaughter of our generals. Let its 
plunder go to the public coffers! The conflagration and ruination of this rebellious 
colony is sufficient recompense for the destruction of so many Roman camps. 
 
Vengeance and bloodlust motivate these soldiers just as strongly as it had motivated many 
armies during the civil wars of 69 CE. But the willingness to forgo their cut of the booty does 
mark a significant shift from the acquisitiveness, to one degree or another, of nearly all the 
Roman armies encountered in the Histories thus far. Specifically, such self-corrective rhetoric 
speaks to the legions’ readiness to turn away from the calculus of the Vitellio-Flavian war, 
wherein it was held in Primus’ ranks that “the booty of a sacked city belonged to the common 
                                                      
424 Chilver (1985) 77: Rigodulum has been “convincingly identified with Riol, on the right bank of the Mosel about 
eight miles downstream from Trier.” 
 188 
soldiers” (3.19.2). The reemergence of the loaded verb penso (pensarentur; cf. aviditate praedae 
pensabantur, 3.26.3) at the end of the above passage drives home the allusion to, and departure 
from that earlier mindset. When Cerialis, as if sensing the softening of the soldiers, “restrain[s] 
their anger” (pressit iras, 4.72.2) lest “he be believed to have imbued [them] with license and 
savagery” (licentia saevitiaque imbuere militem crederetur, 4.72.2) as Primus had done (3.15.2), 
they obey. Tacitus then confirms that the soldiers are indeed changing their attitude in response 
to the shifting parameters of warfare: posito civium bello ad externa modestiores (“they were 
more moderate toward external adversaries now that their war against internal enemies had been 
set aside,” 4.72.2). This comment marks, in unceremonious fashion, the first time in the Histories 
when Tacitus indicates that civil war (bellum civile) may finally be ending. For, after Vitellius 
had been put to death at the end of book 3, thus officially ending the Vitellian regime, Tacitus 
was frank that civil war had not ceased in actual fact: interfecto Vitellio bellum magis desierat 
quam pax coeperat. armati per urbem victores implacabili odio victos consectabantur (“after 
Vitellius had been killed, war subsided more than peace began, armed victors [i.e., Flavians] 
pursued the vanquished throughout the city out of unappeasable anger,” 4.1). 
 Now that a true bellum externum is dawning at last, Cerialis seeks to reassert some 
traditional Roman views of the non-Roman Other. In his subsequent speech before an assembly 
of the defeated Treviri, Cerialis attempts to shift the well-earned reputation for greed away from 
the Romans and onto his and his audience’s mutual enemy, the Germans. Earlier Romans, 
Cerialis pitches, first entered Gaul “not because they were greedy” (nulla cupidine), but because 
the Gauls themselves invited them (4.73.2).425 In this spirit of reconciliation with Rome’s Gallic 
partners, Cerialis resorts to the reservoir of marauding barbarian stereotypes:  
                                                      
425 Master (2016) 55 points out that Cerialis’ claim of nulla cupidine is undercut later in the same speech, when “he 
concludes by acknowledging the value of Gaul’s natural resources” (4.74.3). Cf. Adler (2011) 129. 
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an vos cariores Civili Batavisque et Transrhenanis gentibus creditis, quam 
maioribus eorum patres avique vestri fuerint? eadem semper causa Germanis 
transcendendi in Gallias, libido atque avaritia et mutandae sedis amor, ut relictis 
paludibus et solitudinibus suis fecundissimum hoc solum vosque ipsos possiderent. 
(4.73.3) 
 
Do you believe that you are dearer to Civilis and the Batavians and the men across 
the Rhine than your parents and grandparents were to their ancestors? The Germans 
always invade Gaul for the same reason: lust and greed and a passion for migration, 
that they should leave their swamps and wildernesses to take possession of this 
ground and of you!  
 
The hypocrisy is palpable. It is true, as we have seen in this chapter, that Civilis and his allies 
were, and continue to be, motivated by avaritia.426 But so were the Romans until quite recently. 
Moreover, the recent civility and diplomacy of the German rebels (4.63-66) puts the lie to such 
blanket generalizations about Germanic acquisitiveness and barbarity. But Cerialis is not 
appealing to history or, for that matter, to observable fact; he is appealing to Romans’ long-held 
beliefs about their own superiority. Cerialis is merely doing what Romans have often done 
throughout their history: defined themselves in terms antithetical to the barbarian Other.427  
 
FATUM AND THE WHITEWASHING OF HISTORY 
 
 
Before the battle at Rigodulum, Cerealis had sent word to the land of the Mediomatrici—where 
the late Vocula’s army had taken refuge from the Treviri during the skirmishing between Julius 
Tutor and Julius Briganticus (4.70.5)428—that the traitors, who had “sworn an oath of allegiance 
to Gallic rule” (iuravere qui aderant pro imperio Galliarum, 4.59.2), were to join his army. So it 
was that, after the more time-sensitive matter of Trier’s survival had resolved,  
                                                      
426 For German rebels’ love of plunder even after the speech, cf. 4.76, 78.1; 5.17.  
427 For a recent discussion of the views found in Tacitus’ writings of various barbarian groups, including Germans, 
see Mellor (2011) 42-62, esp. 51-53. On Germany’s role in Tacitus as a repository for vanishing Roman values, see 
O’Gorman (1993), esp. 114-15. On (proto-)racist Roman attitudes towards Germans, see Isaac (2004) 427-39. 
428 Divodurum (Metz), the capital of the Mediomatrici, was also the sight of mass slaughter on Valens’ march south 
(1.63), before he tamped down the violence (1.64-66). 
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convertit inde animos e Mediomatricis legionum miserabilis adspectus. [3] stabant 
conscientia flagitii maestae, fixis in terram oculis: nulla inter coeuntes exercitus 
consalutatio, neque solantibus hortantibusve responsa dabant, abditi per tentoria 
et lucem ipsam vitantes. nec proinde periculum aut metus quam pudor ac deducus 
obstupefecerat, attonitis etiam victoribus. qui vocem precesque adhibere non ausi 
lacrimis ac silentio veniam poscebant, donec Cerialis mulceret animos, fato acta 
dictitans, quae militum ducumque discordia vel fraude hostium evenissent. [4] 
primum illum stipendiorum et sacramenti diem haberent: priorum facinorum neque 
imperatorem neque se meminisse. tunc recepti in eadem castra, et edictum per 
manipulos, ne quis in certamine iurgiove seditionem aut cladem commilitioni 
obiectaret. (4.72.2-4) 
 
Cerialis then turned his attention to the pitiful appearance of the legions arrived 
from the land of the Mediomatrici. [3] They were standing, eyes fixed on the 
ground, in sorrowful awareness of their disgrace. The converging armies [i.e., 
Cerialis’ victorious force and Vocula’s traitors] did not greet one another. [Vocula’s 
old army] hid in their tents, avoiding the very light of day, unresponsive to either 
consolation or exhortation. It was not so much danger and fear as shame and 
dishonor which had left them dumbstruck. Even the victors were astonished. 
[Vocula’s old army], not daring to put voice to their entreaties, begged pardon with 
their silent tears, until Cerialis put their minds at ease by repeatedly insisting that 
events—which had transpired because of the discord between soldiers and 
commanders or the deception of the enemy—were the result of fate. [4] He told 
them to consider today the first day of their term of service and oath of allegiance; 
that neither he nor they ought to dwell on past crimes. Then [Cerialis’ and Vocula’s 
legions] were admitted into the same camp, and an edict went out to all the 
companies prohibiting anyone, either out of rivalry or because of a quarrel, from 
accusing their fellow soldier of mischief or mutiny. 
 
In an effort to move past recent discord and to create a new, unified loyalty to the sole emperor 
Vespasian, Cerialis is attempting to rewrite history. There is tension between the stated 
(dictitans) reason for recent events (acta)—“the result of fate” (fato)—and the reasons supplied 
in the dependent clause: “[drama] which had transpired because of the discord between soldiers 
and commanders or the deception of the enemy” (quae militum ducumque discordia vel fraude 
hostium evenissent). While Cerialis tells his army what it needs to hear, he simultaneous reminds 
his internal and external audience of the truth. The subjunctive evenissent reflects the fact that 
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the verb appears in a relative clause embedded in a subordinate clause;429 the mood does not, in 
other words, necessarily indicate that the narrator is distancing himself from the statement’s 
veracity.  
As we saw in PART 2, Tacitus expends considerable space to showing precisely how 
“the discord between soldiers and commanders or the deception of the enemy” precipitated the 
downfall of Vocula’s legions. But Cerialis insists on the much simpler and more comforting 
explanation of “fate.” As Jason Davies has demonstrated, Tacitus often invokes fatum but does 
so primarily to explain and comment up the broad sweeps and cycles of history at Rome.430 It is 
human frailty, rather, which deserves much of the blame for Rome’s long record of civil strife.431 
The historian even betrays outright contempt for those who would resort to fatum in order to 
explain misfortune on a smaller, more anecdotal scale. For instance, right after the despised 
Hordeonius Flaccus had surrendered his command to Vocula (4.25.4), the legions suffered a 
drought and food shortage, which “the ignorant” (imperitos) among them considered an omen 
(prodigii loco, 4.26.2). Tacitus, however, expresses a more studied view: “what in peacetime was 
called ‘happenstance’ or ‘nature’, was then called ‘fate’ and ‘the god’s wrath’” (quod in pace 
fors seu natura, tunc fatum et ira dei vocabatur, 4.26.2).432  
                                                      
429 Tacitus and other later writers frequently use the subjective in dum/donec (“until”) clauses when earlier writers 
would have used the indicative; see Allen and Greenough § 556.  
430 Davies (2004) 171-221, esp. 212-13: “Since the fatum of Rome was probably the greatest interpretative category 
that any Roman would be likely to refer to in practice, it is of such a magnitude that it must be treated with 
enormous respect…” For the most part, the only individuals whose lives Tacitus imbues with a sense of fate are the 
emperors (Vespasian especially), but only to a degree. On Vespasian’s destiny, cf. also A.16.5.3 with Bartsch (1994) 
6-7 and 30-31. 
431 Cf. esp. 2.38, with Griffin (2009) 169. 
432 Cf. the ignorant Pannonian soldiers’ faulty interpretation of an eclipse in the Annals: id miles rationis ignarus 
omen praesentium accepit, suis laboribus defectionem sideris adsimulans (“the soldiers, ignorant of the reason, 
interpreted it as an omen of present circumstances, conflating the eclipse of the moon with their own toils,” A. 
1.28.1). Educated Romans had understood the science behind eclipses since the Republic: cf. Lucr. 5.751, Cic. Div. 
2.6.17, Liv. 44.37, with Furneaux (1884) 192. 
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Vocula, who seems to have articulated many of Tacitus’ own views, spoke (mainly) truth 
to discord, but was killed for glibly dismissing the seriousness of recent sacramentum-donativum 
tensions. Cerialis takes another tactic: he downplays the significance of discord itself, and hopes 
that forgetfulness will give way to harmony. In that spirit, he bids the former Vitellians “to 
consider today the first day of their term of service and oath of allegiance” (primum illum 
stipendiorum et sacramenti diem haberent, 4.72.4). The differentiation of sacramentum from 
stipendium implies different shades of meaning. Based on our previous discussion, I submit that, 
whereas stipendium represents resumption of service in a Roman legion in a very literal sense, 
sacramentum in this formulation represents the symbolic renewal of unity, harmony, and loyalty. 
Cerialis is offering a fresh start on a personal and institutional level.  
But are Cerialis’ aspirations for future unity actually achieved by his attempt to force 
reconciliation via a revisionist version of contemporary history? The meager evidence available 
to us suggests not. This is not surprising: Cerialis is not, in Tacitus’ estimation, Rome’s long-
awaited savior.433 Vitellius’ old army continues to be a thorn in Cerialis’ side in the ensuing 
engagement with the main forces of Civilis, Tutor, and Classicus. Cerialis returns to his 
encampment after a victorious engagement against the rebels: 
…palantes captarum apud Novaesium Bonnamque legionum manipulos et rarum 
apud signa militem ac prope circumventas aquilas videt. Incensus ira “non 
Flaccum,” inquit, “non Voculam deseritis: nulla hic proditio; neque aliud 
excusandum habeo, quam quod vos Gallici foederis oblitos redisse in memoriam 
Romani sacramenti temere credidi. …” [78.1] vera erant, et a tribunis 
praefectisque eadem ingerebantur. (4.77.2-78.1) 
 
He saw that the companies of the legions captured at Novaesium and Bonna were 
wandering aimlessly about, while only a few soldiers were gathered around the 
standards and the eagles were practically in the hands of the enemy. Exploding with 
                                                      
433 On the various failings of Cerialis generally, see Keitel (1993) 53, Master (2012) 89. In the final battle recorded 
between Cerialis and Civilis before the text breaks off (5.14-18), Ash (2009) 97 points out that Cerialis “manages to 
win only because of a Batavian deserter, who shows him how to outflank the Germans…hardly allow[ing] much 
room for patriotic fervor.”  
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rage, Cerialis exclaimed: “It is not Hordeonius Flaccus nor Vocula that you are 
deserting. There is no question of treachery here. The only thing that I must 
apologize for is that I rashly believed that you had forgotten your alliance with Gaul 
and remembered your oath to Rome. …” [78.1] His words were true, and the same 
taunts were driven home by the tribunes and prefects. 
 
After being scolded, the men reform their ways and rejoin the ranks (4.78.1). But one must 
wonder how long this reformation will last, considering how easily Cerialis’ brokered unity was 
violated. Unfortunately, the answer to this question lies somewhere in the lost books of the 
Histories. Yet even if we choose to believe that Cerialis’ hope of the renewing effect of a primus 
sacramenti dies is eventually realized among Vocula’s legions, there is plenty reason to believe 
that the future of loyalty and the sacramentum is not very bright.  
 
DOMITIAN AND THE NEW FACE OF FIDES 
 
 
The final chapters of book 4 contain a precious glimpse of the young Domitian, the notorious 
Tacitean villain of the Agricola and no doubt a villainous character in much of the lost portion of 
the Histories. Still a teenager at this point, the future emperor is already exhibiting several early 
signs of his later historiographical persona: jealousy, suspicion, paranoia, and ambition: 
 
unde creditur Domitianus occultis ad Cerialem nuntiis fidem eius temptavisse, an 
praesenti sibi exercitum imperiumque traditurus foret. qua cogitatione bellum 
adversus patrem agitaverit an opes viresque adversus fratrem, in incerto fuit. 
(4.86.1).  
 
From there [Lyons], Domitian is believed to have sent secret messages to Cerialis 
to test his loyalty—that is, whether he, Cerialis, would hand over control of his 
army to him [Domitian] when they met. Upon reflection, it was unclear to Cerialis 
whether Domitian wanted to stir up war again his father or acquire resources and 
strength against his brother.  
 
With this passage, Cerialis’ role in book 4 abruptly shifts from agent of order and enforcer of 
fides to subordinate and object of suspicion. Though the extant text breaks off shortly after this, it 
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is tempting to see in this shift an importation of the plagues of 69 CE—seditiones, crises of fides, 
flimsy and broken sacramenta—into the psyche of the peacetime Flavian court. It is a terrifying 
prospect that Domitian should even be in the position to demand fides. In 70 CE, he does not yet 
have that power, but through this passage Tacitus reminds his readers that he soon will. In spite 
of Domitian’s youth and relatively weak position, Cerialis already feels compelled to tread 
carefully and to avoid potential conflict (elusit). Yet Domitian’s true motives are shrouded in 
mystery, as Tacitus has overlaid the scene with hearsay (creditur), secrecy (occultis), and 
uncertainty (in incerto fuit). The loyalties and disloyalties of the coming phase of Roman 
political and military life, suggests Tacitus, will be even more fickle and difficult to navigate 
than the complexities of the civil wars—where at least the creation, affirmation and straining of 
trust and affection often found dramatic, public outlets in sacramentum acts—broken and re-
forged. In the post-civil-war world, can Domitian secure Cerialis’ loyalty by demanding a public 
oath of allegiance? No, probably not. Can Cerialis publicly forswear Domitian in favor, say, of 
Vespasian or Titus—or someone outside the Flavian family? No, certainly not.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
Much is made (for good reason) about the threat Civilis poses to Roman identity and self-
definition. Tacitus himself scarcely misses an opportunity to remind us. In the “First Phase” of 
the revolt (PART 1), while the Vitellio-Flavian war is still being waged, Civilis proves himself 
more than capable of mirroring successful Flavian tactics of military management—namely, the 
administration of oaths and the admittance of plunder. But that is all Civilis can do—reflect 
Flavian tactics back at the Flavians. Civilis’ similarities to Mucianus and Primus are no doubt 
meant to send chills up the reader’s spine. In real terms, however, his rebel army is made up of 
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non-citizen cohorts and Germans from across the Rhine; no actual legions show any inclination 
to join him. Despite the various crises of identity within the Roman civil wars, Roman identity 
vis-à-vis actual non-Romans by birth and self-identity is, at this point, safe.  
All that begins to change when Cremona is destroyed and the “Second Phase” of the 
revolt is ushered in (PART 2). It is one of the great ironies of the plot of the Histories that 
Roman soldiers’ fundamental loyalty to the Roman enterprise suffers its most dire crisis after the 
death of Vitellius, and therefore technically after the end of bellum civile. It is true that, before 
the defection of Vocula’s legions to the Gallic conspiracy (in externa verba iurarent), the Roman 
world had suffered countless outrages at its own hands. But the perpetrators of those outrages, 
however misguided, always acted in the name of a Roman emperor—or a man trying to become 
one.  
Why betray Rome now? What has changed? As I have argued in this study, Tacitus 
defines the civil wars of 69 as (a) the failure to properly reward soldiers for their pledges of 
loyalty and (b) the struggle to arrive at a new settlement between, on the one hand, the built-up 
financial expectations of the Julio-Claudian era coupled with the plundering impulse of civil 
warriors, and on the other hand, the leader’s need to legitimize authority and maintain stability 
through sacramenta. The Flavians were doing an excellent job maintaining that balance (albeit 
with some extremely questionable morality). But, when Hordeonius Flaccus insulted the 
soldiers’ sense of fairness regarding oaths and donatives, it was like it was 1 January 69 all over 
again. This time, after more than a year of horrific civil war, it is hardly surprising that the 
disaffected legions no longer found using the SPQR as an oath-recipient placeholder appealing 
(cf. 1.55.4). Indeed, in the absence of another Otho or Vitellius to absorb their dissatisfaction, the 
offended legionaries went with the Gauls. Civil war, suggests Tacitus, is the result of deeper 
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conflicts between soldiers and commanders. So, in the absence of a civil war, those conflicts will 
find outlet elsewhere. 
The loss of the rest of the Histories robs us of knowing how well the Flavian dynasty  
managed to incorporate Vitellius’ legions into their own system of legionary control—or, for that 
matter, what that system ultimately looked like in later books. But it seems unlikely that Cerialis’ 
appeals to fate settled things for good. Tacitus certainly lays considerable blame for the lack of 
reconciliation at the feet of the Flavian brass of book 4 (i.e., Flaccus, Vocula, and Cerialis). Yet 
the deeper problem is rooted in unsettled questions of what the Principate is and ought to be: are 
the Flavians now synonymous with Rome, or merely the Capitol’s current occupant? That is, can 
Vocula justly argue that, when it comes to purchasing loyalty with donatives, the imperial status 
of the donor supersedes his individual identity? Vespasian’s northern forces certainly do not 
think so: whereas the Flavian command believes that the rivalries and allegiances of 69 CE can 
and ought to be dissolved, and that Flavian rule now equals Roman rule, Vocula’s legions 
dramatize and embody the lingering strife of civil war 
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Final Conclusions 
 
 
The initial failure of the oath-gift relationship rests on Galba’s shoulders. Not even Tacitus can 
bring himself to condemn the praetorians of January 69 for expecting a donative: to want what 
has been freely offered, no matter how corrupt in motivation or vast in size, is not greed per se—
materialism perhaps, but not greed. For greed entails immoderation, and the purchasing of oaths 
in recent decades was, however unsavory, a mutually agreed-upon transaction. To borrow from 
the language of contemporary political discourse, the civil warrior of early 69 might legitimately 
say: “I didn’t leave the Roman party, the Roman party left me.” In this context, Galba’s 
expectation of receiving a “free” oath was the real immoderation. This schism between an 
emperor’s mindset and his soldiers’ expectations afforded Tacitus the perfect starting point for a 
work (or at least a set of several books) dedicated not only to the transition from one dynasty to 
another, but from one imperial settlement to another.  
Galba’s big mistake transcends the man himself. For the true dilemma of the Histories 
resides in the abstract, on the level of institutional rather than inter-factional conflict: when the 
sacramentum-donativum contract is broken, how is the total dissolution of the principes’ source 
of authority—i.e., the willing participation of the legions, represented by their oaths of loyalty, in 
the making and maintenance of empire—averted? Otho and Vitellius (and their advisers), the 
challengers who initially capitalize on Galba’s mistake, constitute merely the immediate political 
and military fallout. Their emperorships, in other words, are more reactive than proactive. Only 
the carefully planned Flavian challenge makes a concerted attempt to remake Rome’s 
institutions: Vespasian (and Mucianus more so) understand and respect sacramenta as the “right” 
way of doing things. The donativum is just the right size. An element of the acclamation scene is 
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even genuinely spontaneous. But does any of that matter? Vespasian’s geographical isolation 
certainly does him no favors: his exercitus melior has no effect on the actual theater of war.  
That warrior role falls to the raptor largitor Antonius Primus and his greedy legions, 
whose mutually agreed-upon “contract” between violent plunder and narrowly avoided mutiny at 
every turn wins the day. Oaths are conspicuously absent from Primus’ campaign, which makes 
sense: the former are about forging lasting bonds; the latter is improvisational, purely goal-
oriented. It is certainly no coincidence that Caecina’s failure to extend the oath to his legion 
occurs on the eve of the Second Battle of Cremona. Nor is it unclear what Tacitus thinks about 
attempting to rebuild military society without its essential ritual: Tacitus’ alignment of Primus’ 
“scales of war” with Hannibal and the Senones Gauls is disconcerting in the extreme, for it 
situates the incipient dynasty on non-Roman—or rather anti-Roman—foundations.    
The Batavian Revolt (book 4) forces the Flavians to reckon with the nature of their own 
successes, as Civilis and his fellow rebels in turn successfully employ similar oath and plunder 
tactics for their own gain. If the Vitellians often function as foils for the Flavians, then the 
Batavians function, uncomfortably, as their double. Worse still, the rebels often exhibit a 
superior understanding of the Romans’ own customs, such that several Flavian generals have a 
difficult time winning and retaining the loyalty of the former Vitellians. The moral nadir of the 
extant work occurs when Vocula’s legions at Novaesium swear in externa verba. This phrase 
retrojects a degree of normalcy onto the forgoing civil-war oaths: at least all Four Emperors 
identified as Roman. As book 4 draws to a close, it is unclear whether the Flavians will ever 
succeed in convincing Vitellius’ old legions (and the reader) that (a) Vespasian is synonymous 
with the state, and that (b) the problems of 69-70 can simply be chalked up to fate, but the 
forecast looks bleak. 
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When Tacitus decided to frame the year 69 in terms of oaths, he vested each subsequent oath 
with the implicit question: “will this be the one that restores order and respect for Rome’s 
military institutions?” In other words, every oath—especially the broken ones—constitutes a 
recollection, reenactment, and perpetuation of the events 1 January 69. Some oaths seem more 
promising than others in the moment (e.g., Vespasian’s acclamation), but all fall short of 
meaningful, lasting reconciliation. The gloominess of this narrative strategy can hardly be 
overstated. To use a stage metaphor, it is as if Tacitus has his main character (i.e., a functioning 
Roman political system) get stabbed to death in the first scene, and then spends the rest of the 
play occasionally trotting out character after character to grab the hilt and twist the blade. 
 The accidents of manuscript transmission can lead to myopia. We must be vigilant 
against extrapolating the darkness of Histories 1-4 into the rest of work, of which we have little 
idea of the content.434 Yet when it comes to the sort of deeper institutional, rather than political, 
crisis I have argued for in this study, there is certainly no guarantee that Roman reverentia 
sacramenti ever fully healed in Histories 5-12. The mere fact of competent, well-founded 
Vespasianic rule, as Tacitus clearly demonstrates in the surviving books, is not in itself sufficient 
to protect against the destruction of entire cities (i.e., Cremona, Rome). The Flavians’ best 
moments, the initial acclamation in Judaea and subsequent oaths in Syria and throughout the 
East, cannot even be attributed to Vespasian; Mucianus, an ambitious and Machiavellian 
(Sejanan?) man, was the sine qua non of those events. In fact, in Histories 1-4, the health of the 
sacramentum lives and dies with the varying competencies and mentalities of Vespasian’s 
agents—from Mucianus, to Antonius Primus, to Hordeonius Flaccus, to Dillius Vocula, to 
                                                      
434 If Histories 4-5 had been lost to us, who could have predicted them? 
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Petilius Cerialis. Given what we know about Tacitus’ fondness for overly ambitious subordinates 
of emperors, that is a scary thought. 
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